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This thesis examines the rhetoric (persuasive
discourse) of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the exiled
spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet. The analysis of
this thesis provides an historical foundation of
understanding for the international campaign of rhetoric
which the Dalai Lama has been leading for the past forty
years, culminating with his Nobel Peace Prize award in
1989. The thesis provides an overview of the Dalai
Lama's persuasive tactics spanning his time spent
campaigning in exile, from 1959 to the present time
(1995). The Dalai Lama has been a strong leader in the
movement to raise support and international awareness
for Tibetans in Chinese controlled Tibet. Specifically,
this thesis presents an analysis of two of the Dalai
Lama's most well known speeches: the Five Point Peace
Plan, presented to members of the United States Congress
Redacted for Privacyon September 27, 1987, and the Strasbourg Proposal,
 
presented to members of the European Parliament on June
 
15, 1988.
 
The Dalai Lama's discourse is examined from the
 
perspective of rhetorical criticism, using the theories
 
of Kenneth Burke as the framework for understanding the
 
texts.  This analysis incorporates Burke's theories on
 
mortification, scapegoating, victimage, and
 
transcendence, as well as the tragic and comic frames
 
for presenting a vision of dramatic conflict.  The Dalai
 
Lama's rhetoric is also analyzed for its cross cultural
 
implications according to Geert Hofstede's dimensions of
 
cultural variability.  This thesis includes a discussion
 
of the Dalai Lama's role as a social movement leader
 
with a charismatic persona and a strong ability to
 
organize and manage a diverse international following
 
while working to preserve the Tibetan diaspora in exile.
 
Lastly, the ethical groundings of the Dalai Lama's
 
rhetoric are taken into consideration.
 
The purpose of this thesis is to introduce to
 
communication students the significance of the Dalai
 
Lama's body of work, and to indicate potential
 
directions for future research.  The rationale behind
 
the thesis is this:  in rhetorical theory and social
 
movement theory, there exist numerous studies of the
 
nonviolent rhetoric and social movement leadership of
 
both Dr. Martin Luther King of the United States and
 Mahatma Gandhi of India; yet the Dalai Lama, whose work
 
I show to be comparable in many ways to that of King and
 
Gandhi, has remained unexamined by scholars in many
 
disciplines, most notably rhetorical criticism and
 
social movement theory.  The intent of this thesis is to
 
focus upon the Dalai Lama's rhetoric and communication
 
skills in order to stimulate an enduring interest in him
 
as a remarkable orator and leader, from whom we may gain
 
insight into improving our ability to communicate and to
 
manage conflict in a nonviolent manner.
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Preface
 
The idea of researching the Dalai Lama for this
 
thesis sprang from a combination of interests.  From my
 
parent's bookshelves, groaning with the weight of old
 
issues of the National Geographic, I learned about
 
different cultures, customs, social histories, and
 
religions.  Also, from my friends and travels abroad, I
 
gained an appreciation for taking a different
 
perspective, for trying to see things through a new
 
lens.
 
As far as research methodology is concerned, I have
 
always enjoyed literature and literary criticism, so
 
when, in the course of my graduate studies, I became
 
acquainted with rhetorical criticism, it seemed that my
 
passion for language and my natural curiosity and
 
determination in getting to the bottom of things could
 
truly be satisfied.  Therefore, by being able to analyze
 
the language, culture, history, and rhetoric of someone
 
from a very far off place--indeed, the Dalai Lama's
 
country, Tibet, is known as the "roof of the world"- ­
conducting research for this thesis has been an ideal
 
experience.  My biggest frustration has been in
 
discerning what to study and what to set aside for
 
later.  There is so much to learn, and, after having
 
researched the life's work of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama
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of Tibet, and the thesis having been completed, I feel
 
as if I've only just begun.
 
On that note, I would like to say that issues
 
relating to Tibet in general remain touchy subjects.
 
During the course of my research, I have found it rather
 
difficult to find objective analyses on the question of
 
Tibet.  Insofar as my biases are concerned, I chose the
 
Dalai Lama as a subject of study because I consider his
 
life's work and person extraordinary.  So, within the
 
context of a qualitative study, I believe the findings
 
of my research as presented in this thesis are well
 
founded and as carefully documented as possible.
 
Therefore, if any interpretive inaccuracies do exist in
 
this thesis, I am confident they arise from my Western
 
and American perspective, and I hope that the reader
 
will forgive them as such.  If anything, I hope that
 
this thesis invites others to pick up where I have left
 
off, reinterpreting where necessary, and finding new
 
information where I have left any stones unturned.
 THE RHETORIC OF THE DALAI LAMA
 
CHAPTER ONE
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Rhetoric is a branch of communication studies explored
 
by scholars at least as early as the civilizations of ancient
 
Greece and Rome.  These first students and practitioners of
 
rhetoric sought to explain what rhetoric was, and how it
 
worked.  In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines rhetoric as being
 
a method or faculty of awareness for discovering all the
 
available means of persuasion 1984, p.24).  While Aristotle's
 
view endures, the ancients could never quite agree upon a
 
single definition or conception of rhetoric.1  Today, the
 
tradition of rhetorical study continues, and various views on
 
just what rhetoric consists of continue to be debated.  For
 
lOne of the most important disputes about rhetoric  among the ancients
 
involved the purpose and motives for the "art" of rhetoric.  The
 
Sophists ran schools for training aspiring leaders the skills of
 
persuasive oration.  Protagoras (fifth century B.C.E.), an early
 
Sophist, "denied the existence of one single truth," believing that
 
"every assertion is subject to controversy, since a person can always
 
argue either for or against it" (Perelman, 1990, p. 1072).  In
 
Protagoras' view, rhetoric serves to present one side of an argument:
 
the orator's side.
 
Isocrates (436 - 330 B.C.E.) considered rhetoric primarily as a
 
speaker-oriented discipline for leaders and politicians that would
 
enable them to better handle affairs of state.  For Isocrates, who was a
 
Sophist, rhetoric was the skill of persuasive oration that could be used
 
to promote Panhellenic unity (1971, pp. 46-70).
 
Plato (427 - 347 B.C.E.) believed that rhetoric, when employed
 
with dialectic, could serve more noble ends for the philosopher.
 
Plato's vision of rhetoric assumes ethical dimensions.  As a
 
consequence, the focus of rhetoric is not just on the orator, but also
 
on the audience and the relationship between speaker and listener.
 
Rhetoric, according to Plato, involves the speaker's (or writer's)
 
scientific aim in matching an ultimate "Truth" with the "souls" of the
 
audience (Plato, Gorgias and phaedrus; Burke, 1950, pp. 53-54).
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the most part, however, many scholars would agree that
 
rhetoric, as an art or discipline, provides tools  for senders
 
of messages to make their messages not only more readily
 
received and understood, but also more apt to be agreed to or
 
acted upon.  In short, rhetoric endows writers and speakers
 
with the power to persuade audiences.
 
Rhetoric has been studied in contexts ranging from
 
politics to mass communication.  As global communication
 
increases, so will the necessity for, and frequency of,
 
connections among the peoples of countries worldwide.  For
 
cross cultural rhetoric to be effective, it must transcend
 
the barriers which separate us, barriers such as national
 
borders, cultures, languages, and political systems or
 
religious beliefs.  This thesis will be an analysis of the
 
rhetoric of the exiled spiritual and secular leader of Tibet,
 
Tenzin Gyatso, who is known as the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.
 
The following analysis will show that the Dalai Lama's
 
speaking and writing reflect a rare capacity for surmounting
 
global obstacles to communication.
 
A self proclaimed "simple monk," this leader of the
 
exiled Government of Tibet has, for more than forty years,
 
conducted high profile diplomatic relations with world
 
leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai of China, Prime
 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Khrushchev of Russia,
 
and, more recently, with heads of state such as Michail
 
Gorbachev of the Former Soviet Union, former President George
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Bush and President Bill Clinton.  He likewise maintains ties
 
to religious leaders such as Pope John Paul II.
 
In 1989 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his
 
advocacy of nonviolent protest in the continuing efforts of
 
Tibetans both inside and outside of Tibet to secure an
 
autonomous secular and religious role and to eliminate
 
alleged political oppression under China's rule.  The Nobel
 
Committee explained the reason why he was awarded the Nobel
 
Peace Prize:
 
The Committee wants to emphasize the fact that the
 
Dalai Lama in his struggle for the liberation of
 
Tibet consistently has opposed the use of
 
violence.  He has instead advocated peaceful
 
solutions based upon tolerance and mutual respect
 
in order to preserve the historical and cultural
 
heritage of his people.  The Dalai Lama has
 
developed his philosophy of peace from a great
 
reverence for all things living and upon the
 
concept of universal responsibility embracing all
 
mankind as well as nature.  In the opinion of the
 
Committee, the Dalai Lama has come forward with
 
constructive and forward-looking proposals or the
 
solution of international conflicts, human rights
 
issues, and global environmental problems (Dalai
 
Lama and Rowell, 1990).
 
This praise is indicative of how many audiences readily
 
accept the ethos and the rhetoric of the Dalai Lama.  In
 
fact, Dawa Norbu, a scholar of Tibetan studies, affirms that
 
"The Nobel Peace Prize may be taken as an indicator of
 
Western if not the world's public opinion" (1991, p.371).
 
However, while The Dalai Lama's rhetoric has been influential
 
in promoting his message, and while his own personage has
 
become highly regarded, coverage of the Dalai Lama's protest
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movement has remained curiously limited and unanalyzed in the
 
Western press in comparison to other Nobel laureates
 
(Spectator, 1989, p.5).  Thus, largely as a result of the
 
comparatively sparse coverage of the situation in the Dalai
 
Lama's country, Tibet, the Nobel Committee observed that
 
"political support [for the Tibet question] from the outside
 
world remains conspicuous by its absence, apart from a few
 
rather toothless U.N. resolutions that were adopted in 1961
 
and 1965" (Dalai Lama and Piburn, 1990, p. 20).  Ironically,
 
the Nobel Committee, which possesses both the power to
 
generate media attention and internationally visible
 
political clout, conceded that the Dalai Lama had been on
 
their waiting list of persons to be considered for the award,
 
and that his selection for the Nobel Prize was precipitated
 
by the global indignation at the events of China's brutal
 
suppression of the student protesters in Tiannanmen Square,
 
which occurred just three months after the Tibetans' anti-

Chinese protests and riots in Lhasa, Tibet (Rule, 1989).
 
Evidence of the Dalai Lama's influence must be
 
understood in terms of his foremost role as a religious
 
leader. Similarly, to find empirical evidence of the efficacy
 
of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric, we must look to his primary
 
audience--his followers.  His followers are comprised of
 
three groups, first, Tibetans, second, religious adherents,
 
and third, political supporters worldwide.  While the Dalai
 
Lama is not yet a household name in Europe or North America,
 
he maintains at minimum recognition, and at most, an
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impressive following among not only Buddhists, but  also the
 
adherents and students of many world religions and countries.
 
Primarily, the Dalai Lama's influence  on his own people, the
 
Tibetans, is unshaken despite the four decades he has spent
 
in exile.  According to Ronald Schwartz, a scholar in Tibetan
 
studies, "Tibetan loyalty to the Dalai Lama has been
 
strengthened through protest...tapes and videos of the Dalai
 
Lama speaking on political as well as religious subjects  are
 
very much in demand and circulate underground among Tibetans"
 
inside Tibet (1994, pp. 7-8).  The Dalai Lama advocates
 
nonviolent protest, but in Chinese controlled Tibet--where
 
the government makes no distinction between nonviolent
 
protest and violent protest--any and all protest is allegedly
 
punishable by imprisonment or death.  Consequently, for these
 
Tibetans to continue to listen to contraband speeches of the
 
Dalai Lama, and to act upon the Dalai Lama's recommendations
 
in those speeches, reveals the efficacy of his rhetoric.
 
Another clue that indicates the influence of the Dalai Lama's
 
rhetoric is that "new terms have...entered the Tibetan
 
political vocabulary" (p.1).  These terms, such as democracy
 
and human rights, are ubiquitous in the Dalai Lama's
 
religious and political writings and speeches.  While the
 
introduction of such terms to Tibet can in part be attributed
 
to the influences of foreign tourism, the Dalai Lama's use of
 
such terms imparts an aura of importance and value which
 
would further encourage Tibetans to use them in their
 
language and to respect them in their society.
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Apart from Tibetans, the Dalai Lama's influence over
 
Westerners is evinced in the myriad followers of Buddhism and
 
organizations that exist to support the causes the Dalai Lama
 
espouses.  "There are an estimated half-million [Buddhist]
 
adherents in North America and western Europe," for whom the
 
Dalai Lama is known and respected (Goodman, 1986,  p. 319).
 
Non-religious organizations that support the Dalai Lama
 
include The Tibet Information Network (TIN), which, based in
 
London, is "devoted to research and documentation of
 
contemporary Tibet" (Schwartz, 1994, p.5); Tibet House in New
 
York City; and Campaign for Tibet in Washington, DC.  These
 
followers, Tibetans and foreigners, Buddhists and others,
 
combine to evince the Dalai Lama's influence in sum.
 
Schwartz affirms that "there has certainly been a feedback
 
effect between protest inside Tibet and international
 
endeavors on behalf of Tibet, with each reinforcing the
 
other" (pp. 8-9).  Without the vigorous lobbying,
 
campaigning, and rhetoric of the Dalai Lama, the existence of
 
these supporters might possibly not have come about.
 
Moreover, the direction and enthusiasm expressed by these
 
followers is usually attributed by them to the Dalai Lama.
 
Tom Grunfeld, author and expert on Tibetan affairs as they
 
relate to international politics, maintains that "there are
 
Tibetans and Chinese who believe the recent reforms in Tibet
 
are a direct result of the Dalai Lama's successful efforts to
 
publicize the Tibetan issue around the world" (1988, p. 27).
 
Peter Williams, a British diplomat involved in British­7 
Tibetan relations since 1944, maintains that the Dalai Lama
 
is an "element affecting Western thinking" (1988, p. 146).
 
Williams states that the Dalai Lama has "held on to the
 
world's attention and admiration by sustaining his own, his
 
country's and his people's claim to separate identity and a
 
measure of control of their own destinies.  This he does in
 
moderate terms, emphasizing...this aim non-violently,  as the
 
Buddhist faith requires" (1988, p.146).
 
The Dalai Lama's Nobel acceptance speech highlights his
 
mission:  "The suffering of our people during the past forty
 
years of occupation is well documented.  Ours has been a long
 
struggle.  We know our cause is just.  Because violence can
 
only breed more violence and suffering, our struggle must
 
remain nonviolent and free of hatred.  We are trying to end
 
the suffering of our people, not to inflict suffering upon
 
others" (1989, p.ix).  This clear and concise message has,
 
in recent years, gained perceptibly increasing worldwide
 
popular (if not political) support. In the context of social
 
movement theory, Herbert Simons posits that leaders "must
 
adapt to several audiences simultaneously.  In an age of mass
 
media, rhetorical utterances addressed to one audience are
 
likely to reach others" (1970, p.7).  Based upon the
 
influence of his message, the Dalai Lama appears to be well
 
aware of this multifaceted aspect of modern communication.
 
The themes and words the Dalai Lama has used in his speeches
 
and writings are voiced  time and time again by the Dalai
 
Lama's allies and foes alike among the international press
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and political corps.  The widespread repetition of the Dalai
 
Lama's views is important to this discussion because "...a
 
good measure of the effectiveness of rhetorical discourse  is
 
the extent to which themes or key terms are echoed by
 
audiences in other discourse," (Brummet, 1981, p. 262).
 
Moreover, the Dalai Lama has displayed solid "intercultural
 
competence," which is the ability to draw upon "culturally
 
different identities that are salient in [each given]
 
situation" (Collier, 1993, p.43).  Especially when dealing
 
with international media and echelons of political power, the
 
Dalai Lama's intercultural competence has served as one more
 
skill to propel his persuasive speech.  Williams comments
 
upon the Dalai Lama's most "salient" and cross culturally
 
universal attributes:
 
His open-mindedness, the simplicity he can
 
[distil] from immense complexity, his sense of
 
humor and the cheerfulness he, like his people,
 
can sustain in the face of adversity and great
 
hardship make him an outstanding person by any
 
standard.  The word charisma
 
is...appropriate...(1988, p.146).
 
Thus the Dalai Lama's ability to use the right words, in
 
tandem with the most universally acceptable attributes such
 
as charisma and a good sense of humor, make him a stronger
 
force to be reckoned with in both political and rhetorical
 
exchanges.
 
In terms of rhetorical analysis, I am interested in
 
examining precisely how, in terms of language use,
 
composition, symbolic and thematic motifs, the Dalai Lama has
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managed to inspire the awe and respect of the West while also
 
inciting the publicly pronounced ire of  every Chinese leader
 
since Mao himself was in office.  While the goals the Dalai
 
Lama has sought have not yet been realized (Rule, 1989,  p. A­
10), his tactic in the protest movement has been to use a
 
globally targeted rhetoric to instigate foreign political
 
influence on China.  This political influence, he hopes, will
 
serve to change China's current policies in Tibet.  The
 
Dalai Lama "has traveled assiduously to bring the Tibetan
 
case and the plight of his people to as wide an international
 
audience as possible" (Williams, 1988, p. 146).  "Instead of
 
war, the Dalai Lama's idea of struggle is to travel the
 
world, drawing attention to his cause and trying to persuade
 
world leaders to exert pressure on China" (Buchsbaum, 1993).
 
The Dalai Lama's unique brand of rhetoric has proven to be
 
his greatest asset in communicating internationally.  My
 
question is, what can we learn from it to improve our own
 
forms of communication and to better understand rhetoric in
 
the Aristotelian sense?
 
Theoretical Convergence
 
This analysis proceeds according to the general
 
principles of rhetorical criticism, which encompass audience,
 
ethos (a speaker's personal history and attributes), and the
 
historical constraints of the speaking or writing situation.
 
This analysis will advance a clearer understanding of the
 
Dalai Lama's audience, his own personal background and how it
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impinges on his speech, the historical situation surrounding
 
the discourse, and how it serves to constrain and define what
 
has been said.  In addition, this criticism will draw upon
 
theories from three key areas which converge as they relate
 
to the rhetoric of the Dalai Lama:  Kenneth Burke's
 
rhetorical theory, social movement theory, and cross cultural
 
communication.  Rhetorical theory will be foremost because
 
its focus on principles of persuasion aligns most closely
 
with the purpose of this thesis; the latter theories will be
 
used to support and advance claims relating to rhetorical
 
theory.  In full, this study will be grounded firmly in
 
findings from historical research about the Dalai Lama's
 
worldwide movement to protest the Chinese occupation of
 
Tibet.  This historical basis will necessarily cover the
 
history of Tibet as it relates to the Dalai Lama's claims
 
about Tibet's sovereignty.
 
Thus, first, the rhetorical theories of Kenneth Burke's
 
'dramatism' will form the basis of my analysis of the Dalai
 
Lama's persuasive discourse.  The Dalai Lama's speaking will
 
be discussed in light of Burke's conceptions of
 
identification, mortification, victimage, and transcendence,
 
as based upon Burke's discussion of them in A Grammar of
 
Motives (1969, pp. 59, 332-333; 406-408; 420-422) and A
 
Rhetoric of Motives (1950, 13; 19-23; 41; 43-46; 53-54; 137­
141; 252-267; 333).  Burke's theories on the use of comic and
 
tragic frames, as Burke presents them in Permanence and
 
Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (1935, pp. 82-91; 247-250; 283­11 
286) and Attitudes Toward History (1984), will also be
 
incorporated into a dicussion of the Dalai Lama's persuasive
 
strategies.
 
As tools for analysis, Burke's theories help reveal how
 
the Dalai Lama, in his public addresses, cuts  across the
 
boundaries of accepted norms for diverse world views, thereby
 
overcoming the formalities of political, cultural, and social
 
contexts.  Through Burke's concept of identification we can
 
observe how the Dalai Lama drives and times his discourse to
 
identify himself with his far flung audience, "all human
 
beings," in order to align people to his cause.  The Dalai
 
Lama fosters the appearance of being simultaneously great and
 
small enough for all members of his audience to achieve a
 
sense of identification with himself, and, as a consequence,
 
with his movement.  He can call himself "a simple monk" and
 
thereby place himself with the plain and lowly (and vice
 
versa), while in the same text wielding phrases such as "my
 
entourage," "my cabinet," and "my land and my people," which
 
underscore his greatness and stature as a leader in order for
 
his cause to be grouped among the causes of the politically
 
powerful leaders of the world.
 
With Burke's concept of mortification, or self
 
punishment, the Dalai Lama's motivation for conducting a
 
relentless one-man campaign to spread his message to the
 
world becomes more understandable.  Burke's concept of
 
victimage, or scapegoating, illuminates the Dalai Lama's
 
harsh castigation of the Chinese for their excesses in Tibet
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(especially during the Cultural Revolution), while
 
simultaneously skirting Chinese accusations that he himself
 
was a leader of a "serfdom" with its own cruelties.
  Burke's
 
thoughts on transcendence through language reveal how the
 
Dalai Lama transforms Tibet's "sins" of being overly
 
isolationist and backwards into positive attributes that  the
 
rest of the world clamors for, such as the simple but  ever
 
elusive state of peace and tranquillity that Tibet is often
 
touted as fostering, or the Tibetan monks' remarkable
 
meditative techniques which amaze and perplex present day
 
Western scientists who study them.  Burke's theory of the
 
comic frame is aligned to the Dalai Lama's use of non-violent
 
rhetoric, which views the enemy not as evil, but rather as a
 
"fool" which needs to be educated so that things may be set
 
aright in the world.  Conversely, the perspective of the
 
tragic frame of language makes understandable the Dalai
 
Lama's use of scapegoating and blame for the woes of Tibet
 
during the last half of the twentieth century.
 
To address the second area of theoretical convergence, I
 
will analyze the Dalai Lama's discourse from the perspective
 
of the rhetoric of social movements.  I shall employ social
 
movement theory to explicate the Dalai Lama's rhetoric
 
surrounding the globally publicized Tibetan protests in
 
Lhasa, Tibet between 1987 and 1989.  Simons has formed a
 
"leader-centered conception of persuasion in social
 
movements" and "the intentional symbolic acts of those who
 
lead social movements" (p.2).  I will deploy Simons' theory
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to explore the Dalai Lama as the symbolic leader of a social
 
movement.  I will consider the tactics the Dalai Lama uses to
 
lead a worldwide social protest movement from his precarious
 
expatriate position in Dharamsala, India, where the local
 
Indian population resents the Tibetans.  Moreover, the
 
country of India, as a whole, prefers the Dalai Lama not to
 
exacerbate its ceaselessly tense relations with China (The
 
Economist, 1994, p. 39).
 
Leland Griffin first approached social movement theory
 
from an historical perspective, encouraging the student of
 
social movement theory to build a broad, sweeping view of the
 
movement in question (1952, pp. 184-188).  Later, Griffin
 
aligned his orientation with Burke's dramatism (Griffin,
 
1969, pp.456-478).  Both of Griffin's views will be
 
incorporated in a theoretical middle ground which will
 
encompass the historic and dramatic elements of the Dalai
 
Lama's rhetoric.  First, I will cover the historical aspects
 
of the Dalai Lama's struggle to lead an international social
 
movement, including his publicity program which was designed
 
to bring about world awareness of Tibet.  The Dalai Lama's
 
publicity efforts have been designed to reverse the isolation
 
and anonymity of Tibet, a nation that had, since ancient
 
times and even well into the twentieth century, purposefully
 
shut itself off from the rest of the world.  Second, I will
 
examine the tactics the Dalai Lama has successfully used in
 
propelling the drama of this tiny, isolated country upon the
 
world stage, and even making that tiny country's story heart­14 
rending enough--and persuasive enough--to merit international
 
action on its behalf.
 
The final area I will use to support the rhetorical
 
analysis is cross-cultural communication theory.  Throughout
 
his campaign to influence action on behalf of Tibet, the
 
Dalai Lama's discourse has evinced cross cultural elements.
 
The Dalai Lama has attempted to maintain the leadership of,
 
and to preserve in exile, his country's culture, while also
 
adapting to, and manipulating in his rhetoric, the symbols,
 
meanings, and norms that are characteristic of Western
 
cultures.  Culture, which is central to the Dalai Lama's
 
ethos, refers to the "historically transmitted system of
 
symbols, meanings, and norms" around and through which groups
 
of people live their lives (Collier, 1993, p. 36). I shall
 
draw upon the work of theorists who have examined the
 
intersection of cross cultural communication and rhetoric.
 
Cecil Blake maintains that "the universality of rhetoric
 
ought to be more fully recognized now than ever before
 
because of the changing drama of world relations..." (1979,
 
p.85).  Blake also asserts that there have been
 
misunderstandings about the Eastern rhetorical tradition
 
(p.87).  Following Blake's guidelines for the "comparative
 
rhetorician," my analysis of the Dalai Lama's discourse
 
shall:
 
attempt to unearth the constituent parts of the
 
society [being studied] and attempt to account for
 
the parts that receive most emphasis...through an
 
examination of the culture as a whole, attempt to
 
conceptualize the peculiar rhetorical theory
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exhibited by (the] society under
 
investigation...(and ascertain the]  identifiable
 
and communicable symbols... (pp.88-89).
 
In addition, I shall employ Geert Hofstede's dimensions of
 
cultural variability, which have proven to help Westerners
 
understand the world views of diverse societies and to
 
communicate better with culturally diverse peoples.
 
Hofstede's dimensions point to ways that Westerners
 
understand cultural phenomena:  a person's place in the
 
social structure (power distance); the society's preference
 
for either group activity (collectivism) or individual
 
action; the values a culture places on material things or on
 
nurturing and affection (pp.89-109, 1992).
 
Leadership and Rhetoric of a Nonviolent Movement
 
Just as Gandhi in India and Martin Luther King in the
 
United States advocated nonviolent protest in order to gain
 
support for their causes, so has the Dalai Lama persisted for
 
four decades to maintain a nonviolent stance in Tibet's fight
 
for independence (and more currently for religious and
 
political autonomy) from China.  In rhetorical theory and
 
social movement theory in particular, there exist manifold
 
studies on the persuasive abilities of both Gandhi and King.
 
These studies encompass analyses of rhetorical strategies
 
such as Gandhi's satyagraha (soul-force or truth-force),
 
ahimsa (nonviolence), and King's ability to draw upon
 
nonviolent tenets as well as develop strong emotive appeals
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to a modern power establishment's media, government, and
 
social structure in order to strengthen the effect of his
 
persuasive discourse.  Such critical analysis of the rhetoric
 
and social movement tactics of Gandhi and King have been the
 
subject of countless scholarly articles and books.  Yet
 
despite the striking similarities in magnitude, intent,  and,
 
as I will argue, significance, among the respective rhetorics
 
of Gandhi, King, and the Dalai Lama, the discourse of the
 
Dalai Lama alone remains unexamined critically by scholars in
 
the fields of rhetorical criticism and social movement
 
theory.2
 
2 Significant studies on both Gandhi and King as social movement leaders
 
include:  Sharp, Gene (1971).  Exploring nonviolent Alternatives.
 
Boston, MA:  Porter Sargent Publisher; Seifert, Harvey.  (1965).
 
Conquest by suffering:  the process and prospects of nonviolent
 
resistance.  Philadelphia, PA:  Westiminster Press.  Communication
 
studies on King include:  Meier, August, "On the role of Martin Luther
 
King," New Politics. 4, 1965, 52-59; Fulkerson, Richard, "The public
 
letter as a rhetorical form:  structure, logic, and style in King's
 
'Letter from Birmingham Jail,'" Ouarterly Journal of Speech. 44, 1979,
 
121-136; Snow, Malinda, "Martin Luther King's 'Letter from Birmingham
 
Jail' as Pauline Epistle," Ouarterly Journal of Speech. 71. 1985, 318­
334; Smith, Donald, "Martin Luther King, Jr.: in the beginning at
 
Montgomery," Southern Speech Communication Journal. 34, 1968, 8-17;
 
Lucaites, John and Condit, Celeste, "Reconstructing <equality>:
 
culturetypal and counter-cultural rhetorics in the martyred black
 
vision," Communication Monographs. 56, 1990, 5-24; Gorden, William, "A
 
stormy rally in Atlanta," Communication Ouarterly, 11, 1963, 18-21.
 
Communication studies on Gandhi include:  Beatty, Michael; Behnke,
 
Ralph; Banks, Barbara, "Elements of dialogic communication in Gandhi's
 
second round table conference address," Southern Speech Cammunicatiort
 
Journal. 44, 1979, 386-398; Singh, Kusum, "Gandhi and Mao as mass
 
communicators," Journal of Communication. 29, 1979, 94-101; Merriam,
 
Allen, "Symbolic action in India:  Gandhi's nonverbal persuasion,"
 
Ouarterly Journal of Speech. 61, 1975, 290-306; Carlson, Cheree, "Gandhi
 
and the comic frame: 'ad bellum purificandum,'" Ouarterly Journal of
 
Speech. 72, 1986, 446-455; Bowen, Harry "A realistic view of nonviolent
 
assumptions," Communication Ouarterly, 15, 19647, 9-10; Narain, Laxmi,
 
"Mahatma Gandhi as a journalist," Journalism Ouarterly. 42, 1965, 267­
270; Chaudhary, Anju and Bryan, Carter, "Mahatma Gandhi:  journalist and
 
freedom propagandist," Journalism Quarterly. 51, 286-291.
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This is a serious omission of a rhetor whose discourse,
 
as I will show, has been effective in moving audiences.
 
Considering the Dalai Lama is a Nobel laureate and popular
 
world figure, who as recently as 1990 had an internationally
 
best-selling autobiography, this omission from critical study
 
seems all the more curious.  In fact, at the time of this
 
writing, not only have none of the major speech communication
 
journals carried any critical treatments of the Dalai Lama's
 
discourse or leadership, but also (with the notable exception
 
of a scant few political science or theological journals,
 
cited herein) neither have any of the other academic journals
 
or even books which I have surveyed contained a single
 
treatment of the Dalai Lama as a rhetor or as an influential
 
and popular social movement leader.  This lack of critical or
 
scholarly study of the Dalai Lama is also evident in journals
 
and books on peace studies, cross cultural communications,
 
Asia studies, and history.3  It is my purpose in this thesis
 
to begin to remedy this lack of critical examination.
 
Although the Dalai Lama is a charismatic religious and
 
social movement leader like Gandhi and King, the former is
 
distinct from the latter in significant ways.  For instance,
 
unlike Gandhi and King, who often lead marches and gave
 
speeches in person, the Dalai Lama is compelled to lead a
 
Communications journals in which I have sought but have not found any
 
mention of the Dalai Lama include, but are not limited to, the
 
following:  Communication Monoaraphs, Western Journal of Speech
 
Communication, Southern Speech Communication Journal, Communication
 
Ouarterly, Ouarterly Journal of Speech, Central States Speech Journal,
 
Communication Ouarterly, Speech Monoaraphs.
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resistance movement that is physically removed from the
 
actual site of the alleged injustices; for forty years and up
 
through the present time, the Dalai Lama has been unable to
 
return to Tibet.  But in spite of his direction of the
 
protest movement from afar, it is clear that "...his
 
authority over all Tibetans, a position that holds no
 
parallel in the world today, holds his own potential
 
hotheads, both within and outside Tibet, in check"
 
(anonymous, Spectator. 1989).  In addition, he is compelled,
 
from his expatriate position, to enlist followers who are not
 
only not his own countrymen and women, but also those who do
 
not share the same ethnic or religious background, and most
 
often, those who do not even speak his native language, nor
 
the languages and backgrounds of other followers to his
 
movement.  Thus, while the overarching principle of
 
nonviolence shapes his movement's actions, the obstacles of
 
physical, linguistic, and cultural separation force him to
 
employ alternative rhetorical strategies to garner support
 
for what he calls "the plight of my people."  A special
 
leader, and an effective rhetoric is required for leading,
 
organizing, and maintaining such a diverse international
 
following.  I suggest that the Dalai Lama is a leader who
 
possesses a cross cultural ability to persuade, and hence his
 
work merits study.
 
Indeed, the adversary of his movement is a formidable
 
one, and to be as influential and popular as he has been
 
seems nothing short of miraculous.  After all, it has been
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observed, "no country is going to pick a fight with China
 
over Tibet" (anonymous, The economist, 1987, p.35).  The
 
Dalai Lama recognizes the reality of the great odds against
 
him, saying, "Sometimes I really feel desperate.  The Tibetan
 
nation, with its unique cultural heritage, is now facing a
 
real danger of extinction."  Yet at the same time, he is
 
determined in his mandate, affirming, "We need to raise world
 
awareness about Tibet, to tell the truth about what is really
 
happening.  An ancient nation with a precious culture is
 
almost dying" (Buschsbaum, 1993, p.8).
 
The Dalai Lama and the East in the West:  Thriving Anew
 
"Owing in large measure to the logical and systematic
 
nature of its doctrines, Buddhism has proven an appealing
 
philosophy in today's rational and scientific world," says
 
Michael Goodman, a biographer of the Dalai Lama (1986, p.).
 
The appeal of the Dalai Lama to Western audiences, especially
 
in America and Europe, arises not only from his own charisma
 
and buoyant public persona, but also from his ability to
 
capitalize upon the last hundred years of advancement and
 
acceptance by Western audiences of concepts such as Zen and
 
Buddhism.  Many western writers, poets, and scholars became
 
acquainted with Buddhism during the nineteenth century as
 
travelers' accounts about Asia reached Europe and America.
 
Writers such as Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman were all
 
influenced by their readings of interpretations and
 
translations of Buddhist philosophy and religion (Ellwood,
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1987; Inada and Jacobson, 1984; Tweed, 1990, pp. 65-92).
 
Eastern philosophy has flourished most recently in the United
 
States, for instance, during the 1960's and 1970's with the
 
Hippies and anti-war protest movements; Tibet even became a
 
fad for many young Americans, who were called "dharma-freaks"
 
(Sanchez, 1985,p.15).  Today, Eastern thought in religion and
 
philosophy continues to gain a following and popularity under
 
the latest mantle of New Age literature, music, and
 
activities such as yoga or meditation.
 
Supported by this foundation of the gradual inroads of
 
Eastern thought, the Dalai Lama's move into the international
 
spotlight is timely.  The Dalai Lama's own individualism and
 
magnetic personality appear to have fostered a greater
 
acceptance by Western audiences, whose values place
 
individualism high on a scale of critically important or
 
desirable traits, all the more so in a rhetor (Hofstede,
 
1992).  He always makes public appearances in his maroon and
 
gold monk's robes, and is noted for sporting a pair of
 
comfortably practical brown oxford shoes (Holt, 1993, p.21).
 
He has been described in Western media as boyish, cherubic,
 
impish, and even cute.4  But his smiling appearance belies his
 
seemingly endless knowledge, which is made clear in his
 
speech.  His firm, authoritative baritone voice is also
 
advantageous to public discourse.  "His voice has a melodic,
 
4 Chinese media, in contrast, have described the Dalai Lama in a far
 
different light, calling him a "political corpse, bandit and traitor,"
 
and a "red-handed butcher who subsisted on people's flesh,"  as well as a
 
"wolf in monk's clothing" (Anonymous, 1989, p.134; Dalai Lama, 1993).
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resonant quality, and although his English is limited...his
 
language is precise and controlled" (Goodman, 1986, p. 318).
 
The Dalai Lama affiliates himself with this media
 
spawned image of the innocent, boyish god-king, saying,
 
"Occasionally I feel very untrained for the job of political
 
leader" (Norman, 1993, p. 18).  Also, his audacity at fleeing
 
his nation from the reign of Communist China yet continuing
 
obstinately to lead an impossible fight, using only words  as
 
weapons to rail against China's alleged occupation of Tibet,
 
further enables Western audiences to liken him to a kind of
 
weirdly garbed rebel--a rebel with a cause.  Hence his
 
message tends to strike a familiar chord to the psyche of the
 
Western, and in particular, American audience.
 
Over the last two decades, he has slowly edged his way
 
into the limelight of Western popular culture; he has been
 
photographed by Annie Leibovitz, and feature articles about
 
him (and the cause of Tibet) have appeared in recent years in
 
popular magazines such as Time, Life, The New York Times
 
Magazine, US News and World Report, and Vanity Fair.5  The
 
Dalai Lama has also been successful at persuading the
 
powerful Hollywood publicity machine to ply his cause.6  As
 
5 Iyer, P. "Tibet's Living Buddha," Time, 131, 1988, 58-60;  Nickson, L.
 
"The Dalai Lama," Life, 11, 1988, 21-25; Dreifus, C. "The Dalai Lama,"
 
The New York Times Magazine, November 28, 1993, 52-55; Rosellini, L.
 
"The days of a holy man," US News & World Report, 109, 1990, 92-94;
 
Shoumatoff, A. "The Silent Killing of Tibet," Vanity Fair, 54, 1991, 76­
104.
 
For many years the popular actor Richard Gere has been an advocate
 
for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan issue.  Gere "devoted his Academy
 
Award acceptance speech" in April of 1993 "to the Dalai Lama's cause"
 
(Norman, p. 18).  The celebrated filmmaker Bernardo Bertolucci's 1994
 
film "Little Buddha" was about exiled Tibetan monks who seek the
 
reincarnation of a fellow lama.  This film starred popular actors Keanu
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British journalist Jane Dibblin observes, "Never have I seen
 
a roomful of journalists and photographers warm so quickly to
 
a political figure:  no country could hope for a better
 
ambassador" (New Statesman, 1988, p.7). Such skills are vital
 
for one who has, for forty years, been "the guest of a nation
 
that would prefer him to remain silent [India] and the enemy
 
of a nation that much of the world is trying to court
 
[China]" (Iyer, 1988, p.60).  Not surprisingly, the Dalai
 
Lama is aware of his precarious position and his popularity,
 
commenting, "The Fourteenth Dalai Lama may be the most
 
popular Dalai Lama of all.  If the Chinese had treated the
 
Tibetans like real brothers, then the Dalai Lama might not be
 
so popular.  So all the credit goes to the Chinese!" (p.58).
 
As Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, he likewise appeals
 
to Western audiences because of his emphasis on open-

Reeves, Bridget Fonda, and singer/actor Chris Issak. Bertolucci received
 
advice on the direction of the film from the Dalai Lama himself.  Also,
 
as recently as September 11, 1994, the Discovery Channel aired a special
 
program entitled "Mustang:  The Hidden Kingdom," which was narrated by
 
the famous actor Harrison Ford.  "Hidden Kingdom" was the story of an
 
aging, high ranking monk of the Dalai Lama's inner entourage who
 
undertakes a journey to the Kingdom of Mustang.  Once there, the lama
 
performs religious ceremonies, and brings with him a tape recorded
 
message from the Dalai Lama which he plays before a Tibetan audience in
 
a temple in Mustang. In the message, the Dalai Lama states in his
 
booming voice that the Chinese have destroyed the Tibetan culture in
 
Tibet, and that it is up to the 'last Tibetans' in Mustang to work to
 
preserve their precious culture.
 
His mission thus completed, the elder lama returns to Dharmsala,
 
India, where the Dalai Lama reigns in exile, with two young boys who are
 
to be educated for the purpose of returning to Mustang as teachers in
 
the future.  The documentary styled drama features much footage of the
 
elderly lama's consultations with the Dalai Lama himself,  as well as
 
horrific footage of brutal beatings and killings of Tibetan protesters
 
by the Chinese (including black and white film clips of rebellion in
 
Tibet in the 1950's and 60's as well as the more recent riots of 1989 in
 
Lhasa).
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mindedness with regard to all religions.  Theologist Paul
 
Williams notes:
 
The Dalai Lama has made it quite clear that he
 
opposes the idea of only one religion, whether an
 
existing religion or a composite 'pick-n-mix'
 
creation.  And he has stated equally firmly that
 
he does not want everyone to convert to Buddhism.
 
Rather, religious believers should follow
 
wholeheartedly their own traditions...It is no use
 
trying to convince others with missionary zeal of
 
the supposed inferiority of their own beliefs
 
(1991, p.520).
 
Such expansive and all embracing notions are increasingly
 
welcome to a world audience burdened with ostensibly
 
irresolvable civil wars tinged with religious fervor.
 
Yet at the same time, the Dalai Lama's religious
 
significance is tempered with all of the requirements of  a
 
modern, educated Western audience.  Articles by and about him
 
have appeared in periodicals such as gmni and Scientific
 
Amaxi2An.7  He broaches topics with logic, objectivity, and
 
lauds the achievements of science and progress.  He
 
encourages "free thinkers in the West" to explore the "spirit
 
of open, critical inquiry that descends from...Buddha"
 
(1981).  He even goes so far as to concede that if science
 
can disprove a Buddhist tenet beyond all reasonable doubt,
 
then the Buddhist idea would be abandoned, and the scientific
 
proof extolled (1985, p.45).  The Dalai Lama has in recent
 
years lectured at universities worldwide, including Oxford,
 
7 Harary, K. "Dalai Lama:  his resolutions," Omni, 13, 1991, 66-70;
 
Holloway, M. "Profile:  the Dalai Lama--a subtle mind contemplates
 
science," Scientific American, 265, 1991, 33-34.
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Cornell, and Harvard.  In his rhetoric, he juxtaposes the
 
valued ancient traditions, which he maintains are part and
 
parcel of the mortally endangered Tibetan culture,  next to
 
the latest scientific achievements and technological
 
advancements.  Through this linkage of the alien (Tibetan
 
culture) with the familiar (Western science and technology),
 
he makes the audience identify with himself, his people,  and
 
his cause.  Through a marriage of scientific and religiously
 
toned discourse, he makes people see the potential value in
 
becoming actively involved in promoting the Tibetan issue.8
 
His popular recognition is at present the greatest
 
leverage he has in placing global, especially Western,
 
pressure on China to, as he puts it, ensure "the welfare and
 
happiness of six million Tibetans in Tibet" (Norbu, 1991,
 
p.352). On the other hand, Norbu suggests that it is equally
 
clear that the Dalai Lama has a long way to go:
 
It may be argued that the Dalai Lama's lack of, if
 
not the absence of, power to negotiate on equal
 
terms with the Chinese is compensated by popular
 
western pressure on China.  This is doubtful,
 
however, because the increase in western moral
 
pressure on China since the mid 1980's coincided
 
with the hardening Chinese position on the Tibetan
 
question as an emotional reaction.  This is not to
 
suggest that popular western pressure must cease
 
but the level of support has to be elevated to
 
political and diplomatic actions in order to
 
produce adequate impacts on the Chinese policy
 
towards the Tibetan question.
 
8 For instance, with the advice of the Dalai Lama, and in  hopes of
 
gaining insight for Western medicine and science, neurosurgeons have
 
examined the abilities of Tibetan monks to perform feats of unusual
 
physical and mental prowess as a result of intense meditation in the
 
ancient Tibetan Buddhist tradition (Goleman, D., Thurman, R., 1991,  pp.
 
vii-6).
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Therefore it is clear that the popular pressure on
 
politicians is necessary, but is as yet insufficient,  for
 
Western leaders to be motivated to actually put themselves on
 
the line (at the level of President or Prime Minister) and
 
confront China with the Dalai Lama's concerns.  Yet headway
 
is being made.  In 1993 he was dubbed "a God who knows how to
 
lobby," and it was noted that "fifteen years ago the Dalai
 
Lama had difficulty obtaining a visa to visit America.  Five
 
years ago, the Foreign Office wavered before permitting him
 
to enter Britain.  But in the last two years he has been
 
received by everyone from John Major to Vaclav Havel to
 
George Bush" (Norman, 1993, p.18).  To date, neither Bush nor
 
President Clinton have used China's most favored nation (MFN)
 
status as a leverage to promote rights for the Tibetans.
 
However, the current trend in popular opinion, if it were to
 
continue along its present trajectory, has potential for
 
becoming influential in changing the MFN status of China,
 
and, as a result, the situation in Tibet.
 
In his prolific lectures and writings, the Dalai Lama
 
emphasizes the importance of understanding Tibet's struggle
 
for self determination as a human struggle.  The symbolic
 
value of this is enormous, because it empowers his rhetoric
 
in a unique way:  by simplifying and reducing all national,
 
cultural, political or religious disparities to a common
 
denominator.  "We are the same human beings.  The purpose of
 
our lives is happiness and satisfaction," he has said (1994).
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Pressing further, he has also said that "...it may be helpful
 
to look deeper into human nature.  Then we can communicate
 
better," (Harary, 1991).  It appears as though he holds up
 
Tibet, the once strictly isolationist nation, as the example
 
to the world of the oppression and evil which can take place
 
if all human beings fail to make vigilant efforts to
 
communicate.
 
"He is a reluctant player on the world stage; but he
 
also feels keenly that the position thrust upon him...is a
 
grave responsibility" (Spectator, 1989).  Given this
 
position, it seems that he wishes, in his role as a skilled
 
communicator himself, to teach the world, and for the human
 
beings of the world, as his students, "to learn" from Tibet's
 
isolationist mistakes "the bitter lesson that the world has
 
grown too small for any people to live in harmless isolation"
 
(Dalai Lama, 1960, p. 87).  This isolation, we may infer,
 
comes from improper, ineffective, propagandistic, or, even
 
worse, from nonexistent international communication.
 
Conversely, as rhetor, he attempts to turn this situation
 
around, both for his countrymen and for those whom he calls
 
"all sentient beings."  Thus, as rhetor, he may serve as the
 
paragon of open, clearly understood, and mutually beneficial
 
communication.
 
Furthermore, the Dalai Lama, more than just aware of
 
mutual understanding, is alert to the vagaries of
 
international communication.  For instance, in his first
 
major book following his escape to exile, My Land and My
 27 
people, he observes the effects of the use of a single word
 
on various audiences:
 
The Chinese [leadership] had an extraordinary way
 
of mixing trivial demands with those of the
 
highest importance...they insisted that the word
 
"reactionaries" should always be used to describe
 
the Khampas [one clan of Tibetans] who had taken
 
arms against them.  The word had a special
 
emotional significance for Communists, but of
 
course it had none for us.  Everybody, in the
 
government and out, began to use it as a synonym
 
for guerrillas.  To Communists, no doubt, it
 
implied the height of wickedness, but we used it,
 
on the whole, in admiration.  It did not seem to
 
matter to us or to the Khampas, what their fellow
 
Tibetans called them; but later, when I innocently
 
used the word in writing, it did cause confusion
 
among our friends abroad (1962).
 
It is statements such as this that I will use as the
 
cornerstones of my analysis; I will cover his persuasive
 
efforts to "set the record straight" to the world about
 
events which have occurred after China's invasion of Tibet,
 
pinpointing rhetoric resulting from the recent crisis events
 
in the late 1980s. First, I will critically examine his
 
"Five-Point Plan" speech before members of the U.S. Congress
 
in 1987.  I will also study his Strasbourg speech of 1988,
 
which augmented the five-point plan speech and "proposed...to
 
have a local democratic system in association with China
 
which controls Tibet's foreign relations and defense needs."
 
These speeches are significant because they were acknowledged
 
by both the West and by China as being influential enough to
 
move the Dalai Lama's adherents in Lhasa, Tibet, to take to
 
the streets in protest (Schwartz, 1994, pp. 7,8, 10, 28, 54,
 28 
225; Dreyer, 1989, p. 284; Roy, 1987, pp. 50-51; Gere and
 
Thurman, 1987, p. 69).  These protests led to riots in Tibet,
 
which became fodder for news headlines around the world
 
(Gargan, 1987, p.A1; Gargan, 1987, p. A-9; Wischmann, 1987,
 
pp. 1118-1119; Deshingkar, 1989, pp. 18-19; Dreyer, 1989, pp.
 
281-289).
 
What did the Dalai Lama say that was persuasive enough
 
to move people, under threat of death, to act?  The Dalai
 
Lama claims that it was merely the conditions in Tibet which
 
caused the riots to erupt.  But even if alleged conditions of
 
human rights abuses exist, his speeches nonetheless proved
 
effective in pushing the Tibetans to raise the illegal flag
 
of Tibet in front of Chinese troops.  At the same time,
 
Western officials were put in the position of having to make
 
some commentary regarding these riots and the Chinese actions
 
in response to the riots.  The Dalai Lama's words moved them
 
all to action.
 
Each of the speeches discussed a newly proposed status
 
for Tibet, one that establishes Tibet as a "zone of peace" in
 
which China's control would be relinquished except for only
 
foreign defense matters.  According to Norbu, "...this 'new'
 
arrangement entails not only granting Tibet a semi-

independent status such as existed in Sino-Tibetan history
 
between 1720 and 1911; it also calls for changing the
 
ideological coloring of a Tibet Autonomous Region" (p.367).
 
But surely such a proposal itself cannot have been earth
 
shattering enough to instigate riots.  I will attempt to show
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that the way the Dalai Lama worded his messages added enough
 
fuel to its content to arouse the people of Tibet's ancient
 
capital city, while also complicating diplomatic ties between
 
China and Western nations.
 
A Rhetoric of Simplicity
 
It is evident that the Dalai Lama has many rhetorical
 
constraints stacked against him, most visibly those of
 
history, political ideology, and the international desire  to
 
have China as a partner in trade.  Investigating the way that
 
the Dalai Lama has, to a large extent, overcome such awesome
 
constraints is incumbent upon me in this rhetorical critique.
 
The Dalai Lama's English has been described as "halting,"
 
therefore his strategy for communication must extend beyond
 
mere language skills, and must rely more heavily upon
 
universally accepted themes of humanity.9  As he stated in his
 
1993 autobiography, Freedom in Exile, "I have decided to tell
 
my story in English...[even though] my ability to express
 
myself in this language is limited.  Furthermore, I am aware
 
that some of the subtler implications of what I say may not
 
be precisely what I intended..."  Such an awareness of the
 
impact of his words reveals his conscious effort to
 
communicate (and to persuade) skillfully, even while he
 
admits the inevitable degrees of human fallibility in
 
9"Setting aside his prepared text to speak in halting English about what
 
he termed the 'universal responsibility' Americans should feel for
 
conditions in Tibet, the Dalai Lama was greeted with applause and
 
cheers..."  If ill, G. "Lawmakers cheer Tibetan in Capitol rotunda," The
 
New York Times, April 19, 1991, A-7.
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achieving mutual understanding.  But while his simple choice
 
of language and his emphasis on equalizing humanity quite
 
possibly helps expand his international audience, it can also
 
work against him when he must promote his cause to the
 
influential echelons of global power politics which is so
 
vital to his fight.  He admits to this, saying,
 
One of my drawbacks...when I meet a president or a
 
prime minister or a foreign secretary or just a
 
beggar--to me there's not much difference.  If I'm
 
talking to an ordinary person who shows real
 
interest in Tibet, I tend to do so just as if I
 
was speaking with a big politician.  Then, when I
 
meet someone important, someone my advisors tell
 
me I need to really impress, if (this person does
 
not] show much interest, I find I cannot respond
 
with much enthusiasm (Norman, 1993).
 
It is this humble attitude which often comes through in his
 
speeches.  Showing his sympathies as lying with the "ordinary
 
person" is what helps promote identification between himself
 
and his audience.
 
In my analysis I will concede and allow for the literary
 
disadvantage of his rhetoric in English, coupled with the
 
evident shortfalls of a Buddhist perspective in international
 
politics  (such as equalizing "a prime minister" with "a
 
beggar").  I will analyze and explicate his language using
 
rhetorical criticism, with the expectation of targeting
 
mainly his use of patterns and structures, themes and
 
symbols; exact word usage and poetics will not be at the
 
forefront of my study.  Also, given the voluminous nature of
 
the Dalai Lama's rhetoric that is available for analysis, and
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for the purpose of narrowing my study into a more lucid and
 
realistic scope, I plan to concentrate primarily, but not
 
exclusively, upon the most recent crisis phase in occupied
 
Tibet which led to more specifically targeted and created
 
rhetoric by The Dalai Lama at the time.
 
Of Rhetoric and Riots
 
Specifically, I will base this thesis upon the Dalai
 
Lama's discourse prior to, and resulting from, the sudden
 
Tibetan uprisings and subsequent alleged oppression of
 
Tibetans by the Chinese authorities between 1987 and 1989.
 
For although the alleged atrocities against the Tibetans by
 
the Chinese have been reported as consistently ongoing for
 
forty years (during this period of time an estimated 1.2
 
million Tibetans have allegedly been killed by the Chinese),
 
these particular outbursts received unprecedented
 
international acknowledgment because of the presence of
 
foreign observers in Lhasa who could actually verify the
 
events.
 
In December of 1987 the Dalai Lama replied that the
 
riots in Lhasa occurred, not because of inflammatory
 
statements he had made during a recent visit to the United
 
States, but because of "the Chinese colonization of the
 
Tibetan highlands.  If the move to bring in a Chinese
 
population is not stopped, Tibetans will soon be a minority
 
in their own country, swamped by masses of Chinese settlers."
 
He then added, alluding to the holocaust in Nazi Germany:
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It is serious for us, for our culture, and for our
 
ancestral heritage, and Tibetans realize it.  In a
 
way, it is a final solution to the Tibetan problem,
 
Chinese style.  If international opinion does not
 
take notice, this will be the annihilation of the
 
Tibetan people and its civilization" (emphasis
 
added) (Buhrer, 1987, p. 21).
 
But despite his refusal to acknowledge that his words pushed
 
the Tibetans to protest, the international press and the
 
Chinese assert otherwise.  For this reason, I will examine
 
the speeches which many claim to have helped foment the
 
riots.
 
In these texts, it is the themes, symbols, and patterns
 
of communication that I seek to explore through a survey of
 
the Dalai Lama's rhetoric.  In addition to rhetorical style
 
and strategy, I will examine the ethical implications of the
 
rhetoric.  The Dalai Lama's cognizance of the mutual role of
 
communicating and understanding one another points to a
 
respect for his audience.  He is clear in differentiating
 
between respectful communication and one-sided communication.
 
I intend to investigate his rhetoric carefully in order to
 
see if this perceived and stated respect for a two-way flow
 
of communication and mutually beneficial direction of
 
communication is borne out in the rhetorical artifacts
 
available for scrutiny.
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Conclusion
 
Numerous essays, exposés, articles, interviews, film
 
documentaries, and books exist about the Dalai Lama's life
 
and his nation's trials.  Yet to date, absolutely nothing has
 
been written about the Dalai Lama specifically to investigate
 
his enormous capacity as a rhetor.  Moreover, his adept
 
handling of persuasive discourse in a cross cultural,
 
multimedia setting, and on an international stage, makes this
 
lack of scholarly critique all the more astonishing.  The
 
rhetoric of the Dalai Lama merits study because it serves as
 
a model in surmounting the rhetorical constraints of
 
contemporary communication.  Therefore, I propose to attack
 
this study using the literature available, in order to open
 
up in the field of communication what I believe will be a
 
useful discussion of a remarkable rhetor.
 
The existing analyses of the political implications of
 
the Dalai Lama's mission indicate he has made headway in
 
developing a rapprochement with the Chinese in regard to the
 
Tibetan question (Norbu, p.372).  Popular media treatment of
 
The Dalai Lama has made him a revered figure in the arena of
 
the Western cult of personality.  Tibetan studies experts
 
agree his influence over Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet
 
continues to be strong.  My analysis will examine the Dalai
 
Lama's rhetoric from the perspective of rhetorical criticism.
 
This study of the Dalai Lama's dramatic speech will fall
 
within Kenneth Burke's theoretical parameters.  As part of
 
the study of rhetorical criticism, the Dalai Lama's discourse
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will be explicated in light of social movement theory as the
 
speech of a charismatic leader of a social protest movement.
 
The phenomenon of the Dalai Lama is likewise noteworthy for
 
its precedent of miraculously maintaining from an expatriate
 
position the organization and support required to propel the
 
movement successfully.  Also, as part of the rhetorical
 
analysis, I will study how the Dalai Lama's discourse
 
encompasses international and cross cultural components.
 
will look at ways that the Dalai Lama's rhetoric features the
 
ability to surmount barriers which normally impede
 
communication--an unrivaled capacity which allows him to
 
cross fluidly into the persuasive realm of diverse cultures,
 
languages, and world views.
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CHAPTER TWO
 
ANCIENT PAST, UNCERTAIN PRESENT
 
The History of Tibet
 
This chapter will impart two important pieces of
 
information.  First, I will present a summary of Tibetan
 
history, and second, based upon an understanding of that
 
history, I will present an analysis of the different
 
interpretations of Tibet's history as they relate to the
 
Dalai Lama's discourse and the positions he takes on
 
historiographical issues.  For the purposes of this study,
 
Tibet's long and intricate recorded history will be divided
 
into six distinct periods of rule and development. The time
 
line in Figure 1 below shows the main points of historical
 
import from these six periods.  The following discussion of
 
Tibet's history will tersely cover the points in Tibetan
 
history which bear most heavily upon the Dalai Lama's
 
discourse.
 
Phase One:  The Rise of Kings and of Buddhism in Tibet
 
The first period of Tibet's recorded history begins in
 
500 C.E. and runs through the mid-800s; this era "roughly
 
coincides" with China's T'ang dynasty (618-905) (Goodman,
 
1986, p. 121).  Tibet's history as a united nation began in
 
617 C.E.  Reaching a peak of influence during the reign of
 
King Songtsen Gampo, for the next two hundred years,
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"Tibet's central Asian empire dominated parts of India,
 
Nepal...Burma to the South, Sinkiang to the North, China to
 
the East, and ...parts of present day Pakistan to the west"
 
(p.121). By the 700s, Buddhism, which had already taken hold
 
in India, started to permeate Tibetan culture via trade
 
routes.  During the eighth century, various Tibetan rulers
 
fought over the supremacy between the Bon, which was an early
 
Tibetan shamanistic religion, and Buddhism.  In an overview
 
of Tibetan history, Grunfeld notes that "despite the small
 
victories of the forces of Bon, Buddhism continued to make
 
major strides, particularly during the reign of King
 
Ralpachen, from 815-38 (1987, p.34).
 
In 821-823, a pact of nonagression defined Sino-Tibetan
 
boundaries.  In particular, the agreement declared that "all
 
to the east is the country of Great China and all to the west
 
is...the country of Great Tibet" (Goodman, 1986, p. 121).
 
This treaty was called the "Treaty of Uncle and Nephew," and
 
it would set the stage for later historical developments
 
between Tibet and China (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 34).  Evidence of
 
this treaty exists in the form of a stone pillar that was
 
erected at the foot of the Potala palace in Lhasa, Tibet at
 
the time of the treaty; the pillar is carved with the terms
 
of the agreement.'°
 
In 842 King Lang Darma, who was an opponent of Buddhism,
 
was assassinated, which caused the united Tibetan kingdom to
 
10 After 1959, the Chinese moved the pillar to a walled-in compound at
 
a site distant from the Potala.
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disintegrate into "numerous tribes, principalities and
 
regional hegemonies that were constantly at war with each
 
other" (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 35).  By this time, nonetheless,
 
Buddhism was growing as the main religion of Tibet.  During
 
the next four hundred years, China's declining T'ang dynasty
 
would recover most of the provinces ruled by Tibet under Lang
 
Darma.  Thereafter, any "contact between the two nations was
 
limited...to frontier clashes" and periodic trade, religious,
 
and diplomatic relations (Goodman, 1986, p. 122).
 
Phase Two:  Mongol Rule Over Tibet
 
The second era into which I have divided Tibetan history
 
for this discussion involves the overrunning and subsequent
 
expulsion from Tibet of the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan's
 
clan; this phase lasted from about 1239 to 1350.  During this
 
period of time the Mongols strengthened trade routes along
 
the Silk Road, thereby increasing social exchanges among
 
Mongolia, China, and Tibet.  Similar to the uncle-nephew
 
agreement described above, Mongol-ruled Tibet formed the
 
beginnings of a "priest-patron" system, in which highly
 
placed religious lamas offered their Buddhist teachings in
 
return for the power and security of being closely associated
 
with Mongol rulers (1987, p. 37).  Tieh-Tseng Li, a historian
 
of Tibetan history and politics, notes that "Kublai Khan
 
found the...Tibetans hard to rule, and resolved to reduce
 
them to a condition of docility through the influence of
 
religion.  Buddhism was reaffirmed as the religion best
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calculated to [do so]...as it had already secured a firm
 
foothold there" (1960, p. 19).
 
This theocratic and vassal system would continue even
 
after Tibet and China had expelled the Mongols, and would
 
last throughout the Qing Dynasty (van Walt van Praag, 1990,
 
p. 67). At the end of this era, in approximately 1358, Manchu
 
China and Tibet regained their respective territories that
 
had been controlled during the Mongol rule.
 
Phase Three:  The Legacy of Tsong Khapa
 
Between 1337 and 1338, an Indian leader named Muhammad
 
Tughluq attempted to undertake a military campaign to
 
overtake Tibet and potentially China (Li, 1960, p. 23).
 
Tughluq's campaign failed as Tibetan mountaineers fended off
 
up to 100,000 soldiers on Himalayan passes, leaving a few
 
stragglers to return to India (p. 23).  The Indian conquest
 
thus foiled, "the emperors at [Beijing] could comfortably
 
afford to leave the Tibetans alone and not meddle in their
 
affairs" (p. 24). From 1350 to 1642, Tibet was ruled by its
 
own nobles and theocratic establishment.  This period was
 
characterized, however, by sporadic diplomatic, religious,
 
and trade relations with China.
 
From approximately 1357 to 1417, Tibet's ruler was Tsong
 
Khapa.  Tsong Khapa reasserted the influence of Buddhism on
 
the Tibetan people by reforming Buddhists into the Gelugpa
 
sect and by ordering the construction of Ganden, Sera and
 
Drepung monasteries, each of which housed between three and
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seven thousand monks.  These monasteries would become the
 
most influential seats of Tibetan power and government.
 
Tsong Khapa's legacy as a religious leader and reincarnated
 
lama formed the foundation for the reign of the Dalai Lamas
 
(Grunfeld, 1987, pp. 38-39).  Tsong Khapa worked to refine
 
Tibetan Buddhism so that its teachings resembled more closely
 
its Indian roots.  At the same time, Buddhist tenets were
 
also incorporated into political structures as well.
  For
 
example, the tenet of reincarnation assumed temporal
 
meanings.  As a central Buddhist belief, reincarnation refers
 
to "the cycle of birth and death [which] is repeated until
 
the individual becomes enlightened... When [enlightenment]
 
happens, the cycle.., ceases and the individual may enter
 
nirvana" (Layman, 1976, p. 10).  So, during Tsong Khapa's
 
reign, to ensure a concentration of Gelugpa power in
 
succeeding rulers, the ancient concept of reincarnation was
 
expanded so that it could be understood in a political sense.
 
Thus reincarnation, as existing in conjunction with temporal
 
rule, assumed political overtones (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 38).
 
In addition, other nonviolent beliefs of Buddhism also became
 
augmented in order to fashion the existing political
 
structure.  Following rules of nonviolence, for instance,
 
helped keep the monks and peasants compliant to the leaders'
 
rule (pp. 38-39).  This political and religious melange set
 
the stage for the line of Dalai Lamas which extends to Tenzin
 
Gyatso, the present day's Fourteenth Dalai Lama.  Regents
 
handled the affairs of state during periods between the death
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of a Dalai Lama and the discovery and appointment of the next
 
reincarnation.
 
The title of Dalai Lama is in fact Mongolian in origin.11
 
The third Dalai Lama was bestowed with this title when,
 
during a visit to Altan Khan in 1578, he converted the Khan
 
to Buddhism.  From 1644 to 1911, Tibet garnered the position
 
of being a self-run state under the protectorate agreement
 
with China that China would extend defenses, when necessary,
 
to fend off any Mongol invaders.  The first part of this
 
phase lasted until 1720, when the Manchus gained control of
 
Tibet and Beijing. Until then, the Dalai Lama rulers became
 
increasingly established.  The religious and temporal role
 
and symbolism of the Dalai Lama was as a leader
 
of the Buddhist church and the administration of
 
the country.  He is an emanation of the bodhisattva
 
Chenresi, the patron saint of Tibet who has
 
returned to earth to guide [humankind] on the path
 
to salvation.  Normally he assumed his temporal
 
rule at the age of eighteen, and his authority in
 
both spheres was in theory absolute; as a divinity
 
ruling on earth there can be no direct opposition
 
to his orders... The dual nature of the Dalai
 
Lama's position was reflected in the governmental
 
structure beneath him, which was divided into two
 
branches, one civil and the other monastic.  Each
 
consisted of approximately 175 officials, but
 
during the last two decades of [alleged] Tibetan
 
independence, from 1930 to 1950, there were
 
approximately 200 of the former and 230 of the
 
latter (Goodman, 1986, p. 81).
 
11  The title of Dalai Lama encompasses many ideas:
 
"Dalai Lama Vajradhara:" dalai, Mongolian for ocean; lama,
 
Tibetan for priest; and vajradhara, Sanskrit for holder of
 
the thunderbolt...Tibetans...usually call their leader
 
"Gyalwa Rinpoche," [meaning] "Victorious One;" "Kyabngon
 
Rinpoche," (meaning) "Precious Protector," or the "Wish
 
Fulfilling Gem" who never dies but "goes to heavenly fields
 
for the benefit of other living creatures" (Grunfeld, 1987,
 
p.39).
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The first officially sanctioned Dalai Lama was Gedun
 
Truppa (1391-1474), who was designated as the reincarnation
 
of Tsong Khapa.  By the time of the fourth Dalai Lama, the
 
institution of Dalai Lama as religious leader was
 
"undisputed," (p.39).  The fifth Dalai Lama, Ngwang Gyatso
 
(1617-82), known to Tibetans as the "Great Fifth," was the
 
first religious leader to also gain temporal powers.
 
Following his death, a regent ruled for many years until the
 
sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso (1682-1707), was found.
 
The sixth Dalai Lama, known as the "Merry One," was a
 
notorious libertine.  The sixth's reputation was enough cause
 
for concern that religious leaders sought a replacement for
 
him, but the Tibetans always viewed the originally named lama
 
as the true one (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 41).
 
The seventh Dalai Lama, Kelzang Gyatso (1708-58),
 
ascended to the throne in 1720, and, over time, markedly
 
increased the temporal powers associated with the role of the
 
Dalai Lama (p. 43).  Table 1 below lists all of the Dalai
 
Lamas, noting where possible their historical significance,
 
and their dates of rule.12
 
In 1788, a portion of Tibet was overtaken by the Gurkhas
 
of Nepal.  The Tibetans negotiated to pay off the Gurkhas to
 
get them to leave, which they did.  But the Tibetans failed
 
to pay the debt, and the Gurkhas returned in 1791 (Li, 1960,
 
12  Little is known about the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Dalai Lamas
 
(Goodman, 1986, p. 84).
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4 
Tsong Khapa
 
Founded the Gelugpa, or Yellow Hat sect.
 
GedUn Truppa
 
Close disciple of Tsong Khapa who strengthened
 
Yellow Hat sect.
 
GedUn Gyatso
 
Propagated Gelugpa faith.
 
Sonam Gyatso
 
Was the first to gain title of Dalai Lama.
 
Yonten Gyatso
 
Ngwang Lozang Gyatso
 
Known as "The Great Fifth."
 
Constructed the Potala Palace in Lhasa.
 
Tsangyang Gyatso
 
Known as "The Merry One" for his rakish behavior.
 
Kesang Gyatso
 
Increased the temporal power of the Dalai Lama as
 
a leader.
 
Jampal Gyatso
 
1W Luntok Gyatso
 
Tsultrim Gyatso
 
Khendrup Gyatso
 
rinley Gyatso
 
Thupten Gyatso
 
Fled to exile in India and declares Tibet
 
independent from China.
 
Tenzin Gyatso
 
Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent
 
protest leadership.
 
Has been instrumental in successfully leading and
 
organizing the Tibetan Diaspora's move into modern
 
life in exile while preserving Tibetan culture and
 
customs.
 
Table 1.  Tibet's Dalai Lamas
 
1357 - 1417
 
1475 - 1542
 
1543 - 1588
 
1589 - 1617
 
1617 - 1682
 
1682 - 1707
 
1758
 
1758 - 1804
 
1806 - 1815
 
1816 - 1837
 
1838 - 1856
 
1856 - 1875
 
1876 - 1933
 
1935 ­44 
p. 52).  The Chinese army was summoned to repel the Gurkhas.
 
The Gurkhas were defeated.  The weakened Tibetan theocracy
 
was subjugated to the Chinese Emperor, and the Dalai and
 
Panchen Lamas were nominally compelled to "report to the
 
[Chinese] Residents and ask their orders"  (p. 53).
 
It was during this period of time that the system of
 
selecting reincarnations showed a tendency to cull discovered
 
incarnations from noble families, such as the female child
 
incarnation of the Grand Lama Cheptsundampa  (pp. 57-58).  As
 
a consequence, under Chinese mandate, for a short time the
 
selection process was substituted with "the drawing of lots"
 
in cases where there was more than one contender for high
 
offices such as Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama (p. 58).  This
 
period of Chinese influence lasted until the early nineteenth
 
century, when the Sino-Anglo Opium War in China virtually
 
ended Chinese influence in Tibet (p. 59).
 
Phase Four:  The Europeans Arrive and
 
Suzerainty Is Confirmed
 
By the turn of the nineteenth century, the Russians and
 
British vied for influence over Tibet. "From 1895 to 1911,
 
Tibet was to become a pawn in the struggle for world
 
domination between London and St. Petersburg" (Grunfeld,
 
1987, p. 48).  Aside from geographical "explorations and
 
surveys...and...interests in trade...Russia's chief
 
connection with Tibet was through [the] Buriat subjects who
 
were followers of the Yellow Hat sect" (Li, 1960, p. 84).
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In the mid 1800s, the Chinese Manchu empire was in
 
decline and its influence on Tibet and the selection of
 
theocratic succession was reduced to token approval by the
 
Emperor (Li, 1960, p. 59).  In 1855, Tibet was again invaded
 
by the Gurkhas, and although China's power had been greatly
 
weakened, the Chinese Emperor once more sent troops to defend
 
Tibet.  An agreement was arrived at in 1856, stipulating that
 
both Tibet and Nepal would "acknowledge allegiance  to the
  ...
 
Emperor of China" (p. 61).
 
But by 1865 in Tibet, a "transfer of...real power to the
 
Dalai Lama" was taking place (Li, 1960, p. 64).  In addition
 
to power, Tibet was also able to regain border territory (p.
 
62).  China's influence on Tibet and neighboring countries
 
was rapidly eliminated through a series of agreements,
 
including Chinese recognition of British control over Sikkim
 
in 1890 and the protocol of 1901 between European countries
 
and China's Imperial Court (p. 63).
 
In 1903, Lord Curzon, British Viceroy to India, "ordered
 
a military expedition to Tibet under Colonel Francis
 
Younghusband" (Goodman, 1986, p. 124).  The mission having
 
been accomplished, the British then initiated the Lhasa
 
Convention, which established British trade on the Tibet-

Sikkim border and also stipulated that the British would have
 
final control over Tibet's interaction in foreign affairs,
 
including relations with China (Goodman,  p. 125; van Walt van
 
Praag, 1990, p. 67).  While Russia had to settle for limited
 
trade access in Tibet, the Convention's definition of Tibet
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as a buffer state among India, British controlled
 
territories, and Russia, was acknowledged by Russia as
 
acceptable (Li, 1960, pp. 120-123).
 
Following the brief invasion of Tibet by British troops
 
in 1903-1904, the "suzerainty" arrangement of the early
 
Twentieth century, like the former protector-protected
 
system, was established with China.  Political scientist Gary
 
Bullert defines suzerainty as follows:  "Under international
 
law, a suzerain state acts as an international guardian while
 
the vassal state is given internal autonomy or self-

governance" (1986, p.35).  In this case, the "suzerain state"
 
was China and the "vassal state" was Tibet.
 
Tibet's suzerainty arrangement was the agreement between
 
China and Tibet that each should remain separately peopled
 
and ruled nations, with the distinction that, should Tibet
 
(as a small and peaceful nation lacking a military) require
 
assistance in defense of foreign attack, that China would aid
 
Tibet.  In exchange for this protective service, Tibet would
 
pay tributes and monies periodically to the rulers of China,
 
such as that paid to China when the Fourteenth Dalai Lama was
 
first chosen as the reincarnation of his predecessor.  The
 
Chinese only released the designated child incarnation to
 
travel to Lhasa after the Tibetan government paid a ransom
 
consisting of a full set of religious writings and a large
 
sum of money (Li, 1960, pp.177-180).
 
The suzerainty arrangement was acknowledged by Great
 
Britain and India by treaty at the 1913 Conference at Simla.
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Goldstein's research confirms that the "British Foreign
 
Office...examined the meaning of suzerainty... [and]
 
concluded that all the evidence showed that Tibet was not
 
merely a portion of China, but, rather, had a clear
 
international identity of [its] own" (1989, p. 716).
 
According to British delegates, Tibet's delegates to the
 
Simla Conference represented an "independent nation
 
recognizing no allegiance to China" (van Walt van Praag,
 
1990, p. 68).  Because Chinese delegates refused to sign the
 
treaty, Tibet's delegates and the British signed a Joint
 
Declaration which "bound themselves not to recognize Chinese
 
suzerainty or special rights in Tibet unless China signed
 
the...Simla Convention" (van Walt van Praag, 1990, p. 69).
 
Following the Simla Conference, Tibet's international
 
relations involved the "British, Chinese, Nepalese, and
 
Bhutanese...When India became independent, the British
 
mission in Lhasa was replaced by an Indian one" (van Walt van
 
Praag, 1990, p. 69).
 
Great Britain's Sir Arthur Henry McMahon presided over
 
the Simla Conference, and the British proposal of
 
establishing new mountain borders along Tibet's western, or
 
outer Tibet region, was instituted as the McMahon Line (Li,
 
1960, pp. 135-140).  It was not until 1949 that China's
 
government (as yet not Communist) "denounced" the Simla
 
Conference and "repudiated...[any] validity" to the document
 
which was signed (p. 142).
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Phase Five:  Left Alone
 
In the fifth period of Tibet's past, from 1914 to 1950,
 
Tibet was essentially left to its own devices and remained
 
purposefully aloof from the rest of the world.  Even the
 
First and Second World Wars went largely unnoticed by Tibet,
 
which remained neutral (van Walt van Praag, 1990,  p. 69).
 
Tibet escaped, by and large, the influences of the modern
 
world in the first part of the twentieth century for three
 
reasons.  First, Tibet had its Himalayan passes as natural
 
barriers that required enormous diplomatic and financial
 
investments on the part of interested parties wishing to
 
cross over them to gain access to Tibet.  Second, Tibet's
 
most powerful neighbors, including Russia, China, and British
 
controlled India, were experiencing great turmoil internally,
 
which diverted their attentions inwards, and away from Tibet.
 
Third, Tibet's ruling administration, having been burned by
 
the recent past's British and Chinese incursions into their
 
nation, exercised an extremely strict isolationist policy,
 
and kept any contact whatsoever with foreign persons and
 
diplomats to a bare minimum.0  Consequently, before, during,
 
and after World Wars I and II, little or none of the
 
diplomatic exchanges or technological advancements such as
 
electricity or automobiles reached Tibet--apart from the
 
13  Heinrich Harrer, in his book Seven Years in Tibet, recounts the
 
great physical barriers presented by the Tibetan topography and the
 
administrative obstacles put up by Tibetan magistrates who attempted to
 
keep him out of the country during the early 1940s.
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Dalai Lama's own experiences with such novelties which were
 
otherwise rare to nonexistent in Tibet.
 
Inside Tibet, with the death of the Thirteenth Dalai
 
Lama in 1933, the theocratic government was in uproar.
 
Indeed, "at one time the Tibetan political situation was so
 
tense that civil war seemed quite possible" (Li,  1960, p.
 
165).  Despite Chinese overtures for administrative and
 
military support during this period of crisis, Tibet's  "Lhasa
 
authorities were not yet ready to place their trust and
 
reliance on the Chinese government of the day"  (p. 170).
 
Eventually a degree of peace was restored among Tibet's
 
ruling factions.  By 1940, the newly selected incarnation of
 
the Dalai Lama had been installed at the Potala (p. 183).  In
 
the interim between the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama
 
and the succession of this Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the Regent
 
maintained the affairs of state in Tibet.  In the mean time,
 
the child lama undertook a period of arduous religious and
 
academic studies.
 
It was not until the late 1940s that Tibet's Regent and
 
administration began to realize the importance of developing
 
external allies.  In 1947 India gained independence from
 
Great Britain; this loss of British control meant for Tibet
 
the loss of a close relation with a power that had
 
consistently acted on Tibet's behalf--albeit for British
 
interests--to maintain Tibet as a buffer state with regard to
 
Russia and China.  India's position toward Tibet would remain
 
similar to the previously held British position only for a
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short time under Mr. Nehru.14
 In addition, with the sudden
 
growth of Mao's power in China, coupled with his promises of
 
gaining Taiwan and Tibet as territories, the Tibetans saw the
 
need to begin opening up lines of communication with the
 
outside world.15
 
Most notable in Tibetan attempts to rectify their
 
extreme isolationism was the Tibetan trade mission, whose
 
purpose was to secure diplomatic ties through agreements with
 
foreign nations to expand their respective trade markets in
 
Tibet (Goldstein, 1989, p. 572).  The mission's goals were
 
also to buy "gold abroad to secure Tibet's currency" and "to
 
gain direct access to foreign currency" (p.  571).16  The trade
 
mission failed on all accounts.  In their lack of diplomatic
 
powers and their "refusal to recognize the new Indian
 
government as Britain's successor," the mission offended
 
India (p. 574).  The Tibetan trade mission's next obstacle
 
was its attempt to deal with the British, who "now preferred
 
to avoid... entanglements in Sino-Tibetan politics and did
 
14 Li maintains that at the Asiatic Conference in 1947, separate
 
delegations for China and Tibet were received by India, and there was
 
displayed "a hug map of Asia on which Tibet was drawn outside the
 
boundary of China" (p. 195).
 
15 According to Gary Bullert, "In early January, 1950, Marshall Chu Teh,
 
Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic, announced the [planned)
 
'liberation of Tibet.'  Mao Tse-Tung spoke of the forthcoming invasion
 
of Tibet in June, 1950" (1986, p. 21).
 
16  For China's part, research indicates that
 
The Chinese had two basic goals with regard to the Tibetan
 
mission:  first, either to dissuade them from visiting
 
America and England, or, if this were not possible, to
 
entice them into using Chinese passports; and, second, to
 
induce them...to attend the upcoming National Assembly
 
meeting that was being convened to elect a president and
 
vice-president (Goldstein, 1989, pp. 579 - 580).
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not want to go out of [their] way to aid or encourage Tibet
 
in its struggle to maintain its de facto independence"  (p.
 
576).  While the British allowed the mission to pass through
 
Hong Kong, the mission was prevented from visiting England
 
(p. 576).
 
Lastly, the trade mission attempted to negotiate with
 
the United States through the U.S. Embassy in Delhi, India,
 
but the U.S. by then affirmed its support of "China's
 
sovereignty over Tibet" and refused to enter into formal
 
negotiations unless the Tibetans would trade in their Tibetan
 
passports for Chinese passports.  In the absence of China's
 
sanctioning of the mission's trip, the U.S. would only offer
 
them "an informal reception" (p. 578).  Not long after the
 
trade mission visited China, it sought to visit the U.S.
 
Like Great Britain, the U.S. "State Department saw no reason
 
to alienate the Chinese and precipitate a major diplomatic
 
incident by ignoring Chinese wishes and treating the Tibetans
 
as a mission from an independent nation" (p. 585). Through
 
the State Department's use of administrative loopholes
 
regarding visas, the Tibetans were able to visit the U.S. on
 
their Tibetan passports.  But they were unable to meet with
 
President Truman as they had been led to believe they would
 
be able to, since the stipulation for a meeting was that the
 
mission be accompanied by the Chinese ambassador.  The
 
Tibetans refused such an arrangement, and instead met alone
 
with Secretary of State Marshall.  Unable to purchase U.S.
 
gold, the mission left and traveled to London (again, via
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finagled visas on Tibetan Government passports).  The English
 
refused to enter into currency dealings, and the mission
 
returned to India empty handed (pp. 598  - 604).  There, after
 
lengthy negotiations, they were able to procure $250,000 for
 
the purchase of American gold bullion (p. 606).
 
Meanwhile, a publicity campaign to inform the world
 
about Tibet was introduced by Lowell Thomas (an American) and
 
his son.  Thomas's "dramatic visit and the broadcasting
 
records he made during his stay in Tibet, and the statement
 
he issued on his return, aroused great interest in the
 
Tibetan situation and produced ...comment throughout the
 
world" (Li, 1960, p. 200).  The Austrian mountain climber and
 
explorer, Heinrich Harrer, also made efforts in Europe on
 
behalf of Tibet, including writing his best-selling book,
 
Seven Years in Tibet, which was published in many languages.
 
But in the end, the Tibetans' belated efforts at securing
 
allies through publicity, trade, and diplomacy proved
 
fruitless.  In a last ditch effort at isolation, they
 
expelled all Chinese from Tibet in 1949 (Goldstein, 1989,  pp.
 
613 - 614).  But Mao's threats were to be realized in 1950,
 
when the Communist Red Army crossed into Tibetan territory
 
and began to engage in bloody skirmishes easily won over the
 
ill equipped and outnumbered Tibetan Khampas (Bullert, 1986,
 
p. 23).
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Phase Six: The Cultural Revolution and Subsequent
 
Reform in Tibet
 
The sixth phase of Tibetan history begins with the
 
invasion (or liberation) of Tibet by China in 1950 and
 
continues to the present day.  It was during this time frame
 
that the Dalai Lama experienced the final transition of Tibet
 
from a nation isolated from Chinese control to a nation that
 
was to become merely another portion of China's vast
 
countryside and administration.  So while the rest of the
 
world turned its attention to the start of the Korean War, in
 
1950-1951, the small, Tibetan bands of poorly armed and
 
equipped Khampas were quickly overcome by Mao's Red Army
 
troops.  Finally, the Chinese troops marched into Lhasa to
 
assume control over the ancient theocratic regime of which
 
the young Dalai Lama was the head.
 
The issue of suzerainty was one of the most significant
 
reasons for the lack of foreign support for Tibet in fending
 
off the Chinese.  The Indian and Western understanding of
 
Tibet's relation to China through suzerainty created the
 
perfect opportunity for the Chinese to invade and for India
 
and the West to look the other way.  Tibet's suzerainty
 
arrangement was complicated because the Chinese did not
 
actually sign the Simla agreement.17  The Simla agreement
 
17 Norbu claims that China's refusal to ratify the Simla Conference was
 
due to
 
...the Sino-Tibetan failure to reach an agreement on the
 
China-Eastern Tibetan frontier.  China pressed for a common
 
boundary through Gyam-da, only about 125 miles from Lhasa...
 
[which] shows that the early Chinese Republican
 
government...conceded to the British division of Tibet into
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formally established, in terms of modern international  law,
 
that Tibet was a vassal state with its own "internal
 
sovereignty and self-governance."  Even though, by most
 
accounts, this Tibetan de facto autonomy was the case,
 
China's refusal to sign proved critical.  In 1949, protecting
 
Tibet's suzerain status was thus easily dismissed by Great
 
Britain and India at the time when an invasion of Tibet by
 
Chinese troops loomed ahead.18
 
The questionable clarity of the suzerainty concept
 
enabled the transfer of Tibet back into China's tight rein.
 
With the arrival of the Chinese troops in 1950-1951, Tibet
 
appealed, to no avail, to the United Nations for help.  One
 
reason why help was not forthcoming was that all Chinese
 
reports of the suzerainty relationship were altered to stop
 
any international outcry.  Any Chinese documentation changed
 
all references of suzerainty by translating them as
 
"sovereignty" (Bullert, 1986, p. 24).  In this manner, China
 
became the supreme controller, instead of friendly protector
 
of Tibet, all according to international law.  Political
 
two spheres of influence...that of the Chinese (inner Tibet)
 
and that of the British (outer Tibet) (1987, p. 274).
 
18 Great Britain's and India's ignoring the Simla Treaty was possible
 
because since China had not signed at Simla, India and Britain's own
 
agreement over Tibet's status was deemed politically inexpedient to
 
affirm (Altschiller, 1994,p.192):
 
Contrary to charges of British imperialism...Lord Curzon,
 
Viceroy of India, stated that the British didn't want Tibet
 
and preferred to have the Chinese protect it against Russia
 
as a northern buffer for India.  Curzon regarded suzerainty
 
of China over Tibet to be a "constitutional fiction," not
 
actual control, utilized only for convenience of both the
 
British and the Chinese (Bullert, 1986, p.35).
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scientist Julian Weiss states that "when Britain and India
 
chose to obstruct rather than support the Tibetan appeal for
 
help, nothing was done.  Lhasa did not even receive a reply
 
to its last agonized telegram to the U.N. requesting neutral
 
observers to be sent to Tibet to confirm that they were in
 
fact being invaded by the Communist Chinese" (p.388).  The
 
United Nations, then, had apparently accepted the Chinese
 
translations and the attendant meaning change from suzerainty
 
to sovereignty.
 
The years of 1950 to 1959 are sometimes referred to as a
 
"honeymoon" period.  During this time frame, while there was
 
building tension and anxiety about China's takeover of Tibet,
 
there was also a good deal of attendant hope for progress and
 
modernization of Tibet.  But as the years passed, Chinese
 
officials increasingly usurped Tibetan administrative powers.
 
This became a source of frustration and anger for both
 
Tibetans and Chinese.  The Tibetan theocratic establishment,
 
headed by the kashag (Tibet's cabinet of elder statesmen) and
 
the teenaged Dalai Lama, felt their powers rapidly eroding.
 
This reduction in power was keenly felt by the kashag, who
 
were ordered to be replaced or to resign when they showed
 
signs of intransigence.  At the same time, the frustrations
 
of the Tibetan people were reaching a peak because they were
 
undergoing food shortages which had never been experienced
 
before, as well as sudden price inflation due to the presence
 
of the large numbers of troops in the formerly sparsely
 
populated country.  Meanwhile, the Chinese could not grasp
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why the "backward" Tibetans stalled all Chinese attempts to
 
enable Tibet to be modernized by communism.
 
The Tibetans and Chinese came to loggerheads in early
 
March of 1959, when the Dalai Lama was invited to attend a
 
theatrical performance at the Chinese generals' headquarters
 
in Lhasa.  The Tibetans feared foul play, and converged
 
around the Potala to protect the Dalai Lama and to prevent
 
him from attending the performance.  At least ten thousand
 
Tibetans in Lhasa crowded around the Potala palace to protect
 
the Dalai Lama from what they believed would be his
 
kidnapping by Chinese leaders (Grunfeld, 1987, pp.130-133;
 
Barber,1960, pp.106-107).  The throngs of Tibetans were of
 
course problematic to the Chinese generals, whose troops
 
ordered them to disperse.  But the crowd refused to leave.
 
This went on for days.  Finally, fearing that the troops
 
would open fire on the crowds and the palace, the Dalai Lama
 
and his entourage and family were able to slip out through
 
the crowds and journey over the Himalayan passes into India,
 
unseen by Chinese search planes overhead (anonymous, The New
 
York Times, 1959, p.A-12).  The Dalai Lama has remained
 
exiled in India ever since.
 
The history of Tibet from 1959 through to 1976 parallels
 
that of China during this time.  Propaganda and political
 
indoctrination campaigns, massive destruction of cultural
 
icons, religious establishments, monasteries, villages, and
 
families have been widely documented and are acknowledged by
 
Western, Tibetan and, more recently, Chinese historians and
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government officials alike.  Hundreds of thousands, and
 
perhaps even millions, of Tibetans and Chinese were killed in
 
the process of Mao's Cultural Revolution.  There was
 
widespread collaboration by Tibetans with the Chinese
 
administration.  Those Tibetans who were not killed or who
 
would not collaborate fled into exile into India, Nepal,
 
Burma, Bhutan, and some ended up in European countries or in
 
the United States.  The steady stream of refugees from Tibet
 
continues to pour over the Himalayas to this day, causing
 
problems for India politically in terms of its relations with
 
China, and socially and culturally, in terms of clashes
 
between Tibetan refugees and many Indians who resent the
 
Tibetans' incursion into India.
 
Border conflicts resurged during this period and
 
continue to exist along the Himalayas.  There was a border
 
war in 1962 between India and China; border territories still
 
remain in dispute.  Also, "with the fall of Tibet there has
 
been an intense... arms race between India and China.  From
 
both sides there has been a progressive diversion of  scarce
 
resources... to arms building" (Norbu, 1987, p. 289).
 
At Mao's death in 1976, and during Deng Xiaopeng's
 
subsequent rise to power, efforts were begun to redress the
 
excesses which had occurred in Tibet as elsewhere in China.
 
Culminating with newly instituted religious freedoms in the
 
1980s, the Tibetans were given more rights, and even tax
 
breaks, in order to restore order in the poor regions of the
 
former Tibet, especially in the Tibetan Autonomous Region
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(TAR), or outer Tibet.  Gradual reform measures, however,
 
have taken place in Tibet more slowly than they have in the
 
rest of China.  Nonetheless, religious freedoms have slowly
 
and incrementally been restored; even if they are severely
 
restricted, their allowance is in stark contrast to the
 
outright banning of any religious activity which
 
characterized the 1960s up through the mid 1970s.
 
At the same time, the unproductive and unworkable
 
results of communist farming collectives have been recognized
 
by the Chinese leaders in Beijing.  During the past decade,
 
land has been returned to peasants to rent and farm, and
 
nomads are, comparatively speaking, more free to roam Tibet
 
as they have done traditionally.19  Schools, roads, airports,
 
administrative facilities, hotels and restaurants have been
 
constructed, and other material signs of infrastructure
 
modernization have taken place in Tibet since China's
 
takeover in 1950.  The influx of Chinese settlers in Tibetan
 
regions due to job, wage, and housing incentives offered by
 
the Chinese central government has allegedly made Tibetans a
 
distinct minority in Tibet; the exact population figures
 
19  Some reforms have backfired.  Schwartz maintains that
 
The resurgence of the natural economy where Tibetan
 
producers cling to their self-sufficient ownership [i.e.,
 
minimal consumption of goods)... is an undesirable outcome
 
of the reform policies of the 1980s.  The same is true for
 
the revival of traditional religion, which consumes economic
 
resources and reinforces the traditional way of life and
 
traditional modes of production.  The expanding Chinese
 
market economy is... used as a standard against which
 
Tibetan cultural attitudes are measured (1994, p. 200).
 
The Chinese are thus confounded when Tibetans continue to pour their
 
meager salaries into rebuilding monasteries instead of buying goods from
 
the market.  The TAR continues to operate at a deficit.
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regarding numbers of Chinese and Tibetans in inner and outer
 
Tibet remains unclear.20
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Tenzin Gyatso was born in the Tibetan village of Takster
 
in 1935.  In a tradition spanning the centuries, he was
 
selected as Dalai Lama at the age of two by high official
 
monks following the mysterious omens and directives given by
 
Tibet's state oracle.  After the child had passed a series of
 
tests which confirmed he was the reincarnation of his
 
predecessor, he was taken from his peasant family and
 
instituted at the capital of Tibet, Lhasa, where he was to
 
begin an eighteen-year long education in the philosophy of
 
metaphysics, religion, and the affairs of running the
 
government of Tibet.  But his life of peaceful study and
 
preparations for assuming full control of leadership was
 
abruptly curtailed.2I  At the age of fifteen, he was
 
catapulted into leadership of the nation due to the arrival
 
of Chinese Communist Army troops in 1950-1951.  For nearly a
 
decade, the Dalai Lama attempted to deal with the Chinese,
 
and was able to maintain an uneasy alliance in the interests
 
20  Zhu Li writes in the Beiiing Review (October 12, 1987) that,
 
"according to 1986 statistics, there were 2,024,938 people in the whole
 
region, of whom 1,937,379 were Tibetans.  The 73,534 Hans accounted for
 
only 3.6 percent of the total population..." (p.4).  Yet reliable
 
Western sources as well as the Tibetan government in exile dispute these
 
figures.  In addition, when Zhu Li does not specifically refer to the
 
TAR, and instead only mentions "the whole region" in general the 
boundaries for assessing Tibetan population counts is also in dispute.
21  Traditionally, a Regent headed up the affairs of state until the 
young Dalai Lama had passed his doctoral examinations.  But in the case 
of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the urgency of the situation speeded up 
the transfer of power from the Regent to the Dalai Lama. 60 
of his people.  He traveled with the Panchen Lama to Beijing
 
to attend meetings and diplomatic events. He was also able to
 
make a trip to India, during which time he made the
 
acquaintance of Mr. Nehru and other Indian ministers.
 
Increasingly, however, he found the administrative
 
powers of his cabinet, or Kashag, abridged by the Chinese
 
leaders' threats and manipulation.  Finally, in 1959 he fled
 
Tibet following the uprising of Tibetans in Lhasa against the
 
Communist Chinese.
 
The above sketch of Tibet's history having been
 
completed, the next section of this chapter will examine the
 
Dalai Lama's stance on Tibet's history.  The following
 
section provides an analysis of how history is used by the
 
Dalai Lama (and to a lesser extent, his rhetorical
 
adversaries) to persuade audiences of the veracity and
 
importance of certain claims regarding events in Sino-Tibetan
 
history.
 
Interpreting History:  Two Views
 
History is paramount in the debate over the status of
 
Tibet.  Goldstein correctly observes that
 
Two diametrically opposing views of Tibet's status
 
vis-a-vis China have dominated both the popular and
 
the scholarly literature.  The pro-Tibetan school
 
argues that Tibet had been an independent state
 
conquered by the Chinese Communists and was wrongly
 
incorporated into the Chinese state.  The pro-

Chinese school sees Tibet as a traditional part of
 
China...which was rightly reunited with China in
 
1951.  In both schools, impartiality often takes
 
third place to polemical oratory and political
 
expedience, with selected international events used
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in isolation to substantiate one position or the
 
other (1989, pp.xix-xx).
 
The "pro-Tibet school" rhetoric is found in most Western
 
media and academic treatments; the "pro-Chinese school"
 
rhetoric is found, first, among Chinese leadership, and,
 
through the lack of action on behalf of Tibet or through
 
tacit support of China, in Western and Indian political
 
levels.  The significance of this historical cleft has
 
created an obstacle to dialogue between the Dalai Lama
 
himself and the Chinese leadership.22  The "pro-Tibet
 
22  Dawa Norbu explains the importance of the historical issue to the
 
present and future communication between the Dalai Lama and Chinese
 
leadership:
 
Chinese hard-liners object to the very concept of
 
independence that might have existed in the pre-1950 Tibetan
 
history...The (Chinese] pragmatists, however, particularly
 
Deng Xiaopeng and Hu Yaobang, might have been contented with
 
the Dalai Lama's acceptance of the fact that since 1950
 
China had gained sovereignty over Tibet and that it is on
 
that basis that he wishes to negotiate an 'associate' status
 
for Tibet.  The pragmatists would realistically reason that
 
the possibility of future Tibetan independence--as a result
 
of the Dalai Lama's claim that Tibet prior to the Communist
 
takeover in 1950 was independent--is rather slim because
 
China continues to be the third military power in the
 
world...and the possibility of armed external intervention
 
on behalf of the Tibetans is most unlikely... (p.367).
 
Yet the Dalai Lama has been so bold as to play up this latter
 
possibility during the Gulf War, when he lauded the United States coming
 
to the defenses of Kuwait as a small, independent nation, with the
 
obvious implications of comparing Tibet's invasion in 1950 to Kuwait's
 
in 1991. As one article in The Economist put it:  "If Kuwait deserves
 
liberation from an aggressor, why not Tibet?  The question enrages
 
China...Yet it is a question raised with increasing effect by Tibet's
 
exiled spiritual Leader, the Dalai Lama" (emphasis added)(April 27,
 
1991,p.41). It may seem especially curious that the Dalai Lama praised
 
U.S. military action because war's violence is paradoxical to the his
 
stated nonviolent (Buddhist) stance for conflict resolution.  On the
 
other hand, the Dalai Lama maintains that, "According to the Buddhist
 
view point, result and motivation are more important than method... The
 
main difficulty in such cases is determining after serious and careful
 
consideration whether there is any possible alternative to violence"
 
(Goodman, 1986, p. 327).
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school," led by the Dalai Lama, claims the Chinese have
 
"attempted to rewrite the history of Tibet to serve their own
 
purposes" (Weiss, 1989, p. 395). The Chinese say otherwise,
 
and the tacit acceptance of Chinese moves by Western
 
diplomatic corps serves to back the Chinese leadership's
 
position.23
 
Certainly, from a Westerner's perspective, one of the
 
Dalai Lama's chief rhetorical tools is the documented history
 
of Tibet as a self ruled country.  "This... debate on pre­
1950 Tibetan history might continue to be problematic in
 
Sino-Tibetan dialogue," posits Norbu; however, it could also
 
prove to be useful in the persuasive realm of publicity to
 
sway world opinion.  In mustering support for his cause, the
 
acknowledged veracity of history is useful to the Dalai
 
Lama's "polemical oratory."  The relative historical "truth"
 
of Tibet's past self rule, with regard to social movement and
 
rhetorical theory, serves as a factual mechanism which
 
"unmasks" the establishment, which in this case is the
 
Chinese and Western leaders who back each other.  This
 
Beckwith comments that
 
If the present status of Tibet may be compared with small-

scale crime, it is precisely as if the media of a major city
 
were to broadcast news about the rape and torture of a
 
victim as a criminal slowly murders her, while the police
 
make public announcements to the effect that the criminal is
 
too important and too good a "friend" for them to interfere.
 
The problem, in short, is that such criminal activity finds
 
widespread condonation in spite of international law (1988,
 
p.627).
 
23 63 
unmasking therefore aids the cause in augmenting the popular
 
pressure to sway the establishment's leadership.24
 
In his second autobiography, Freedom in Exile  (1990),
 
the Dalai Lama concedes that he is vexed by the fact that
 
even though the Chinese have "lost face" in front of the
 
whole world over the Tibetan issue and the mistakes made by
 
the Gang of Four and the Cultural Revolution, China seems
 
relatively unfazed and continues to go about its alleged
 
business of human rights abuses and political  excesses.
 
Nonetheless, the Dalai Lama continues to push the historical
 
facts to the fore in his persuasive campaign.  Norbu likewise
 
confirms that "the Dalai Lama has indicated that he refuses
 
to rewrite Tibetan history in the way the Chinese wish him to
 
do" (p. 367).
 
Tibet's Questionable Past
 
According to testimony before the US Senate Committee on
 
Foreign Relations in 1992, "Tibet defined itself as  a unique
 
culture and predominantly Buddhist civilization during its
 
imperial age, which lasted for two centuries and ended soon
 
after 800 AD" (Altschiller, 1994, pp.190-191). The next phase
 
in Tibetan history
 
saw the rise of an extremely powerful and unified
 
nation under the rule of King Songtsen Gampo,
 
military expansion into China and Nepal and
 
adoption of Buddhism as Tibet's religion.  Since
 
24 Not unlike the fact of the high body counts of both civilians and
 
military personnel in Vietnam helped 'unmask' the U.S. government's
 
public claims that America had the upper hand in the Vietnam conflict.
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then, the history of Tibet has been, internally,
 
that of the formation of a system of government
 
representing the religious and lay elements,  under
 
the supreme leadership of Dalai Lamas.  Externally,
 
there has been a history of invasions by Mongols,
 
Gurkhas, and Chinese forces and their subsequent
 
expulsion (van Walt van Praag, 1979, p.296).
 
On these general points, the Dalai Lama, Chinese, and Western
 
scholars and leaders all seem to agree.  But beyond the time
 
period of the first Chinese rule during the Yuan dynasty lies
 
the debate over Tibet's past.  For the Chinese, the Yuan
 
dynasty is an historical marker; it is an historic first like
 
the flag planted on the moon.  In fact, Tibet split from the
 
Yuan dynasty and then rejoined China during the Ming dynasty;
 
Tibet's departure from the Ming was ended in the eighteenth
 
century with the Manchu dynasty.25
 
For the Dalai Lama, 1911 is the milestone from which
 
Tibetan history is counted as independent.26  Thus the ebb and
 
flow of Tibetan control and the uncertainty created by
 
history forms one unifying theme in the Dalai Lama's
 
discourse:  the theme of relationship.  This theme serves to
 
downplay the conflicting historic markers and to shift the
 
25 Under the Manchu agreement, the
 
Dalai Lama [was) to become the spiritual guide of the Manchu
 
emperor and accepted patronage and protection in
 
exchange...Manchu influence did not last for very long and
 
was entirely ineffective by the Time the British...invaded
 
Tibet in 1903-1904, and ceased entirely with the overthrow of
 
the Qing dynasty in 1911 (Altschiller, 1994, p.191).
 
26 Stewart, Smith, and Denton maintain that "social movements attempt to
 
alter perceptions of the past...by presenting positive or negative
 
versions of events, situations, heroes, villains, and effects by
 
comparing and contrasting the past with the present, by correcting
 
historical accounts, and by producing revelations about the past"  (1989,
 
p. 123).
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focus to human interaction.  This relationship theme alludes
 
to the "patronage and protection" system of controller and
 
controlled, of powerful and powerless.  Each faction, as
 
human individual or as group, needs something from the other.
 
To that end, in his Oxford Union Address, the Dalai Lama
 
says,
 
When I look at the past...Tibet acted as a buffer
 
state, which was not only a benefit to the Tibetan
 
people themselves, but also provided the best safety
 
for both India and China.  So in a future Tibet I'm
 
determined that irrespective of her political
 
status, Tibet should be demilitarized, should be a
 
zone of peace...That will provide the best safety
 
for both our two neighbors (1991, p.4).
 
He establishes that these three nations, their peoples, and
 
their futures are united in their relationship as
 
"neighbors."  And "irrespective" of who has the upper hand in
 
"political status" or power, each one needs the other.  Thus,
 
in discourse mirroring the patronage-protection system, the
 
theme of relationship reflects a contemporary usefulness.
 
The Dalai Lama contends that many people could benefit in the
 
future if they could make the relationship work, indeed, as
 
it worked in the past.  Even if each "school" in the debate
 
cannot agree upon when Tibet became a part of China, neither
 
side disputes that in the past Tibet did form an effective
 
"buffer state" among the powers of the region.
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Suzerainty vs. Sovereignty
 
Despite the blurring of the importance of historic
 
markers by the theme of relationships, it is important for
 
the Dalai Lama to move the focus of debate into the modern
 
era.  This is essential because Tibet's more recent history
 
includes entanglements with now powerful Western nations.
 
These entanglements extend the idea of the relationship of
 
protector-protected in three ways.  First, the relationship
 
of geographic neighbors is related to the power relationship
 
of nuclear weapons politics and responsibility of the great
 
powers to avoid nuclear Armageddon.  Second, in the arena of
 
human relations, the West's prior involvement in Tibet
 
strengthens the idea of one's moral responsibility to a
 
friend.  Concentrating the history of Tibet in the present
 
century bolsters the moral relationship through the political
 
intrigues of the West's recent past.  It also improves the
 
Dalai Lama's ethos by extracting his own personage, with all
 
its associations of a distant and easily dismissed "mediaeval
 
serfdom," and reinserting himself, historically, into today's
 
realpolitic of international power strategies.  Third, by
 
updating his personality and power relationships with Western
 
countries, his stature and message are elevated to levels of
 
political leadership, where negotiations will ultimately take
 
place if his goals for Tibet are to be realized.
 
The Dalai Lama states that although Tibet was indeed
 
within ancient China's empire at intervals during times past,
 
Tibet was definitively self ruled until China's takeover of
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Tibet in 1950-1951.  Over the years the Dalai Lama has
 
reminded the West of its culpability in its passive
 
acceptance of this change.
 
While hinting at Western culpability, the Dalai Lama
 
claims that Britain has a special responsibility to Tibet:
 
As every Tibetan who knows anything about history
 
knows, Britain is the only country outside Tibet
 
with whom we have ever had direct links.  Britain
 
is the only country who knows the real situation.
 
So there is a very close link.  Also, I think that
 
Britain has...very good relations with China,  so
 
there is a role for Britain to play...What I am not
 
so certain about is Britain's attitude towards
 
China.  At the moment, there is only praise, trying
 
to please, not daring to criticize.  If I were
 
Chinese, then I think I would begin to wonder
 
whether Britain is being completely sincere.  But
 
this is not my business (Spectator, 1988, p.13).
 
Thus the Dalai Lama uses historical fact to influence the
 
Western powers with whom Tibet was formerly tied.  The Dalai
 
Lama attempts to influence the West by raising issues of
 
accountability and strengthening the historically validated
 
bonds between the West and Tibet.  At the same time, he
 
embarrasses and unmasks Western leaders, making them appear
 
as foolish and cowering servants of China who are "trying to
 
please, not daring to criticize."  Conversely, he tries to
 
instill doubt in Chinese leadership about Western motives and
 
reliability, advising China "to wonder whether Britain is
 
being completely sincere."
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What, and Where, Is Tibet?
 
Another theme which the Dalai Lama employs in discourse
 
over history is the actual designation of what, exactly,
 
constitutes Tibet.  In Peter Bishop's book, The Myth of
 
Shangri-La:  Tibet, Travel Writing and the Western Creation
 
of Sacred Landscape (1989), he argues that Tibet is not just
 
a physical place, it is also a state of mind.  Travel
 
accounts, novels, and archaeology, as well as Western
 
nostalgia for a mythic imperialist grandeur, have all served
 
to promote a visible niche for Tibet in our collective
 
Western consciousness (pp. 1-24).
 
India, China, and the Tibetans themselves each have
 
different ideas about the borders of Tibet.  One article in
 
The Times of India states that
 
The Tibetan case is complicated further by the fact
 
that there is near-total confusion about what is
 
meant by the term Tibet.  If Tibet is to include
 
all areas inhabited by ethnic Tibetans, as the
 
Dalai Lama...implies, it can mean a "Greater Tibet"
 
that includes not only the Tibetan autonomous
 
region (TAR) but also the whole of eastern Tibet
 
(Kamdo) and parts of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu
 
provinces in China ( Deshingkar, 1989, p. 19).
 
The problem of cartography and the elusive boundaries of the
 
real Tibet is resolved in the rhetoric of the Dalai Lama.  He
 
circumvents China's limiting Tibet to the TAR by eschewing
 
the use of the Chinese designation of TAR.  Instead, the
 
Dalai Lama makes concrete allusions to objects that are
 
Tibetan, and lets the audience figure out the rest.  He
 
states that Panda bears are not Chinese, but are Tibetan;
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Pandas are found in the Sichuan region of China,  which
 
extends far beyond China's designated TAR.  In his Five-Point
 
speech to members of US Congress in 1987, he refers  to
 
Tibet's geography in the vaguest of terms:
 
Tibet's highly strategic position in the heart of
 
Asia, separating the continent's great powers- ­
India, China, and the USSR--has throughout history
 
endowed it with an essential role in the maintenance
 
of peace and stability.  This is why, in the past,
 
Asia's empires went to great lengths to keep one
 
another out of Tibet.  Tibet's value as an
 
independent buffer state was integral to the
 
region's stability (p.4).
 
The purposefully vague language he uses serves his rhetoric
 
in three ways.  First, by avoiding specific boundary issues,
 
it enables the listener to picture the greater issue, that
 
regional war must be avoided. Wars and petty border disputes
 
can be ended by preserving, or actually reinstituting, this
 
idea of Tibet as a "buffer" zone.  The Dalai Lama's implied
 
question works like this:  If Tibet as "buffer state" can
 
exist in imagination, and has existed in the past in
 
actuality, why then cannot it not exist now, in the present,
 
in reality?  Second, by downplaying details and specifics, he
 
is able to speak in lofty terms which are consistent with his
 
high religious post and all its associated ideals of peace
 
and harmony.  Also, while enhancing his ethos, again, greater
 
issues, higher moral standards and ideals are touched upon.
 
By being vague in his discourse, he is lifted up above the
 
political infighting over minutiae and so fulfills his post
 
as a true leader.  Lastly, by elevating the status of Tibet
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from that of a tiny region to that of  a concept, Tibet
 
becomes equated with international peace.  It is the
 
responsibility of world leaders to work for peace; it is
 
then, too, their responsibility to work for reinstituting
 
Tibet as a buffer state.
 
Human Rights Redefined
 
Although the Chinese have, for the most part,
 
successfully quelled international scolding, they have been
 
unable to stamp out the continuing internal unrest of the
 
Tibetans, despite alleged torture, jailings, genocide, and
 
other crimes against humanity (which have been documented
 
debatably by the International Commission of Jurists and more
 
reliably by Amnesty International and Asia Watch,  among other
 
humanitarian groups).27  China claims that not only Tibet, but
 
China, too, suffered as a result of the Cultural Revolution.
 
In response, the Dalai Lama redefines the human rights issue
 
27  See also: (1) Amnesty International, Tibet (People's Republic of
 
China):  compilation document, 1992, which refers to "detention without
 
trial, ill treatment of detainees and police shooting of civilians in
 
Tibet in February 1988; torture and ill-treatment in detention of
 
Tibetans, February 1989; one year under Martial Law:  an update on the
 
human rights situation, March 1990, recent reports on political
 
prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Tibet, October 1991;  Amnesty
 
International's concerns in Tibet, January 1992."  (2) Asia Watch,
 
"Evading scrutiny:  violations of  human rights after the closing of
 
Tibet:  supplement to the Asia Watch report on human rights in Tibet,"
 
1988. (3) Ackerly, J.  The suppression of a people:  accounts of torture
 
and imprisonment in Tibet.  Physicians for Human Rights, Somerville, MA,
 
1989. (4)  Tibet. its ownership and human rights situation, Information
 
Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing,
 
China, 1992. (5) Dumbaugh, K. Tibet:  disputed _facts about the
 
situation.
  Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
 
Washington, DC, 1988.
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in terms of transgressions that the Western audience would
 
understand.
 
The alleged human rights abuses is a central theme in
 
the Dalai Lama's discourse.  He presents a sweeping vista of
 
carnage accumulated through time.  The relationship theme
 
works with the human rights theme, conjoining the rest of
 
humanity with China in guilt for what has purportedly
 
transpired.  From his discourse the audience may surmise that
 
the West is deemed as guilty as China for the West has,
 
through inaction, allowed the alleged carnage to continue.
 
In his Five-Point plan, he states:
 
Human rights violations in Tibet are among the most
 
serious in the world.  Discrimination is practiced
 
in Tibet under a policy of "apartheid" which the
 
Chinese call "segregation and assimilation."
 
Tibetans are, at best, second class citizens in
 
their own country.  Deprived of all basic democratic
 
rights and freedoms, they exist under a colonial
 
administration in which all real power is wielded by
 
Chinese officials of the Communist Party and the
 
army (1987, p.9).
 
The mere euphemism, "human rights," suddenly comes to life
 
via an array of tangible terms.28  Human rights is no longer a
 
nebulous, disembodied idea, it is "discrimination" and
 
"segregation and assimilation."  He uses the latter terms
 
from China so that their actions are revealed and explained
 
by a Western term and understood clearly.  He plays upon
 
28 Stewart, Smith and Denton hold that "Social movements often attempt
 
to alter perceptions of the present by redefining actions, events, and
 
situations through renaming them" (emphasis in original) (1989, p.123).
 
The Dalai Lama's discourse reflects this attempt at changing perceptions
 
through the renaming process.
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traditional Western disdain for anything even mildly relating
 
to Communism by equating the "Chinese officials" with the
 
"Communist Party and the army."  He conjures up for the
 
democracy loving Westerner the stark despair of a people who
 
are "deprived of all basic democratic rights and freedoms."
 
The West and China are linked in their "violations"  since not
 
just China is responsible for human rights abuses, but other
 
nations have their own abuses which are "among the most
 
serious in the world."  He also elicits guilty feelings on
 
the part of Western audience members because their own
 
national histories entail their respective, only recently
 
dealt with problems of "colonial administration," sanctioning
 
of "apartheid," and treating peoples of African or Indian
 
descent as "second class citizens in their own country."
 
This historical vista of human rights abuses is the
 
newest incarnation of the Dalai Lama's sentimental style of
 
rhetoric.  For contemporary political oration, hysteria in
 
speeches would not be effective.  The above text is an
 
example of the metered sentimental style in the Dalai Lama's
 
discussion of human rights.  The terms are chosen from
 
Western political history and language, and are widely used
 
and understood.  Black maintains that "in a milieu in which
 
emotional expression is severely regulated...a special
 
caution will be exercised in those circumstances in which
 
strongly emotional expression is allowed.  The sentimental
 
style is a superb instrument for such a situation" (1992, p.
 
102).  International diplomacy is certainly such a "milieu."
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The sentimental style is even more obvious in the Dalai
 
Lama's earlier phase of his rhetorical campaign.
 
It is instructive to contrast the calm and calculated
 
terminology of the Dalai Lama's recent discourse on human
 
rights with that of a much earlier phase.  Chapter six of
 
this thesis includes a discussion of Edwin Black's notion of
 
the "sentimental style," in which "no scintilla of reaction
 
is left for the auditor's own creation;  every nuance of
 
effect is regulated by the speech...(which] seeks a total
 
control over consciousness" (1992, p.101).  The Dalai Lama's
 
historically drenched speech at present reveals the earlier
 
roots of an impassioned campaign rife with sentimental
 
stylistics. So in spite of the Dalai Lama's frequent use, at
 
present, of dry and at times even boring terminology, at its
 
wellspring lies the bloody imagery of a highly sentimental
 
discourse.  This earlier discourse, while unfamiliar to the
 
uninitiated in the debate, is recalled by the political
 
elites with whom the Dalai Lama must negotiate if Tibet's
 
future is to be changed.
 
The Dalai Lama presents this human rights talk as
 
evidence of "historiographical genocide," particularly with
 
regard to the Chinese population transfer policy and the
 
international cooperation, via the passivity of U.N. member
 
nations, with China's alleged abrogation of international law
 
by its invading/liberating Tibet (Beckwith, 1988,p.627).  But
 
the Dalai Lama also claims that hope is not to be lost.  He
 
says that in the recent past, during
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.. the sixties and early seventies, the Tibetan
 
issue seemed almost hopeless...in the meantime in
 
our own country destruction, immense destruction was
 
happening.  However, during this period we never
 
gave up hope, and I think that the most important
 
thing is that inside Tibet the determination of the
 
people, especially the younger generation, was never
 
shaken...So because of human determination and
 
constant effort, things can change (1992, p.2).
 
By discussing the past in terms of a future, "younger
 
generation," the Dalai Lama transforms the history of
 
hopelessness into a future history of "change."  Through
 
"determination and constant effort," he says, there is hope
 
for the future.
 
According to the Dalai Lama, so deep does the ancient
 
history of Buddhist religion and unique culture run in
 
Tibetan society, that the Tibetans are remarkably hardy and
 
persistent in their struggle for "basic" human rights.  In
 
addition to citing religious and cultural advantage over the
 
Chinese in his fight, the Dalai Lama also notes that
 
historical artifacts are on his side, serving as proof and
 
testimony that Tibet ought to return to being a self ruled
 
state, free from China's interference.  He cites a document
 
detailing human rights abuses was recently uncovered by
 
Tibetans from Chinese storage.  He maintains that an obelisk
 
which stood in front of the Potala, his palace-monastery in
 
Lhasa, proclaimed an ancient agreement between Tibet and
 
China that each would remain respectfully separate countries.
 
The Chinese have moved from its original site and walled in
 
this obelisk:  by hiding the truth of the past from Tibet,
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their freedom is curtailed.  He asserts that ancient library
 
holdings from monasteries also confirm Tibet's historic
 
independence from China.  Much of this, however, he claims
 
the Chinese withhold or have destroyed.
 
A theme that is central to his rhetoric is one he terms
 
"universal responsibility," which, to Westerners, simply
 
means accountability.  According to this ideal, each human
 
being should act and feel compelled to be responsible for
 
one's fellow human beings.  In relation to the invasion of
 
Tibet by China, and his subsequent escape into exile, the
 
Dalai Lama appears to hold not only India and Great Britain
 
accountable, as intoned in the above quote, but also the
 
United States.  In terms of universal responsibility, the US,
 
as a great western power, shirked its duty to help repel the
 
Chinese from entering and taking over Tibet.  He recounts how
 
one of the members of his entourage who fled with him in 1959
 
was keeping the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) abreast of
 
their movement and progress via radio.  So through claims
 
such as this, the Dalai Lama establishes an historical
 
relationship between the West and Tibet.
 
In the rhetoric of the Dalai Lama, the accountability of
 
the West for the fall of Tibet does not end in 1959.  It
 
extends far beyond into the present and future.  As Business
 
Week observed in October, 1987, "Rioting by Tibetans against
 
Chinese oppression has brought out of the closet a political
 
skeleton in US-Chinese relations:  human rights" (Becker, J.
 
and Javetski, B., 1987, p.53). The rhetoric of the Dalai
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Lama, like the rioting, appears to aim to have the same
 
effect.  The Dalai Lama states that the CIA maintained
 
operatives in Tibet and trained and supplied the Freedom
 
Fighters (the Tibetan Khampas) with arms for ongoing
 
guerrilla warfare against Chinese troops (Dalai Lama, 1990,
 
pp. 121-122).  His statements imply this:  if the West knew
 
about the circumstances in Tibet, and was willing to use its
 
money and expertise to aid Tibetans in the fight against the
 
Chinese, how could the West, in terms of accountability and
 
communication with the rest of the world, turn a deaf ear and
 
close its collective mouth regarding the alleged genocide of
 
Tibetans by the Chinese?  And even worse, how can the West
 
live with this fact?  How can the West not feel the weight of
 
guilt on its national morale?  How can the West, in its
 
passivity, let inaction promote continued human rights
 
abuses?
 
The Dalai Lama links the past with universal
 
responsibility because, clearly, under this tenet, it is
 
never too late to begin to care or to take the right action.
 
Thus his rhetoric urges two different things for two key
 
audiences.  First, the West (especially the US as an involved
 
operative in the Tibetan resistance movement), must take
 
action, or at minimum, join the Dalai Lama in communicating
 
to the world its displeasure at these alleged gross acts of
 
torture and genocide by the Chinese.  Second, China must stop
 
committing these alleged crimes and recognize that the world
 
is aware of Chinese actions and could act to counter them.
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Through historical anecdotes and references,  he develops
 
a foundation for his argument that the relationship between
 
Tibet and the West cannot be cut off by political snubbing or
 
through the passage of time.  By drawing upon the guilty
 
actions of Western nations in the past, he attempts to make
 
the Western audience feel culpable for the fate which befell
 
Tibet.  In order to incite Westerners to action on behalf of
 
Tibet, he uses historical fact to play upon their guilt. He
 
points out that the only way that redemption of their guilt
 
can occur is by acting now, in the present.  Through the
 
Dalai Lama's persistent use of the tenet of universal
 
responsibility, he makes it clear that it is not too late for
 
the West to act to help Tibet.  He also makes it clear that
 
the West is accountable for its past actions.  Those actions
 
cannot be erased by time--only action can redeem the past
 
mistakes and the West's guilt for having committed them.
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CHAPTER THREE
 
THE CROSS CULTURAL RHETORIC OF THE DALAI LAMA
 
Language of Cultural Pairings
 
This chapter will present an analysis of the Dalai
 
Lama's selective use of language, symbols, and historical
 
allusions, showing how these components,  as tools of
 
persuasion, are all culture based.  Taking the Dalai Lama's
 
earlier, and more overtly antagonistic rhetoric, as well as
 
more recent and congenial discourse, I will show how the
 
Dalai Lama's discourse reflects the verbal pairings of
 
cultural symbols and values.  I will discuss the aspects of
 
the Dalai Lama's discourse which indicate that he is able to
 
combine values and symbols which are important in different
 
ways to the East and West, and combine them so that a clear
 
and unified interpretation is available to the audience,
 
regardless of each audience member's cultural orientation.
 
Using excerpts from his first autobiography, My Land and Mx
 
people (1962), his Oxford Union Address in 1991, as well as
 
more recent essays, I will show how the culturally based
 
orientation of the Dalai Lama's discourse forms a tactic of
 
persuasion.
 
The passages described below reflect well the cross
 
cultural language that appears in much of the Dalai Lama's
 
political and persuasive discourse.  The texts which are
 
analyzed in this chapter may be seen as representative of the
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Dalai Lama's persuasive discourse as a whole.
 However, the
 
conclusions drawn regarding the cross cultural impact and
 
strategies evident in these texts are not in any way limited
 
to the passages offered below, but are instead based upon
 
careful study of many of the Dalai Lama's speeches,
 
interviews, and essays.  The discussion of this particular
 
chapter is limited to analyzing several germane passages, and
 
the substance of this thesis overall is limited to an in-

depth analysis of two key speeches.  But to avert the risk of
 
appearing overly simplistic, the reader should note that the
 
conclusions I draw in this chapter are based upon information
 
gleaned from diverse texts studied for this thesis--texts
 
which cover forty years in the evolution of the Dalai Lama's
 
rhetoric.
 
The analysis to be presented in this chapter corresponds
 
to Cecil Blake's conception of the manner in which we should
 
examine cross cultural rhetoric:
 
...the comparative rhetorician must deal not only
 
with speechmaking but also with all the other
 
various forms of communication in the culture [in
 
question)... Communication occurs in a cultural
 
context comprised of many factors-­
sociopsychological, historical, epistemological,
 
and philosophical--all influenced by the traditions
 
of the culture 1979, pp.92-93).
 
The Dalai Lama's discourse combines the cultural and
 
historical traditions of two general world orientations, East
 
and West.  He links the symbols from each tradition to effect
 
persuasion.  The Dalai Lama points to the progressive
 80 
successes of Western countries, such as Western democracies
 
that promote scientific and material progress, while also
 
praising (directly or indirectly) the respect he has for the
 
ancient traditions of Buddhism and even the enduring strength
 
of the Chinese people as a nation.  He also compares and
 
contrasts diverging world views, such as Western
 
individualism versus Eastern collectivism.  Lastly, his
 
discourse shows his understanding of the universal human need
 
for ordering and hierarchy, and how that need is manifested
 
in different ways in the East and the West.
 
Of Words and World Views
 
The persuasive tactics of the Dalai Lama as a cross
 
cultural communicator can also be made evident in light of
 
Geert Hofstede's "dimensions of cultural variability"  (1980;
 
1984).  Hofstede's dimensions have been noted for being
 
particularly suitable for analyzing communication contexts
 
that are tailored to Western thought and a Western cultural
 
mind-set (Johnson and Tuttle, p.467-468). Since the focus
 
here is on the efficacy of the Dalai Lama's discourse
 
targeted for Western audiences, then the application of
 
Hofstede's dimensions should be fruitful.
 
Hofstede's theory was initially developed to promote
 
business management understanding.  Considering it is the
 
business of the Dalai Lama to manage international organizers
 
and lobbyists, it seems fitting to apply Hoftstede's theory
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to the Dalai Lama's discourse.  In brief, Hofstede's
 
dimensions can be summarized as follows:
 
individualism-collectivism, power distance,
 
uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity.
 
Individualistic cultures emphasize the individual's
 
goals, while collectivistic cultures stress that  group
 
goals have precedence over individual goals.  High
 
power-distance cultures value inequality, with
 
everyone having a rightful place, and the hierarchy
 
reflects existential inequality.  Low power-distance
 
cultures, in contrast, value equality.  Uncertainty
 
avoidance involves the lack of tolerance for
 
uncertainty and ambiguity [in settings of
 
communication exchange].  Cultures high in uncertainty
 
avoidance have high levels of anxiety, a great need
 
for formal rules, and a low tolerance for groups that
 
behave in a deviant manner.  Masculinity...involves
 
valuing things, money, assertiveness, and unequal sex
 
roles.  Cultures where people, quality of life,
 
nurturance, and equal sex roles prevail...are feminine
 
(Gudykunst; Nishida, 1989).
 
It bears mentioning here that because I find the nomenclature
 
of the masculinity/femininity dimension to be misnomers, for
 
the purpose of my study I will relabel Hofstede's masculinity
 
dimension as "resourcism" and the femininity dimension as
 
"nurturism."  Resourcism, I think, more aptly reflects the
 
general social tendency, whether by men or women, to value
 
money, things, and, often as a consequence, "unequal roles"
 
for members of different sexes, races, or other socially
 
distinctive categories, such as ethnic groups.  Similarly,
 
nurturism as a term more clearly represents the general
 
cultural phenomenon, as embraced by both women and men, of
 
valuing intangible things, such as caring for others,
 
lowering social barriers which can separate different races,
 
sexes, or ethnic groups in order to foster equality and
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social harmony.  Thus "feminine," that is, "quality of life"
 
in Hoftstede's conception, is hereby relabeled without a
 
reference which classifies a specific  sex.  Put simply,
 
unlike the terms "masculinity" and "femininity," the terms
 
resourcism and nurturism enhance the objectivity of the
 
social phenomena which they denote by stripping away the
 
stereotypical or prejudicial connotations which the former
 
terms, being sex-specific, tend to connote.  This term change
 
is recommended for future communications research because,
 
while it retains Hofstede's original meaning, it also
 
promotes objectivity in scientific inquiry.  This brief
 
digression thus completed, let us continue with the
 
discussion of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric and its cross
 
cultural aspects.
 
The rhetoric of the Dalai Lama is effective in part
 
because he is adroit in his handling of all of the above
 
dimensions of cross cultural exchange.  The Dalai Lama takes
 
dimensions which would normally appear to be contradictory  or
 
opposing, and combines aspects in ways that make such
 
opposition not only complementary, but perfectly seamless.
 
An illustration of this would be the description he gives for
 
the Tibetan culture.  The Dalai Lama's description appears to
 
be the perfect mix of all of the most laudable attributes
 
(from a Western perspective) of Hofstede's cultural
 
dimensions.  For example, the Dalai Lama asserts that the
 
Tibetan culture is worthy of saving for the following
 
reasons:  it is a collectivistic culture in that the lives of
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the people are centered around religion.  The Dalai Lama
 
maintains that "the sense of religion pervaded even the
 
wildest places, one would often see its symbol,  too, in the
 
poorest tents of the nomads:  the altar with the butter lamp
 
before it" (1962, p.64).  The government of the country was
 
historically a theocracy, which held nurturism in high
 
regard, even to the extreme of viewing as equals every
 
sentient being from humans to animals and fish down to the
 
lowliest insects.  In 1962, the Dalai Lama wrote that
 
probably ten percent of the total population were
 
monks and nuns.  This gave a dual nature to the
 
whole of our social system.  In fact, it was only
 
in my position as Dalai Lama that lay and monastic
 
authority was combined...Outside the monasteries,
 
our social system was feudal...But on the other
 
hand, promotion to higher ranks...was democratic
 
(pp.59-60).
 
Thus even in a feudal system, shades of democracy existed.
 
But overall, it was a "dual" system, which combined the moral
 
standards of religion with the practical matters of running
 
the administration of a nation-state.  The affirmation of
 
democratic elements in the society is vital to promoting
 
identification with Western audience members who are likely
 
to favor democratic ideals and forms of government.
 
The Dalai Lama's following statement from his Oxford
 
Union address in 1991 reveals his attempt at showing
 
Westerners the value which they might find in the Tibetan
 
culture:
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According to...scientists' presentations in America,
 
thirteen percent of the whole population [there]
 
have some form of mental illness.  Actually, this
 
morning when I met the Prime Minister [of Great
 
Britain] I also mentioned that...You see, the real
 
cause of that kind of high percentage of mental
 
illness, according to the explanations of the
 
scientists...is the lack of human compassion, in
 
society as well as in the family...Love and
 
affection only comes from human beings or sentient
 
beings.  Even if it is a poor animal, it can provide
 
us with affection.  But for a machine, no matter how
 
sophisticated, it is almost impossible...(1991, p.3)
 
The Dalai Lama heightens his own ethos through his assertion
 
of a high power distance relationship to his audience by
 
associating himself with a powerful Prime Minister of a great
 
Western nation.  At the same time, he shows that the West's
 
love of technology cannot surpass the need for "human
 
compassion" that is integral to Tibetan society.  The West
 
lacks this proclivity, and, as the "mental illness"
 
statistics indicate, the West appears to desperately need it.
 
He relies upon the Western audience's credulity in "the
 
explanations of the scientists" to further the persuasive
 
impact of such a delicate cross cultural observation.
 
Leaders trying to gain supporters do not normally insult
 
prospective followers.  The Dalai Lama manages, through
 
pairing Tibetan and Western cultural symbols, to educate the
 
audience with his discourse without breaking the fragile
 
trust which the uncertainty dimension of intercultural
 
exchanges entails.
 
Appealing to Western materialism, the Dalai Lama
 
describes Tibet's culture as being full of resourcism in that
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Tibet's 6,000 monasteries, nunneries, and holy places were
 
stocked with priceless religious objects of devotion, from
 
golden butter lamps and enormous gilded Buddha statues to
 
murals painted in gold and encrusted with jewels. However,
 
this material splendor was not the result of wanton
 
materialism because the finery existed in the name of
 
religion.  So via religion, this Tibetan resourcism is
 
associated with nurturism and compassion.  Reminiscing about
 
his former palace, which housed most of the government
 
functions, he says
 
Here there were rooms full of thousands of
 
priceless scrolls, some a thousand years old.  Here
 
were strong rooms filled with golden regalia of the
 
earliest kings of Tibet...and the sumptuous gifts
 
they received from the Chinese or Mongol emperors,
 
and the treasures of the Dalai Lamas who succeeded
 
the kings...In the libraries were all the records
 
of Tibetan culture and religion, 7,000 enormous
 
volumes...Some were written on palm leaves imported
 
from India a thousand years ago.  Two thousand
 
illuminated volumes of the scriptures were written
 
in inks made of powdered gold, silver, iron,
 
copper, conch shell, turquoise, and coral, each
 
line in a different ink (1962, p.54).
 
The repetition of the word "thousand" tends to expand the
 
imagery of richness in the scene which he describes.  The
 
Dalai Lama contends that, not in a monetary sense but for the
 
religious and cultural sense, one of the most egregious
 
travesties incurred by the Chinese was the destruction of all
 
but a handful of the thousands of monasteries and nunneries,
 
as well as the theft of the vast majority of the nation's
 
riches of priceless works of religious art and environmental
 86 
resources.  It would appear that as a direct result of the
 
Dalai Lama's rhetoric and campaigning on these themes, the
 
Western press has made much of the alleged loss of wildlife
 
in Tibet, land destruction from metals mining, topsoil
 
erosion from improper farming methods, and land wastage due
 
to nuclear weapons storage and dumping (Shoumatoff, 1991, pp.
 
76-104) .29
 
In his address at Oxford in 1991, he appeals to
 
Westerners' resourcism by likening Tibet to a fabulous
 
vacation resort.  After describing Tibet's magnificence, he
 
comments:
 
Sometimes I jokingly tell people that the Tibet of
 
the future will be rather like a holiday resort:
 
those people from London or New York, exhausted due
 
to the speed of life or due to the [pollution) and
 
these sorts of things--go to Tibet and spend a few
 
weeks.  That will be of mutual benefit!  You bring
 
more dollars--that's our benefit, and you get some
 
mental peace--that's your benefit! (p.6)
 
He plays on the West's cultural emphasis on hard work and
 
money, as well as relying on the cultural tradition of a
 
29  The figures and statistics on Tibet vary wildly between most Western
 
sources and notably the Chinese sources. Western scholars claim there
 
are 6 million Tibetans left in Tibet, and that as a direct result of the
 
Chinese presence 1.2 million Tibetans have died.  China maintains there
 
were only 3 million Tibetans in pre-1950 Tibet, and that this number has
 
remained more or less constant. Western sources claim there were 6,000
 
monasteries in pre-1950 Tibet and that today only a handful remain.
 
China alleges that only 1,300 monasteries existed in pre-1950 Tibet and
 
that the Chinese destruction of the monasteries has been more than
 
compensated for by the "billions of dollars" in Chinese investments in
 
Tibet for agriculture, infrastructure, and rebuilding several
 
monasteries. The Dalai Lama deploys Western figures in his rhetoric as
 
they are more damaging to the Chinese.  It is difficult to verify the
 
accuracy of these figures.  Where analysis of such statistics is
 
necessary, I have attempted to verify them through reputable
 
journalistic sources.
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Westerners' annual migration to a vacation "resort"  to take a
 
break from "the speed of life."  He develops a complete
 
linkage and reversal of cultural representations:  Tibet has
 
and promotes peace of mind, which is what Westerners need;
 
Westerners have and promote "dollars," which is what Tibet
 
needs.  All of this transfer leads to "mutual benefit."  By
 
equalizing the cultural attributes which each society has and
 
lacks, he avoids the potential for a distasteful sermonizing
 
quality in the discourse.  Instead, the Dalai Lama gives the
 
audience a compliment.  Compliments foster persuasion.3°
 
Thus we see how the Dalai Lama turns what might be
 
considered avaricious resourcism on its head through the
 
symbolic function of the religious life of the average
 
Tibetan.  It is widely known that religion is the overarching
 
world view under which all other Tibetan cultural dimensions
 
are subjugated.  The Dalai Lama has used this fact to his
 
rhetorical advantage, and it has proven to be very appealing
 
to Western audiences.  The Dalai Lama, for instance, takes
 
pains to clarify that an individual human being, and hence
 
the dimension of individualism which is so valuable in
 
Western perception, is only an individual in the truest
 
meaning, when she or he has "peace of mind," "happiness," and
 
"freedom from suffering."  This peace of mind, the Dalai Lama
 
says, can only be gained through collectivism, or other-

oriented behavior, which he calls universal responsibility.
 
3° In his Rhetoric, Aristotle states that "To praise a [person] is in
 
one respect akin to urging a course of action" (line 1368a, 1984, p.
 
61).
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He states that the "belief in rebirth should engender a
 
universal love, [because] all living beings and creatures in
 
the course of their numberless lives and our own, have been
 
our beloved parents, children, brothers, sisters, friends.
 
And the virtues our [Tibetan] creed encourages are those
 
which arise from this universal love--tolerance, forbearance,
 
charity, kindness, compassion" (1962, p. 51).
 
The religious themes in the Dalai Lama's discourse
 
heighten the power-distance dimension, which empowers him to
 
his people to the point that, whereupon seeing the Dalai
 
Lama, Tibetans fall to the ground and perform prostrations in
 
honor and respect.  The office of the Dalai Lama in and of
 
itself reflects the "existential inequality" that is
 
characteristic of a high power-distance culture. Yet all the
 
while, the belief in reincarnation and the inherent value
 
(and by correlation, equality) of all sentient beings,
 
balances the scale with the traits of a low power-distance,
 
or equality oriented culture.  Wischmann confirms that
 
"separating the government from religion was impossible
 
before the Chinese came to power" in Tibet (1987, p.1118).
 
Therefore, in the Dalai Lama's discourse, the Chinese have
 
yet to come to power, thus the "inextricable mix of sacred
 
and secular" is reflected in his speeches (p.1118).  One
 
anecdote serves to illustrate the rhetorical implications of
 
this mix.  Following the Lhasa riots in 1987, the US State
 
Department complained specifically that the Dalai Lama's
 
speech before the US Congress in 1987 was political, when it
 89 
should have been strictly religious (p.1119).  Such a
 
separation between church and state is not possible in the
 
Dalai Lama's discourse, for inherent in his title and office
 
are the concerns of politics.  This works to his advantage
 
when he is told by countries such as India or Great Britain
 
or the US that he must not make political statements; he then
 
just incorporates references to Tibet into his religious
 
teachings.
 
Finally, with regard to the dimension of uncertainty
 
avoidance, again the Dalai Lama presents a view of his
 
culture as being perfectly balanced.  In Tibet, the Dalai
 
Lama contends, traditionally there have been very strict
 
formal rules of etiquette as well as an intolerance for
 
deviant behavior.  Tibetan butchers, for example, were
 
traditionally social outcasts because they kill other beings­
-animals--for meat.m  Such strict adherence to social rules
 
and the emphasis placed on social strata and customs
 
indicates high levels of uncertainty avoidance in the Tibetan
 
culture.  On the other hand, Tibet's culture is exceedingly
 
religious; it embraces mystery, uncertainty, and ambiguity,
 
which again lowers their overall uncertainty avoidance and
 
anxiety.  The link in the lowered anxiety likewise promotes
 
culturally valued senses of mutual respect, understanding,
 
and peace of mind.  Such attributes are, in the Western view,
 
31 Grunfeld states that in pre-1951 Tibet, "A number of professions were
 
considered unclean...There were professional, hereditary beggars, metal
 
workers, fishermen and women...smiths,...butchers and undertakers"
 
(1987, p.15).
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certainly desirable and useful in everyday life in general,
 
and to effective communication in particular.
 
In short, the Dalai Lama's persuasion is enhanced
 
through the use of pairings of culturally rooted symbols that
 
are important to the West and to Tibet (or the East in
 
general), and most effective, shared by all.  The Dalai Lama
 
combines the mystery of the Buddhist faith with the certainty
 
and methodical accuracy which Westerners perceive science and
 
technology to possess:
 
If we expect to solve all human problems with a
 
computer or through a machine, this is a wrong
 
conception, a wrong expectation.  Human mental
 
problems must be solved through mental attitude,
 
through mental training.  So therefore today it
 
seems that even some great scientists are showing
 
genuine interest in the inner world and mental
 
development or mental state...when we talk about
 
mental peace or mental calmness then there is a
 
direct spiritual involvement...(1991, pp.3-4).
 
He matches the desire for mental peace, and the Tibetan
 
cultural renown in attaining this peace, with the Western
 
desire for material progress balanced with mental peace.  He
 
compares the West's political and religious traditions of
 
revolution for freedom and the Western desire for
 
geopolitical stability with Tibet's situation:  "...the
 
Tibetan national struggle...is far more than political
 
freedom, [it] is also for spiritual freedom, which is not
 
only of benefit to Tibetans alone, but also to larger
 
communities..." (1991, p.5).
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Communication scholar Luther Jerstand observes that "in
 
Tibetan [theatrical] dramas of propaganda, [we]  can actually
 
witness manifestations of good and evil battling for the
 
hearts of [people]" (1967, p. 202).  The Dalai Lama's
 
persuasive discourse offers a similarly dramatic rendering of
 
events past, present, and potentially in the future.  An
 
illustration of a dramatic rendering of the future's
 
potential is the following commentary on the Dalai Lama's
 
Strasbourg Proposal.  The Strasbourg Proposal, as we shall
 
see in Chapter Five, offers a pragmatic program that would
 
enable Tibet to have an associated status with China, while
 
still being an internally self governed democracy.  In 1992,
 
four years after having delivered the Strasbourg Proposal,
 
the Dalai Lama described his hopes for the proposal and the
 
possible results of the plan, if it were to become enacted:
 
It is my hope that China's leaders will work with
 
their own people, with their neighbors, with the
 
rest of the world to live in harmony and peace.
 
Only then will their ancient country, now
 
constituting a quarter of humanity, finally assume
 
its rightful place in the global family.  This is
 
in keeping with the Buddhist vision of a world
 
based on compassion; a world without enemies, a
 
world of peace and true happiness (p.29).
 
He presents a hopeful and idealistic vision for the Chinese,
 
who in this drama play the role of the "evil manifestation,"
 
to join the fold of Western democratic nations, who are
 
implied as being the "good manifestation."  He also invokes
 
the West's deeply felt moral superiority resulting from the
 
demise of many Communist states.  This is done by hinting
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that the distasteful aspects of China's Communist "leaders"
 
can only be shed by China if it accepts the Strasbourg
 
proposal, for "only then will" China "finally assume it
 
rightful place in the global family."  Yet the Eastern
 
perspective of China, with its "ancient" longevity to be
 
extended by this proposal, helps to equalize the East's
 
equally deeply felt moral superiority over the comparatively
 
younger civilizations of the West.  He affirms an idealistic
 
resolution for that problem, "to live in harmony and peace"
 
and in "a world based on compassion."  The tranquil terms,
 
"harmony and peace," are juxtaposed with China, signaling an
 
opposition between right (peace) and wrong (China's present
 
policies).  He refers to the great power of China, both in
 
terms of sheer population, or "a quarter of humanity" with
 
all its impugned might, while in the same breath pointing to
 
both the desire of both East and West to integrate China into
 
some conception of a new world order.
 
In summary, through the examples and analysis provided
 
above, we see evidence that the Dalai Lama incorporates
 
cultural dimensions into his discourse, using cultural
 
orientations as rhetorical tools to incite Westerners to
 
action.  Lest this analysis appear to be an
 
oversimplification, it bears mentioning that these particular
 
passages were chosen because they illustrate well the Dalai
 
Lama's ability to communicate and persuade audiences across
 
cultures.  However, the assumptions and claims presented in
 
this Chapter are by no means limited to the discourse
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examined here.  I have come to these conclusions based upon
 
patterns that I have observed in a wide range of the Dalai
 
Lama's texts, including both of his autobiographies (1962;
 
1990) as well as numerous interviews of him and speeches by
 
him.  Therefore, I would venture to say that if one were to
 
select at random a text by the Dalai Lama (aside from
 
strictly religious teachings), one would be likely to find at
 
least one, if not more, of the cross-cultural tactics which I
 
have described in this chapter.
 
By using Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability
 
as a grounds for understanding the Dalai Lama's perspectives
 
and discourse, it is possible to ascertain some of the
 
specific tactics the Dalai Lama uses to bridge the
 
communication gap between two otherwise divergent and
 
culturally bound perspectives.  These contrasting cultural
 
perspectives, which Hofstede finds useful in the context of
 
international business management, are individualism versus
 
collectivism, nurturism versus resourcism, uncertainty
 
avoidance, and power distance.  The Dalai Lama's discourse
 
reveals his ability to jibe Eastern and Western cultural
 
dimensions in a persuasive manner.  The Dalai Lama
 
accomplishes this fusion of cultural contrasts by presenting
 
pairings of what we would see as the most mutually
 
praiseworthy cultural attributes.  Science and faith;
 
materialism and intangible mental peace; the natural and the
 
supernatural are just a few of the culturally based pairings
 
which impel his discourse.  Each pairing reveals world views,
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values, relationships between social strata, and emotion
 
based myths which have been historically transmitted by human
 
interaction to the respective cultures.  The Dalai Lama's
 
cross cultural rhetoric is targeted to promote western
 
activities on behalf of his movement to save what little
 
culture and cultural artifacts he alleges are left remaining
 
in Tibet.  Above all, it is discourse that is designed to
 
promote identification among the disparate audience members
 
around the world and to urge them to act.
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CHAPTER FOUR
 
CONSUMMATE CHARISMA
 
A Charismatic Leader
 
The charisma of the Dalai lama is a central force behind
 
the movement to free Tibet from China's control.  Essential
 
to the perpetuation and expansion of any social movement is
 
strong leadership.  Franz Michael states that the success of
 
the Tibetan community in exile "is an outstanding example of
 
what faith and loyalty to one's culture can accomplish under
 
great leadership" (1985, p. 738).  This chapter will examine
 
how the Dalai Lama's personality, actions, and abilities
 
serve him well in his work to organize and support his own
 
people, and especially in his campaign to influence
 
international diplomats and the media.
 
In Persuasion and Social Movements, authors Stewart,
 
Smith, and Denton state that "a leadership position is
 
attained in a social movement when members perceive a person
 
to possess one or more of three attributes:  charisma,
 
prophecy, or pragmatism" (1989, p.39).  While the Dalai Lama
 
has been criticized for his lack of "pragmatism" by members
 
of his own movement (Kaye, 1987,p.60; McDonald, 1993, p.24)
 
as well as his rhetorical and political opponents, especially
 
China (anonymous, Beijing Review, 1987, p.14; Zi, 1989, p.28­
29), and also the West (Jenkins, 1988,p.18-19), his
 
charismatic and prophetic appeal are widely acknowledged
 
(Michae1,1985, pp.738-740; Norbu, 1991, p. 371).
 96 
Stewart, Smith, and Denton also state that charisma is a
 
strong attribute for a leader of a social movement:
 
The charismatic leader's source of legitimacy
 
lies in his or her apparent access to a higher
 
source or divine inspiration...The charismatic
 
leader tends to be a showperson with a sense of
 
timing and the rhetorical skills necessary to
 
articulate what others...cannot put into words
 
(1989, pp.39-40).
 
The "higher source" and "divine inspiration" of the Dalai
 
Lama comes, of course, from his religion.  He is commonly
 
referred to in Western media as being the Buddhist equivalent
 
to the Pope.32  He is known for rising at 4:00 a.m. to pray,
 
and for studying scriptures for at least four hours every
 
day.  The Dalai Lama is noted for maintaining this strict
 
regimen regardless of where in the world he has traveled to
 
in his very active speaking and teaching schedule.
 
The Dalai Lama's quality of having charisma is
 
beneficial to his position as a leader, for "in our [Western]
 
society,... [this] capacity is sometimes called tact, savoir
 
faire, diplomacy, or social skill" (Goffman, 1967, p.13).
 
Goffman's notion of the tactful and skilled diplomat also
 
translates, in the realm of international negotiation, into
 
32 In 1984, when asked about the comparison of the current Polish Pope
 
to the Polish people and the Dalai Lama to the Tibetan people, the Dalai
 
Lama responded,
 
There are great similarities.  But in the case of Tibet and
 
the Dalai Lama, it is not only the present generation who is
 
concerned.  The relationship goes back for centuries.  In
 
this sense, it is much deeper than the relationship between
 
the present Pope and the Polish people.  On the other hand,
 
the Papal institution is worldwide, a recognized and
 
independent institution.  The Dalai Lama is just a refugee.
 
[He laughs] (1986, p. 128).
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the concept of an interculturally competent diplomat.
 
Communication competence in diplomatic circles entails the
 
ability to adapt to rapidly changing argumentative contexts
 
and their attendant cultural implications.  The diplomat's
 
role in displaying charisma, tact, and social skill is
 
crucial to persuasion in negotiations (Cohen, 1991,  pp. 78­
79).
 
In organizing the exiled Tibetan community in India, the
 
Dalai Lama's persona and skills in diplomacy were put to the
 
test.  Since 1960, when the Dalai Lama organized the Tibetan
 
government in exile, he has been working tirelessly to
 
continue in his role of "authority over [Tibetan] civil life
 
as well as over the structure and practice of the Tibetan
 
Buddhist faith" (Michael, 1985, p. 741).  Michael attests
 
that the Dalai Lama "persuaded the Indian government to
 
provide areas of uncultivated land... where, with Indian
 
help, the Tibetans were given ownership of about an acre per
 
person" (emphasis added) (1985, p. 741).  Considering India's
 
enormous population and traditional land disputes amongst its
 
populace, it is noteworthy that the Dalai Lama was able- ­
through "persuasion"--to secure for his people "several
 
thousand acres each in several [Indian] states and regions"
 
(Michael, 1985, p. 741).
 
A Strong Face
 
The concept of "face" relates to "intangible issues
 
such as... status, pride, honor, power, and dignity" (Cohen,
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1991, p. 132).  Indeed, the relevance of face concerns is a
 
crucial consideration in the Dalai Lama's campaign
 
leadership.  In addition to his charisma and diplomatic
 
skills, the Dalai Lama's appearance is often commented upon
 
and described in Western media in a manner that links him to
 
both the average person and to God.  There is an everyman
 
quality that lends to the Dalai Lama's charisma and common
 
appeal.  Take, for example, the following description, which
 
effectively encapsulates the remarks frequently found in
 
Western commentary about the Dalai Lama:
 
He wears the same maroon robes with saffron
 
waistcoat as any other monk and, for footwear,
 
plain, thickly soled brown shoes which lend a
 
workmanlike air to his appearance that his blue-

tinted spectacles do nothing to undermine.  His hair
 
is cropped to a shadow like all the other monks.
 
Yet in spite of this apparent ordinariness, there is
 
something in his bearing that invites reverence:  h2
 
looks holy... (emphasis added)(1988, p. 12).
 
This description (like myriad others I read while conducting
 
the literature review) emphasizes the Dalai Lama's
 
commonality and links him to not just other monks, but also
 
to the common worker, through his "workmanlike air" and his
 
"ordinariness."  But while having a workmanlike air, he still
 
maintains his lofty stature and pride since "he looks holy,"
 
which certainly cannot hurt his "image" or "face;" after all,
 
who could argue with a God and win?  As the symbolic
 
figurehead of Tibetans and as the leader of the Tibetan
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Government in exile, it is imperative that the Dalai Lama
 
maintain a certain image of power, sagacity, and endurance.
 
The news media have, at times, also hinted at the
 
possibility that the Dalai Lama himself  possesses observant
 
powers to see into the future.  For instance, in one article,
 
the Dalai Lama is quoted as saying, "...whilst in the past I
 
feel that I was able to contribute something to Tibet as a
 
nation, to Tibetan culture, to Buddhism--for the future I
 
don't know;"  then the interviewer suggests precisely the
 
prophetic ability of the Dalai Lama, commenting:  "Then [the
 
Dalai Lama] laughed...Clearly, he knew perfectly well [what
 
the future would be]" (Norman, 1988, p. 12).  In fact, most
 
of the printed interviews highlight the question of Tibet's
 
future, asking the Dalai Lama to make a prediction.33  So
 
while the reporters likely have as much factual information
 
as the Dalai Lama about the Tibet question, they nonetheless
 
ask for, and report on, the Dalai Lama's insight into the
 
future.  Ultimately, then, the news media help to promote the
 
image of the Dalai Lama as apparently possessing prophetic
 
powers.  Consequently, such media treatment serves to help
 
him maintain his prophetic image.
 
The implications for his face carry over into the
 
potential to negotiate from a position of great strength with
 
33 Articles in which the reporter specifically solicits the Dalai Lama's
 
opinion or projection about the future include:  The Christian Science,
 
Monitor, July 30, 1984; The Washington Times, September 21, 1984; Ih
 
Taia Tribune, October 13, 1984; MacLean's, September 29, 1986 (as
 
reprinted in The Collected Statements. Articles and Interviews of His
 
Holiness the XIV Dalai Lam, Information Office, Central Tibetan
 
Secretariat, 1986).
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China in the future.  That is why it is extremely helpful for
 
his campaign to have the media continually depict him as both
 
holy and charismatic while also making him seem to be a truly
 
likable person, who possesses all the "ordinariness" of any
 
one of us.  Through the Dalai Lama's diplomatic savoir faire
 
and skills, he garners status, pride, and power by his
 
association with international diplomatic circles.
 
Conversely, through the Dalai Lama's often remarked upon
 
"ordinariness," he gains the acceptability associated with
 
Western concerns for democracy and representative forms of
 
government, since he appears to be as like his fellow
 
Buddhist monks as anyone could be, and therefore is best
 
qualified to represent them, as well as the generally
 
religious Tibetan populace at large.  In addition, commentary
 
highlighting his "ordinariness" helps to debunk the assertion
 
by Chinese leaders that the Dalai Lama was the leader of a
 
"serfdom" who lived in opulent splendor while the general
 
Tibetan populace suffered in poverty.  Western media, by
 
showing how ordinary the Dalai Lama appears to be, and by
 
emphasizing his strict regimen of religious study, shows that
 
his lifestyle is definitely not luxurious.
 
The Dalai Lama's charisma and disciplined character,
 
therefore, enhances his authority as a leader.  He is seen as
 
being empowered by and connected to the gods, while also
 
supported by, and connected to, the followers in his
 
movement.  Especially for Tibetans, Michael affirms that the
 
Dalai Lama,
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whose authority continues to be derived from the
 
belief in his Incarnation of Chenrezi
 
(Avalokitesvara),34 an emanation of the Buddha's
 
compassion shared and maintained by all Tibetans,
 
retains his role as highest executive authority,
 
decision maker, guide, and teacher of his people in
 
both religious and secular matters... by his
 
charisma as much as tradition, the whole religious
 
establishment... is more united than it has ever
 
been.  This... authority concurs with a fully
 
retained and recognized worldly authority that has
 
enabled him to play his leadership role in
 
rebuilding the hope and confidence of his people in
 
exile, a role which has in turn been reaffirmed by
 
the unique part he played in salvaging the Tibetan
 
polity" (1985, p. 743).
 
Since 1960, in addition to establishing a modern, democratic
 
form of Government in exile, the Dalai Lama has set up
 
numerous organizations to educate Tibetan children.  He has
 
also organized the development of Tibetan Buddhist
 
monasteries and universities in India, and worked to
 
establish work programs to keep Tibetans employed (Michael,
 
1985, pp. 740-743).  To date, these institutions are
 
operating successfully and are expanding, receiving more
 
Tibetan refugees, gaining more sponsors, and constructing new
 
facilities.
 
As far as the Dalai Lama's political organizing and
 
campaigning is concerned for Tibetans still inside Tibet,
 
Schwartz believes that
 
The Dalai Lama [is] a symbol and rallying point of
 
Tibetan protest... since he epitomizes both the
 
Tibetan religious and political past and a bridge
 
to the modern world.  The sense of constituting a
 
34 Chenrezi, or Avalokitesvara, is considered to be the protector deity
 
and patron saint of all Tibetans.
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political community is condensed into the figure of

the Dalai Lama, who represents not only the pre­
1959 government in Lhasa, which continues in exile
 
in India, but a remembered political history
 
sketching back to the time of the ancient kings
 
(1994, p.221).
 
The Dalai Lama's authority and appeal is certainly not
 
limited to his own people.  Through largely complimentary
 
treatment in the media (as discussed above briefly, and in
 
greater detail in Chapter One), the Dalai Lama's authority
 
extends into the West. The Dalai Lama's simultaneous appeal
 
to the common and to the holy, as well as his ethos-

strengthening symbolism, is what has made the Dalai Lama's
 
message so hard for the Chinese leadership to counter, and
 
Western diplomats to refuse.
 
The charismatic appeal of the Dalai Lama has made it
 
difficult for Western leaders to continue to shut him out
 
from diplomatic relations--for surely a Western leader can
 
ignore a common man, but they could not easily deny a god-

king (Norman, 1993, pp.18-21).  So it has happened that
 
Western leaders (and even leaders in Asia from countries such
 
as Thailand) have risked the wrath of China and welcomed the
 
Dalai Lama into their capitals to speak on behalf of the
 
Tibetan people about human rights and the situation in Tibet
 
(anonymous, The New York Times, 1994, p.A-7); Lintner, 1993,
 
pp.10-11; Doherty, 1991, p.1002).
 
By the same token, the imagery of vision, insight, and
 
perceptiveness is dominant in the Dalai Lama's rhetoric, and
 
helps to strengthen his stature. There is a theme of
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"perceptiveness," that is prevalent in the Dalai Lama's
 
books, interviews, speeches, and public statements.  For
 
instance, the title of one book he wrote is kindness.
 
Clarity, and Insight (1984).  The Dalai Lama presents himself
 
as being the all seeing, all knowing ruler who has been
 
displaced, exiled, from his land.  Yet through the eyes of
 
his people, and empowered by the truth of their visions, we
 
can infer that he sees beyond his own horizons into the areas
 
that China shields from the rest of the world (Dalai Lama,
 
1960; 1990). One way the Dalai Lama (1993) contends that he
 
is equipped with special insight into the Tibetan-Chinese
 
conflict is that he receives current information in the form
 
of constant, secret contact with Tibetans inside Tibet,  as
 
well as narratives from refugees who stream into India to
 
escape the oppression which they aver they cannot endure in
 
Tibet (Michael, 1985, p. 737-738).
 
In the metaphysical realm, the Dalai Lama's "third eye,"
 
or supernatural capacity to comprehend the otherworldly realm
 
and tap into sources of knowledge that most mortals cannot
 
know, further enhances his own image as being visionary in
 
the fullest sense.  Particularly for Tibetan followers, the
 
Dalai Lama's purported supernatural ability is valuable
 
because "magical signs and omens, and millenarian hopes for
 
salvation, are also elements of Tibetan popular religion.
 
These elements... provide a...supernatural gloss to current
 
political developments" (Schwartz, 1994, p. 226).  The
 
implication is that the physical exile of the Dalai Lama is
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simply that, physical, or geographical.  The Dalai Lama's
 
followers may feel that to a certain extent (perhaps on the
 
spiritual plane) he is able to reach into current events and
 
provide a presence of support.
 
A Greater Vision
 
In G. Gordon's book, persuasion:  the Theory and
 
Practice of Manipulative Communication, the author maintains
 
that "prophecy at large may influence the destiny of a total
 
culture, but its influence is rarely discrete or measurable,
 
filtered, as it is, from prophet to social field to myth and
 
then into the future" (1971, p.505).  Stewart, Smith and
 
Denton state that one of the roles a social movement leader
 
may fulfill is that of the prophet:  "the prophet's source of
 
legitimacy lies in his or her apparent proximity to the
 
writings of the social movement, its ideology...the prophet
 
knows the truth and sets a moral tone for the social
 
movement" (1989, p.41).
 
In his role as charismatic leader, the Dalai Lama also
 
fulfills the leadership role of prophet.  He makes frequent
 
references to the bright future of Tibet, and often mentions
 
the fall of the Communist Soviet bloc when discussing China's
 
present society, predicting the same fall for China's
 
Communist system.  In April of 1992, his annual statement for
 
the anniversary of the Tibetan national uprising was
 
entitled, "Future Tibet Will Be an Oasis of Peace."  In the
 
speech, the Dalai Lama offers the following predictions:
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I am more optimistic than ever before about the
 
future of Tibet.  This optimism stems from the
 
determination of the Tibetan people inside Tibet and
 
also from the dramatic changes that have taken place
 
everywhere in the world, particularly in the
 
erstwhile Soviet Union.  I feel certain that within
 
the next five to ten years some major changes will
 
take place in China.
 
Such affirmations of a bright future function in much the
 
same way as Dr. Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech.
 
By offering the movement's followers a vision of hope, an
 
image of a brighter future, the speaker downplays the
 
wretched indecision and lack of progress in the present time.
 
This hopeful rhetoric also serves to spur the followers into
 
action, to make that vision a reality.  Thus while the
 
prophetic "influence" is not "discrete," it does serve to
 
make the myth potentially a reality through the audience's
 
potential for action.  "The professional prophet," remarks
 
Gordon, "enhances the personal feeling of importance of his
 
audience..." (1971, p.508).
 
Moreover, there exists in Tibet a sense of
 
millenarianism.  Therefore, the Dalai Lama's persuasive
 
discourse is more apt to be taken seriously in that context.
 
Schwartz states that
 
Millenarianism is just one expression of the
 
challenge posed by the [alleged] destruction of
 
traditional Tibetan society and culture to Tibetan
 
religious beliefs.  The problem of finding meaning
 
in the calamity of the Chinese occupation, and some
 
basis for hope for the future, is one that is felt
 
by all Tibetans (1994, p.229).
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Therefore when the audience of the Dalai Lama receives both
 
his hopeful messages together with his more pessimistic
 
statements, the apparent contradiction is lessened through
 
this millenarian viewpoint.  The "calamity" of the present
 
situation and the hope for a better future go hand in hand.
 
While the Dalai Lama admits humbly that his own
 
prophetic capacity is limited, this limitation is offset by
 
the closeness and accessibility of a follower who can improve
 
the Dalai Lama's prophetic authority.  This person is someone
 
with unquestionable and inexplicably accurate "supernatural"
 
powers of vision and insight:  the Tibetan oracle who remains
 
with the Dalai Lama's exiled government at all times (Dalai
 
Lama, 1962; 1990).  Thus the Dalai Lama's own prophetic
 
powers are coupled with a greater vision in that he is aided
 
by incomprehensible supernatural abilities.  John Avedon
 
describes the import of the Nechung oracle:
 
For 1,300 years Tibet's chief oracle has been
 
consulted by the nation's leaders on virtually
 
every key decision of state.  Although on sacred
 
occasions the oracle would appear before up to
 
80,000 people in Lhasa [specifics about the Nechung
 
oracle remained a secret]... As part of Tibet's
 
entry into the world... the Dalai Lama agreed to
 
have some details... revealed (1984, p. 199).
 
Therefore, in keeping with tradition and his secular and
 
religious office, the Dalai Lama invokes the import of the
 
Nechung oracle in his discourse to strengthen his authority
 
and apparent ability to see beyond what ordinary humans are
 
able to see.  Perhaps a reliance upon a mysterious, ancient
 107 
tradition may seem peculiar to future-oriented Westerners who
 
tend to value a logical, rational approach in their leaders.35
 
On the other hand, the use of antiquated methods to gain
 
insights is not limited to the Dalai Lama's leadership.
 
Americans may be reminded of a similarly "peculiar"  habit of
 
one of America's most popular presidents:  Ronald Reagan is
 
known to have consulted horoscope experts before scheduling
 
key meetings throughout his two-term presidency.  Even in the
 
West, mysticism thrives, for example, regardless of whether
 
they are considered believable or not, the fact remains that
 
many major Western newspapers continue to print daily
 
horoscopes.
 
In stark contrast to the Dalai Lama's own alleged
 
awareness and insight, the Dalai Lama describes the Chinese
 
government as a leadership without vision, or, in the case of
 
Mao, as headed by leaders unable to realize their visions in
 
a humane manner.  Likewise, he describes the Chinese people
 
as a whole as mysterious--"I can not yet fathom the Chinese
 
mind" (Dalai Lama, 1990).  What may be inferred from this
 
statement is that, to the contrary, he does understand the
 
results of Chinese actions, but what he does not understand
 
is the motivation behind them.  For when he refers to "mind,"
 
he refers to the Chinese leadership's ability to continue to
 
rationalize in their own minds their allegedly inhumane
 
35 Referring to the Tibetan reliance upon mystical weather predictors,
 
astrologers, and oracles, the Dalai Lama affirms that "these mysterious
 
experiences (exist] and will remain, although what involvement they will
 
have in the (future modern Tibetan] Government I can't say" (1986,  pp.
 
174-175).
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actions despite the subsequent and inevitable loss  of face
 
their alleged actions continue to invoke.  The Dalai Lama
 
laments, "I had hoped that the Chinese cared about
 
international opinion, but [even United Nations resolutions]
 
had no noticeable effect on them" (1962, p. 230).  The Dalai
 
Lama thus expresses exasperation with this alleged Chinese
 
perverseness and illogic in the face of "facts" and
 
"international opinion."  For instance, the Dalai Lama claims
 
that much of the "progress" that the Chinese proudly tout as
 
having been the result of their investments in Tibet really
 
only amount to "dzuma," which in Tibetan means "eye-wash" or
 
a "sham" (1990, p. 108).
 
He asserts that this supposed lack of Chinese vision,
 
within the context of their behavior, has hurt their ability
 
to rule effectively while also hurting the Tibetans.  In
 
terms of the Chinese economy, this is not far from the truth.
 
Dreyer, for instance, states that the Chinese central
 
government has lost large quantities of money from its
 
investments in Tibet, rather than gained from them (1993, p.
 
257).  Tibet today remains the only area of China which is
 
operating at a deficit (Dreyer, 1993, pp.257-258).  Yet
 
Chinese leadership, in an effort to save face, maintain that
 
Tibet's "development" has been marked and quantifiable
 
(anonymous, peijing Review, 1987, pp.24-25).
 
The Dalai Lama continually pokes and prods at this
 
alleged Chinese blindness to the facts.  The Dalai Lama
 
comments on the attention to superficialities within the
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early Communist Chinese regime he witnessed before he fled
 
Tibet:
 
With [the Chinese troops] came Generals...,
 
who...were [with] a Tibetan in national costume and
 
fur hat.  As they entered the room, this man made
 
three formal prostrations.  I thought this rather
 
strange as he was evidently a member of the Chinese
 
delegation.  It turned out that he was the
 
interpreter, and a loyal supporter of the Communists.
 
When I later asked why he was not wearing the same
 
Mao suits as his companions, he replied good
 
naturedly that I must not make the mistake of
 
thinking that the Revolution was a revolution in
 
dress; it was a revolution of ideas. (1993, p.72).
 
Thus the Dalai Lama reveals how he sees through the facade of
 
behavior.  The Tibetan was a "loyal supporter" of the
 
Communists, helping enable the Chinese in their program to
 
eliminate the old order of Tibet--of which the Dalai Lama
 
himself is an integral part.  Yet this Tibetan maintains the
 
superficial dress of the old order, so he can facilitate,
 
with his friendly and "good natured" manner, the process of
 
eliminating the old order and instituting the new.  The
 
Tibetan interpreter's "three formal prostrations" are
 
likewise shown to be part of the "dzuma."  The prostrations
 
constitute a sham due to the fact that the interpreter was
 
operating for the Chinese Communists, which alters the normal
 
interpretation of the prostration as a symbol of deep respect
 
and subservience into a physical motion--a mere formality
 
used to hasten the demise of the system from which the
 
prostration arose in the first place.  Hence, the Dalai Lama
 
shows that he has the unique ability to see beyond the
 110 
Chinese actions and into their motives.  Thus the Dalai Lama
 
illustrates, in the manner of The Emperor's New Clothes
 
fable, that he has the courage to convey his unique insight
 
to the rest of the world.
 
Another example of the Dalai Lama's self-proclaimed
 
insight into the Chinese administration's duplicity are his
 
observations about Mao Tse-tung.  For example, after the
 
Dalai Lama describes Mao's apparently friendly attitudes
 
toward him, he offers insight into how Communist "projects"
 
in China that were unfolding apace in the name of "progress"
 
also portended the destruction of Tibet's traditional culture
 
and infrastructure in the name of similar progress in Tibet:
 
My final interview with this remarkable man [Mao]
 
was toward the end of my visit to China... By then,
 
I had been able to complete a tour of the Chinese
 
provinces, and I was able to tell him truthfully
 
that I had been greatly impressed and interested by
 
all the development projects I had seen.  Then he
 
started to give me a long lecture about the true
 
form of democracy, and advised me how to become a
 
leader of the people and how to take heed of their
 
suggestions.  And then he edged closer to me on his
 
chair and whispered:  "I understand you very well.
 
But of course, religion is poison.  It has two
 
great defects:  It undermines the race, and
 
secondly it retards the progress of the country.
 
Tibet and Mongolia have both been poisoned by it."
 
I was thoroughly startled; what did he mean to
 
imply?  I tried to compose myself, but I did not
 
know how to take him.  Of course, I knew he must be
 
a bitter enemy of religion. Yet he seemed genuinely
 
friendly and affectionate toward me... (1962, pp.
 
117-118).
 
This vignette shows that the Dalai Lama's instinctive
 
reaction reveals his insight into the situation. The Dalai
 
Lama, in being "thoroughly startled" at Mao's apparently
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malevolent motives for Communist change in Tibet, indicates
 
that he fears the worst.  Mao's motives seem all the more
 
unspeakable since they are "whispered."  In asking the
 
rhetorical question, "what did he mean to imply?" we as
 
readers fill in the answer--we, too, share the Dalai Lama's
 
insight of Mao's contradictory position of being "a bitter
 
enemy of religion" and the "genuinely friendly and
 
affectionate" man.  Moreover, Mao's whispered comments are a
 
contradiction of his earlier comment to the Dalai Lama that
 
"Buddhism was quite a good religion" (1962, p.116).  These
 
statements, plus the reader's knowledge of history, affirm
 
the answer to the rhetorical question because the reader
 
knows that Mao's position as "enemy" superseded that of
 
"affectionate" friend.
 
In his description of yet another incident involving
 
Mao, the Dalai Lama implies that Mao attempted to befriend
 
the Tibetans so as to use them for hastening the demise of
 
the Tibetan state.  The Dalai Lama recounts how Mao's actions
 
in participating in a Tibetan celebration mocked the
 
Tibetans:
 
I also gave a dinner party in Peking, to celebrate
 
the Tibetan New Year by returning some of the
 
hospitality I had received [while visiting China].
 
Everything was done according to the traditions and
 
customs of Tibet...I had the pleasure of meeting
 
many Chinese officials on this occasion, including
 
Mao Tse-tung, and I was struck again by their charm
 
of manner and courtesy and culture.  We had no
 
religious ceremonies at the party, but we had the
 
usual New Year decorations and a special kind of
 
cake which is made in Tibet for this season.  It is
 
our custom to take a small piece of this cake and
 
throw it up to the ceiling as an offering to
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Buddha.  When Mao Tse-tung was told of this custom,
 
he threw a piece up to the ceiling, and then with a
 
mischievous expression, he threw another piece down
 
on the floor (1962, p. 121).
 
Mao's insolent action and his "mischievous expression"
 
therefore betray his true feelings about the "traditions and
 
customs of Tibet."  Mao's duplicity is revealed to be
 
symbolic of the Chinese in general, as well as ironic.  Mao's
 
behavior is symbolic, since it foreshadows the literal
 
destruction of Tibetan monasteries and religious life; it is
 
ironic since Mao's mockery of a Tibetan custom contradicts
 
the Dalai Lama's observation that on the surface the Chinese
 
officials exhibited "charm of manner and courtesy and
 
culture."  Here again, the Dalai Lama does not come right out
 
and explain his insight, but rather he lets the reader arrive
 
at such conclusions from the vivid picture he paints of the
 
event.
 
Another example of the Dalai Lama's insight is his often
 
repeated claim that the Chinese keep Tibet hidden from
 
international observers because, contrary to Chinese claims,
 
Tibetans are not happy with the current situation there.  The
 
Dalai Lama often brings out the contradiction that if things
 
are going so well in Tibet, then why does the Chinese
 
leadership continue to ban most foreigners from the region?
 
In an article by the Dalai Lama printed in the New York Times
 
on February 3, 1979, he declares:
 
If the majority of people in Tibet are really happy
 
and willing to live under the Chinese rule, it
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would be foolish and unreasonable on the part of
 
the 100,000 Tibetans in exile to stubbornly act
 
contrary to their wishes... But we must first know
 
for certain that the Tibetans are completely
 
satisfied and happy.  So far it is only the Chinese
 
publicity organs and their recognized spokesmen in
 
the West who claim that the Tibetans in Tibet are
 
happy... During the past thirty years there has
 
been much propaganda about the tremendous progress
 
made by China in virtually every field, contrary to
 
what was actually happening in the country...If the
 
Tibetans are genuinely contented with the present
 
state of affairs, there is a way in which the
 
Chinese can easily convince us and the world of
 
this... Tibet should be opened so that Tibetans
 
within and without can freely visit each other...
 
Such an opportunity will help us in "seeking truth
 
from facts," a popular slogan in China today (1986,
 
pp. 200-201).
 
Subsequently, the Chinese acquiesced to these requests.
 
A Tibetan group of delegates from the Dalai Lama's government
 
in exile was mobbed by Tibetans in Lhasa, much to the chagrin
 
and surprise of Chinese officials in Tibet who apparently
 
underestimated the staying power of the long exiled Dalai
 
Lama.  The Chinese offer of Tibetans in exile to return to
 
visit Tibet, however, was not without its political
 
implications--the Tibetans were allowed to return home
 
provided they permanently exchanged their Tibetan passports
 
for Chinese passports.  In addition, the 1980s ushered in a
 
brief period of limited tourism in Tibet, which was brought
 
abruptly to a halt in the aftermath of the riots in Lhasa in
 
1987 and 1988 (Schwartz, 1994).
 
Consequently, by seeing beyond the alleged sham, the
 
Dalai Lama can see the "truth."  His leadership power is
 
enhanced by not only being able to see the truth at the
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present time; he can also see the truth in the future.  With
 
the oracle at his dispense, the Dalai Lama maintains an image
 
of possessing prophetic knowledge.  For instance, the Dalai
 
Lama states:
 
At the beginning of 1956, during Losar [a religious
 
festival], I had a very interesting encounter with
 
the Nechung oracle, who announced that "the light of
 
the Wish Fulfilling Jewel [one of the names by which
 
the Dalai Lama is known to Tibetans] will shine in
 
the West."  I took this to indicate that I would
 
travel that year to India, though I now see that the
 
prophesy had a deeper implication (1993, p. 105).
 
This "deeper implication," of course, is the fact that in
 
these very words, a Westerner is reading from the
 
autobiography by the Dalai Lama.  Therefore this person in
 
the West is in the process of learning from the Dalai Lama's
 
words, and thus is being enlightened by him:  that is, "the
 
light" of the Dalai Lama is "shining in the West."  This
 
"deeper implication" of "the prophesy" then, bolsters the
 
Dalai Lama's ally, the "Nechung oracle," and by association
 
in the fact that the oracle works solely for the Dalai Lama,
 
the prophetic powers of the Dalai Lama himself are raised.
 
"The greatest psychological value of the intelligent
 
oracle...is not that [she or] he dulls the edge of a
 
necessarily frightful future, but rather that [she or] he
 
exculpates people from the anxiety of the past" (Gordon,
 
1971, p.513).  The Dalai Lama, himself having narrowly
 
escaped from the alleged clutches of the Chinese Communist
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terrors, likewise relieves not only his own anxieties, but
 
also the anxieties of the international Tibetan Diaspora.
 
In conclusion, this chapter has looked at the ways that
 
the Dalai Lama capitalizes upon his diplomatic skills,
 
charisma, and allegedly unique insight to further persuasion
 
in politics and to maintain his position of authority over
 
Tibetans and international supporters.  The Dalai Lama's
 
ability to strengthen his "face" for negotiations also
 
carries over into much of the Western news media's treatment
 
of him and his leadership qualities.  One Western reporter,
 
for instance, suggests that "in good measure because of his
 
campaigning, the world increasingly sees the Tibetans as
 
impoverished outcasts in their own ecologically devastated
 
homeland" (McDonald, 1993, p.26).  As a social movement
 
leader who must be able to anticipate and handle the moves of
 
his political adversaries, both the charisma and the renowned
 
vision of the Dalai Lama as reported in the media have served
 
to create a strong image.  The Dalai Lama's stature in
 
international negotiations has become elevated so that where
 
he was once shunned by leaders and diplomats, he is now
 
frequently hosted by them.  The next chapter will examine two
 
speeches that the Dalai Lama delivered as a result of this
 
more recent open-door policy by Western leaders.
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CHAPTER FIVE
 
REVELING IN CONTRADICTION:  A RHETORICAL STRATEGY
 
Introduction
 
This chapter forms the center of this thesis, and
 
provides two kinds of analysis.  First, I offer a contextual
 
analysis of the settings and aftermath of two of the Dalai
 
Lama's most important speeches so as to establish an
 
understanding of the background which set the stage for the
 
Dalai Lama's delivery of each speech, as well as the reasons
 
for why it may have been received and responded to as it was.
 
Second, I provide in this chapter substantive analytical and
 
rhetorical criticism of each speech.  The analysis of each
 
speech covers the following points:  (1) a discussion of the
 
historical, contextual background of the speech; (2) audience
 
analysis, (3) textual analysis and criticism, and (4) a
 
discussion of audience response and events in the aftermath
 
of the speech.
 
Background
 
International discussion over the Tibet question has
 
flourished in the face of media suppression and diplomatic
 
efforts to downplay the events surrounding Tibet (McDonald,
 
1993, p. 24).  The riots in Lhasa, Tibet during the late
 
1980's showed to the world that the issue will continue to be
 
problematic for both China and the West, internally as it
 
relates to politics and internationally in the form of
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diplomacy. In heated exchanges between 1987 and 1989, China
 
and Western nations had to face up to the contradictions that
 
existed in the public dialogue over Tibet.
 
The main contradiction that existed for China was that
 
its proclaimed reforms and relaxation of strict policies of
 
religious suppression in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
 
only resulted in a redoubled effort on the part of Tibetans
 
to protest the Chinese presence there.  Between 1987 and 1989
 
a series of riots broke out.  The riots in the Tibetan
 
capital, Lhasa, were covered by international media and
 
witnessed by western tourists.  As a result, tourists and
 
reporters were summarily rounded up and expelled from the
 
region, and tourism in Tibet was suspended indefinitely by
 
the Chinese authorities.  For prominent Western nations, such
 
as Great Britain, France, and the United States, the
 
contradiction existed in the manner of implementing foreign
 
policy and handling internal politics:  the West's stated
 
respect for human rights stopped abruptly short of diplomatic
 
relations, especially where trade and economic policies were
 
concerned.  With regard to the United States, Vause affirms
 
that "...the 'Tibet Question' raised by Congress is
 
potentially more serious because it raises political issues
 
that cut to the very heart of deeply held convictions of both
 
the Chinese and the Americans" (1989, p.13).  These
 
"political issues" were defense, human rights, including
 
religious freedom, and trade.  Presenting such issues in a
 
persuasive and palatable manner is a monumental task.
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Kenneth Burke vouches for this.  "Religion, politics, and
 
economics," he says, "are notoriously touchy subjects..."
 
(1950, p.32).
 
Knowing this to be the case, the Dalai Lama capitalized
 
upon the contradictions in policy regarding these "touchy
 
subjects" in two speeches.  According to both Chinese and
 
Western sources, the speeches contributed to outbreaks of
 
rioting in Lhasa, Tibet (Vause, 1989, p.13).  In the
 
aftermath of the 1987 riots, the New China News Agency stated
 
that "Yesterday's riot is regarded as a direct outcome of the
 
Dalai's activities to split the motherland as an exile
 
engaged in political activities" (Gargan, 1987, p.A-1).36
 
Behind closed doors in diplomatic circles, Western
 
politicians were rebuked by China for having allowed the
 
Dalai Lama to air his views and play up the contradictions in
 
the Tibet issue (Sciolino, 1987, p.A-1; Doherty, 1991,
 
p.1002; anonymous, 1994, p.A-7).  The first speech, which the
 
Dalai Lama presented to the US Congress's Subcommittee on
 
Human Rights on September 21, 1987, was to be the precursor,
 
in both form, content, and riotous effect, to his second
 
36 Another Chinese official declared:
 
Last September (1987) the Dalai Lama made a five-point
 
statement to the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the US House
 
of Representatives, soon after which, separatists in Tibet
 
declared their support for the five-point statement.  The
 
riots in Lhasa followed.  These things are very clear...I
 
only want to talk about the apparent connections between the
 
two events.  The Dalai Lama should not have done things like
 
this which are irresponsible to his nation and religion
 
(anonymous, Beijing Review, 1988, p.20).
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speech, which was to be given before the European Parliament
 
in Strasbourg on June 15, 1988.
 
Timing and Audience
 
The "Address to Members of the United States Congress:
 
Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet" introduced into the debate
 
over the Tibet Question for the first time a comprehensive
 
intertwining of the elements in East-West diplomacy that are
 
contradictory.  Whereas formerly the issues of trade and
 
human rights, plus the stakes of war, peace, and security
 
measures had been separated largely into unrelated, or at
 
best, loosely related affairs in the Dalai Lama's discourse,
 
this speech marks the first time he takes the bold step of
 
embracing all of the issues and holding the contradictions
 
forth for the immediate and global audience to contemplate.
 
The speech also introduces a comprehensive outline for
 
specific measures about which the Chinese and Tibetans, with
 
the help and diplomatic pressure of the West, could negotiate
 
to improve the situation in Tibet.
 
"Concern in the American Congress about the human rights
 
situation in Tibet had been building for months before the
 
[1987] demonstrations began" and a series of debates took
 
place and amendments were passed regarding Tibet (Vause,
 
p.13).  Unable to secure the full joint session of Congress
 
as he had hoped, the Dalai Lama had to settle on giving his
 
speech to the Congressional Subcommittee on Human Rights.
 
Table 2 below lists the members of the subcommittee.  His
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reception on Capitol Hill was nonetheless reported to have
 
been enthusiastic (If ill, 1987, p.A-7) and singularly
 
unprecedented (Vause, 1989, p.14).  In fact, "Congress even
 
passed a bill welcoming the Dalai Lama to the United States"
 
(U.S.G.P.O. doc. 82-962, 1988, p.1).
 
Am  ,AII$IIiitiaii'  . t466h A: W. 
Jaime B. Fuster  Puerto Rico 
Tom Lantos  California 
Edward F. Feighan  Ohio 
Ted Weiss  New York 
Gary L. Ackerman  New York 
Gerald B.H.Solomon  New York 
Christopher H. Smith  New Jersey 
Jan Meyers  Kansas 
John Miller  Washington 
Mark J. Tavlarides  Subcommittee Staff Director 
David Lonie  Minority Staff Consultant 
Bernadette Paolo  Subcommittee Staff Consultant 
Kerry Bolognere  Subcommittee Staff Consultant 
Table 2.  Members of the US Congress Subcommittee
 
on Human Rights
 
Through channels of media, the speech of the Dalai Lama
 
reached the wider world audience.  This speech, either alone
 
or in conjunction with at least the token verbal support of
 
the US Congress, allegedly spurred the Tibetans to action.
 
The timing of the speech, too, may be part of the reason for
 
its impact.  "October 7, 1987 was the thirty-seventh
 
anniversary of the Communist Chinese Army's
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invasion/liberation of Tibet" (Vause, 1989, p.16).37  Thus for
 
the Dalai Lama to have spoken at a time that was
 
diplomatically advantageous, as well as symbolically
 
meaningful to Tibetans, certainly promoted the impact of the
 
speech.
 
It appears as though the Dalai Lama's goals were
 
realized.  It does not seem impossible that the Dalai Lama
 
had specifically planned to give the speech just prior to a
 
date that marked the deepest cleavage in Chinese-Tibetan
 
relations--the date of the invasion/liberation of Tibet.  By
 
giving the speech in just enough time in advance, it would
 
have time to reach across the world and permeate the censored
 
channels of Tibet and China's media through the communication
 
black market.38  In this way, the speech's import could be
 
understood by the date that is a celebration for the Chinese
 
and a day of mourning for Tibetans.
 
37  Vause confirms there were undeniable connections between the Dalai
 
Lama's speech and the riots:
 
On September 27, 1987, within days of the Dalai Lama's
 
appearance before the Congressional Human Rights
 
[Subcommittee], a ...demonstration was held at Tibetan
 
Buddhism's most holy site, the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa...On
 
September 30 Congressman Lantos reported to the press
 
information he had received that the Chinese government had
 
executed at least two Tibetan nationalists as a political
 
message in reprisal for the speeches given by the Dalai Lama
 
during his visit to the US...Representatives of the Dalai
 
Lama in New York provided the [report] to Lantos (1989,
 
p.16).
 
38 The penalties are stiff for Tibetans caught with any materials
 
perceived as anti-communist, pro-Tibetan, or independence oriented.
 
Schwartz cites, for example, the case of three Tibetans who were charged
 
on November 10, 1989, for "the printing and distribution of literature
 
explaining the Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Proposal and his speech to
 
the European Parliament in June 1988" (1994, pp. 169-170).  These three
 
Tibetans received sentences of between two to five years in prison.
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In garnering the receptive Congressional audience, he
 
was able to have secured a strong enough link to diplomatic
 
circles with a Western nation that could influence China.
 
Representative Lantos voiced the contradiction between the
 
human rights policy and foreign policy of the United States:
 
Critics of the Congressional initiatives on Tibet,
 
including administration officials, question the
 
wisdom of Congress in making its concerns about
 
human rights in this region known.  In response, I
 
would quote Secretary of State Shultz, who said
 
that "human rights is at the core of American
 
foreign policy because it is central to America's
 
conception of self."  In keeping with the
 
Secretary's policy pronouncement, the
 
subcommittees" hope to determine whether there is a
 
core to American foreign policy toward China on the
 
Tibet issue (p.2).
 
The import of the speech in the hands of the Chinese would be
 
a political embarrassment;40 in the hands of the Western
 
press, the "core" foreign policies of nations of the so-

called free world would be questioned; in the hands of
 
Tibetans, it would be just the right impetus for protest.41
 
39 Lantos is referring to the Subcommittees on (1) Human Rights and
 
International Organizations and (2) on Asian and Pacific Affairs, as
 
well as to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
 
40 As Norbu puts it, "The Dalai Lama...inside or outside Tibet,
 
continues to be a pain in the neck to China.  Hence, wherever possible
 
China has tried to stop his activity abroad" (1987, pp. 287-288).
 
41 Vause sums up the events as follows:
 
On October 1 violence had erupted in Lhasa,
 
leaving...persons dead...arrested, and considerable property
 
damaged...Chinese response was swift and certain.  Beijing
 
issued one of its harshest attacks on the Dalai Lama, whom
 
it blamed for inciting the riot, and immediately dispatched
 
additional security forces to Lhasa...Tibet was
 
(then]...sealed off from the outside world.  A curfew was
 
imposed, foreign journalists...and Western reporters...were
 
expelled (1989, pp.16-17).
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The Dalai Lama's visit had been organized by members of
 
the Democratic Congress as well as supporters of the Dalai
 
Lama and lobbyists for human rights in Washington, DC.  The
 
then Democrat-controlled Congress supported debates by
 
Congressional supporters of human rights issues, including
 
members of the Congressional Subcommittee on Human Rights.
 
In addition to passing a bill specifically to welcome the
 
Dalai Lama to Washington, Congress passed a bill expressing
 
concern for human rights issues in China, featuring
 
an amendment to the State Department authorization
 
bill which passed the House and Senate unanimously.
 
The House version called upon the People's Republic
 
of China to respect human rights.  The Senate went
 
a step further by attaching the exchange of
 
"defense articles" to China with compliance to
 
human rights provisions (U.S.G.P.O. doc. 82-962,
 
1988, p.1).
 
Clearly, the Dalai Lama's reception in Washington to speak
 
before Congress was established with the knowledge of the
 
State Department and the united cooperation of both the
 
Senate and the House.  Moreover, the "exchange of 'defense
 
articles'" that would be dependent upon China's compliance
 
with human rights conditions firmly tied trade issues to
 
human rights issues with the State Department's acquiescence.
 
At the center of the impetus for these actions, was the Dalai
 
Lama himself, and his imminent appearance on Capitol Hill.
 
Thus the bills that were passed to welcome the Dalai Lama to
 
Congress and to confirm the relationship between Sino-

American trade and China's alleged human rights abrogations
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also indicated that Congress both recognized and established­
-with the recognition of the State Department--a link between
 
the Dalai Lama as a person who was related to China and as a
 
person who is publicly known as a political as well as
 
religious figure.
 
However, following the Dalai Lama's speech and the riots
 
in Lhasa afterwards, the US State Department attempted to
 
deny that linkage.  The State Department reconfirmed its
 
position that Tibet was part of China, while also complaining
 
that the Dalai Lama should not have spoken about politics.
 
The State Department claimed that the US had issued him a
 
travel visa under the assumption that during his stay he
 
would stick to religious, and not political speeches.42
 
Charles Rose, Representative in Congress from North Carolina,
 
noted the quandary in which the US found itself as a result
 
of the Dalai Lama's speech:
 
The Dalai Lama did not come to Washington asking us
 
to help him establish the independence of Tibet.
 
Nowhere in our conversations with him has he talked
 
about that, although that has been picked up on and
 
emphasized in the press a great deal...So His
 
Holiness...makes a speech that is a model of
 
moderation, his followers get excited about what
 
has taken place in Washington, the fact that the
 
House and the Senate are interested in the plight
 
of the people [of] Tibet, and [referring to the
 
riots] you all know the rest of the story...
 
42This claim seems mendacious in light of the fact that the Dalai Lama's
 
visit had been scheduled well in advance and had been preceded by
 
numerous very political debates in Congress regarding the Tibet
 
question, China, and the Dalai Lama. Also, the Congress and Senate's
 
passing of bills on Tibet related issues that year and during the years
 
beforehand indicates that it was well understood on Capitol Hill and at
 
the State Department that the Dalai Lama's significance was not strictly
 
religious, but was also political.
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Rose's observation that the speech was moderate and at the
 
same time provoked interpretations of independence which led
 
to rioting is accurate.  Only a very deft and well timed
 
rhetoric can be simultaneously "moderate" and riot causing.
 
The way in which the Dalai Lama presented the "core" problem
 
(the problem of the contradiction between the West's two-

policy view toward the Tibet issue) lies at the heart of the
 
efficacy of the Dalai Lama's speech.  Benjamin Gilman,
 
Congressman from New York, observed that "the Dalai Lama's
 
five point peace proposal seems to me and many of my
 
colleagues to provide the desired framework for an equitable
 
solution (U.S.G.P.O. doc. 82-962, 1988, p.9)"
 
The Dalai Lama was persuasive in his targeting the US,
 
and by international political solidarity, the Western
 
audience in general, for their collective policy of
 
separating human rights from foreign policy and trade issues.
 
Reflecting later, the Dalai Lama revealed this view, saying,
 
"I held the view that the US was the champion of
 
freedom...[but] as I have come to know the [US] better, I
 
have begun to see that, in some ways, the American political
 
system does not live up to its own ideals" (1990, p. 198).
 
The effect of the speech was that Westerners apparently
 
felt compelled to respond to it and to specifically address
 
the guilt which the Dalai Lama's discourse provoked. The
 
following official commentary is one such illustration of
 
this phenomenon.  In an attempt at extirpating the US guilt
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over its contradictory policy, J.Stapleton Roy, Deputy
 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
 
scolds the Dalai Lama for the irresponsible rhetoric of his
 
Five Point Plan speech.  Yet in so doing, Roy also sinks
 
deeper into the contradiction which the Dalai Lama's speech
 
brings to light:
 
...the US Government considers Tibet to be a part of
 
China and does not in any way recognize the Tibetan
 
government in exile that the Dalai Lama claims to
 
head.
 
It is important to distinguish in this
 
connection between the Administration's strong and
 
unwavering support for human rights and our position
 
on the political claims of the Dalai Lama and on the
 
status of Tibet...This distinction is crucial to
 
understanding why the Administration disavows any
 
support for the Dalai Lama's five-point program.
 
Neither the United States nor any other member of
 
the United Nations recognizes or has ever recognized
 
Tibet as a sovereign state independent of
 
China..  . .43I urge the conferees on the State
 
Department authorization bill to make clear the
 
distinction between their legitimate concern for
 
human rights in Tibet and the question of support
 
for a political program relating to Tibet (1987, 49­
51).
 
This statement reflects the political quagmire into which the
 
West was thrown as a result of the Dalai Lama's speech before
 
Congress.  Therefore, while the Dalai Lama's speech was not
 
effectual in producing political action for the plan it
 
presented, it was effective in fostering debate over issues
 
which had lain dormant for years.  These issues were, as
 
43 Mr. Roy errs on this point.  In 1961, El Salvador supported Tibet by
 
introducing bills to the United Nations which were passed which both
 
condemned China's invasion of Tibet and supported Tibet as a sovereign
 
nation.  Despite this fact however, the bills were without teeth and no
 
action was taken on them.
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Congressman Rose stated above, "picked up on and emphasized
 
in the press a great deal."  For the Dalai Lama to have
 
accomplished this in light of the fact that his authority in,
 
and recommendations regarding, foreign affairs was rejected
 
by the West, attests to the efficacy, and intent, of his
 
discourse.  The New York Times reported, "the Dalai Lama
 
responded with dry humor to Chinese [and Western] charges
 
that he was responsible for the violence in Lhasa.  'I am
 
happy to be a scapegoat,' he said" (Hazarika, 1987, p.A-8).
 
The Dalai Lama's speech had two main effects.  It
 
invoked collective guilt over the West's contradictory policy
 
(US Government, doc. no. 82-962, 1988) and it embarrassed
 
Chinese leaders who were eager to improve their international
 
reputation (Norbu, 1991).  The speech fueled debate, which is
 
essential to keeping the issue alive.44  Such discussion is
 
what could ultimately lead to a push for negotiations and a
 
change in China's administration of Tibet (Norbu, 1991).
 
This reasoning evidently is what caused the Dalai Lama to
 
repeat, and expand upon his Five Point Plan a year later in
 
his Strasbourg Address.  The backdrop for this drama thus
 
44 Vause claims that not since the days of the newly founded United
 
States was the established balance of power system in the US so tested
 
(1989, pp. 10-43).  The views of the State Department under the Reagan
 
Administration were in direct opposition to the views of Congress, even
 
though the State Department accepted the passing of the bill that made
 
the "exchange of 'defense articles'" dependent upon human rights
 
compliance by China.  The Administration publicly backed China, while
 
Congress publicly backed the Dalai Lama's position and human rights
 
advocates.  Vause maintains that as a consequence of this overt
 
disagreement in policy, and its implications for potentially imperiling
 
Sino-American relations, there was discussion by government officials of
 
the need for an overhaul of the US system of diplomacy, in which
 
international powers of negotiation and decision making would be placed
 
more clearly in the hands of either Congress or the Administration
 
(Vause, 1989).
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established, we may inspect the contents of the Five Point
 
Plan itself.
 
The Five Point Peace Plan
 
In brief, the Five Point Peace Plan provides a reason
 
for the West in general and the US in particular to be
 
concerned about Tibet.  It establishes that Tibet is a
 
strategic region that at present is in turmoil, but which
 
could, with the West's help, potentially become a region of
 
peace and stability that would contribute to global peace.
 
The five points that the Dalai Lama proposes are as follows:
 
1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone
 
of peace;
 
2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy
 
which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as
 
a people;
 
3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human
 
rights and democratic freedoms;
 
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural
 
environment and the abandonment of China's use of
 
Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and
 
dumping of nuclear waste;
 
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future
 
status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan
 
and Chinese peoples.
 
Each of these components, however idealistic it appears to
 
be, does reflect pragmatic concerns while also serving as a
 
kind of religious lesson in nonviolence toward humans and
 
nature.
 
The themes of the speech may be seen as corresponding to
 
the points on the physical structure of the Buddhist stuns,
 
or shrine.  A stupa is square at its base, with a series of
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steps leading upward; atop the steps of the base sits a
 
spherical form (a kind of cupcake shape), which is finally
 
crowned by a pointed cone.  The four corners which comprise
 
the foundations of this speech are the interlocking
 
relationships between the "strong and the weak;" the
 
"brothers and sisters."  These themes unite the top and
 
bottom of the hierarchy.  The steps of the base constitute
 
the "peace" which must be attained at the "national,
 
regional, and global" levels.  The next series of steps
 
leading upward constitutes the past, present, and future:
 
the Dalai Lama speaks to us "today," telling us that in the
 
future, the "world [will be] increasingly interdependent,"
 
and that "we need each other more than in the past." The
 
round object which rests upon these steps is the "planet,"
 
which we are "destined to share."  And, "above all," at the
 
top of this structure is the cone, which ends in a point in
 
the sky:  "the principles" which should guide all human life,
 
those of "love and compassion."
 
The Dalai Lama opens the speech by saying that "The
 
world is increasingly interdependent, so that lasting peace- ­
national, regional, and global--can only be achieved if we
 
think in terms of broader interest rather than parochial
 
needs."  This statement invites the listener to picture the
 
world as an interlocking puzzle, which cannot be complete
 
without stability and peace in each of its parts.  The world
 
has become a place that is too "interdependent" for its
 
nations to each be selfishly obsessed with "parochial needs."
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This theme of interdependence is woven throughout the
 
text.  It enhances the ability of this mysterious "god-king"
 
from a fabled land and alien culture to get members of the
 
Western audience to identify with himself and with his
 
message.  Interdependence is congruous with Kenneth Burke's
 
conception of "consubstantiality" (1950, pp.20-23).  Burke
 
states that
 
A is not identical with...colleague, B.  But
 
insofar as their interests are joined, A is
 
identified with B.  Or [A] may identify [herself or]
 
himself with B even when their interests are not
 
joined, if [A] assumes that they are, or is
 
persuaded to believe so...
 
In being identified with B, A is "substantially
 
one" with a person other than [herself or] himself.
 
Yet at the same time, [A] remains unique, an
 
individual locus of motives.  Thus [A] is both
 
joined and separate, at once a distinct substance
 
and consubstantial with another (emphasis in
 
original) (1950, pp.20-21).
 
It is clear that through his emphasis on the theme of
 
"interdependence," the Dalai Lama, and by extension all of
 
Tibet, is the "A" of Burke's scenario.  The Dalai Lama, as
 
"A," wishes "B," that is, the West, to realize that "their
 
interests are joined."  It is the purpose of the speech to
 
"persuade" the West that although "unique," it is still
 
responsible for its counterpart, Tibet.  During the course of
 
the speech, the Dalai Lama develops numerous illustrations of
 
ways in which his cause and the interests of the West are
 
"both joined and separate."
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At the outset, the Dalai Lama affirms his ethos,
 
stating, "I speak to you today as the leader of the Tibetan
 
people and as a Buddhist monk devoted to the principles of a
 
religion based on love and compassion.  Above all, I am here
 
as a human being who is destined to share this planet with
 
you and all others as brother and sisters."  By calling
 
himself "the leader of the Tibetan people" and "a Buddhist
 
monk," he alludes to his "parallel role to the papacy,"
 
(Wentz, 1990, p.133). This reference enhances his stature
 
while also aligning the elusive Eastern religious tradition
 
to the familiar Western tradition. By calling himself merely
 
"a human being," he places himself among the great masses of
 
humanity.  When this strategy is examined according to
 
Burke's conception of "hierarchy," it becomes apparent that
 
the Dalai Lama is doing something unusual when he places
 
himself at opposing ends of the hierarchy, or social order.
 
According to Burke's "hierarchical principle," a speaker must
 
work within the confines of the existing social hierarchy,
 
using language and symbols to confirm and reiterate the
 
presence of that order (Burke, 1950, pp.138-141; Coyne, 1973,
 
pp.66-70).  The Dalai Lama, in acknowledging that order,
 
places himself at either ends of this pyramid of social
 
order.  In so doing, his speech aims to achieve maximum
 
audience receptivity by inspiring the awe and respect of
 
"underlings" as well as "overlords" (Burke, 1950, p. 138;
 
Coyne, p.70).
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It should be pointed out that this is not the Dalai
 
Lama's attempt at employing the tactics of the politician who
 
contrives to use the "plain folks appeal."  This is not the
 
case because, through the phenomenon of the universal
 
(Tibetan) belief in reincarnation, the entire Tibetan culture
 
and its social order holds the idea that any human can
 
become, through mental training, a higher incarnation, or
 
even a deity.  So while the Dalai Lama in his leadership post
 
is at the zenith of the hierarchy, and is considered by many
 
to be the manifestation of a deity in human form, the well
 
known story of his humble peasant birth serves to confirm,
 
rather than dissipate, his appeal as a human being among the
 
greater masses of the hierarchy.  A similar phenomenon, in
 
terms of symbolism, can be observed when Americans cast
 
Abraham Lincoln, as martyred leader, in a nearly deified
 
imagery, all the while we are conscious of, and often
 
reminded of, the fact that he was born and raised in a log
 
cabin.
 
His ethos thus established, the Dalai Lama restates the
 
theme of the "interdependence" of nations by saying that "As
 
the world grows smaller, we need each other more than in the
 
past.  This is true in all parts of the world, including the
 
continent I come from."  This opening paragraph provides a
 
vision of a world that needs Tibet, just as Tibet needs the
 
help of the world.  The introduction also provides a small
 
foreshadowing of the structure of the speech as a whole.
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In the second paragraph, the Dalai Lama recapitulates
 
the "open conflicts" existing in "the Middle East, Southeast
 
Asia, and in my own country, Tibet."  He claims that "unless
 
comprehensive solutions are formulated...piecemeal or merely
 
expedient measures will only create new problems."45  The
 
responsibility for averting such future problems rests on the
 
actions of those involved in the negotiation process.  The
 
Dalai Lama refers to the region's "great powers," and says
 
that "all relevant countries and peoples, large and small"
 
have to be a part of the process to resolve the conflict.
 
Again, the interdependence of nations entails not only acting
 
out of "broader interest," but also to avoid future
 
conflicts.  We may infer that as a great diplomatic power,
 
the US is "relevant" to the process of preventing conflicts.
 
Again, the steps of the structure, this "regional" peace,
 
cannot be stable without the help of those at the base, the
 
"strong and the weak."
 
The third paragraph describes how "the Tibetan people
 
are eager to contribute to regional and world peace..."  At
 
this point, the Dalai Lama also reaffirms Tibet's unique,
 
nonviolent history while also reiterating its "strategic
 
45 This claim is well founded.  J.T. Dreyer, a political scientist
 
specializing in Asian studies, maintains that
 
Unless the negotiation process [between the Dalai Lama
 
and China) can be restarted soon, a likely scenario is the
 
emergence of a Northern Ireland-type situation, in which
 
religious festivals or the anniversaries of previous
 
uprisings become occasions for outpourings of popular
 
discontent.  Each new outpouring of discontent may provide
 
more martyrs. Avenging the honor of the martyrs will provide
 
the excuse for future uprisings in Tibet (1989, p.289).
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position in the heart of Asia..."  In this way, the Buddhist
 
history of "respect to all forms of life," which alludes to
 
the highest goals or principals at the top of this thematic
 
stupa, is also linked to the base of the stupa, where the
 
physical levels of peace (national, regional, global) anchor
 
the higher ideals (love and compassion).  The "regional"
 
level of peace at the base is also linked to the stupa's
 
sphere, which is the "world."
 
Next, the Dalai Lama offers three examples of the
 
instability of this regional peace:  the invasion of Tibet in
 
1949/1950; his own "flight to India in 1959;" and the China-

India "border war in 1962."  These examples support his claim
 
in the second paragraph that only "piecemeal or merely
 
expedient measures will only create new problems."  He then
 
declares that the "border demarcation" is only a symptom of
 
the real problem, "China's illegal occupation of Tibet."  The
 
next paragraph reiterates the Dalai Lama's vision of Tibet's
 
history:
 
Since Tibetan emperors unified Tibet, over a
 
thousand years ago, our country was able to maintain
 
its independence until the middle of this century.
 
At times Tibet extended its influence over
 
neighboring countries and peoples and, in other
 
periods, came itself under the influence of powerful
 
foreign rulers--the Mongol Khans, the Gorkhas of
 
Nepal, the Manchu Emperors and the British in India.
 
Note that he uses the words "unified Tibet," which reveal the
 
goal of his speech:  to unify the disparate regions of the
 
former Tibet (which he alleges the Chinese to have broken
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apart).  Similarly, he follows this thought with the word
 
"independence"  as if to confirm the notion of a "unified
 
Tibet."  Then he repeats the word "influence" twice:  this is
 
a reminder that Tibet has influenced other nations in the
 
past, and will continue to do so in the future.  Other
 
nations, such as Great Britain and India, are mentioned to
 
encourage them to exert their own influence to stabilize
 
political conflicts over Tibet.
 
In the next paragraph he combines Tibet's past history
 
with its present by stating, "under international law Tibet
 
today is still an independent state."  As part of the
 
rhetorical process in aggrandizing the importance of Tibet,
 
the word "one thousand" is repeated.  In the second
 
paragraph, he had stated, "Buddhism was introduced to Tibet
 
over one thousand years ago;" here he states that Tibet
 
became a "unified" entity "over a thousand years ago."  The
 
Dalai Lama presents in this manner the theme of the human
 
potential to promote conflict or peace.  The theme of this
 
human potential evolves in the section on the Chinese
 
"population transfer policy," (discussed below) when the
 
"thousands" become "millions."  In the mind's eye of the
 
listener, the potential for problems associated with a
 
Chinese controlled Tibet expands at an alarming rate.
 
Conversely, were the help of allies made palpable, the
 
potential for peace could likewise expand.
 
He then states that, were it not "for China's
 
occupation, Tibet would still, today, fulfill its natural
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role as a buffer state maintaining and promoting peace in
 
Asia."  He reaffirms the "sincere desire" of all Tibetans to
 
resume Tibet's role as a buffer state that could "further the
 
cause of world peace and the well-being of mankind and the
 
natural environment we share."  He describes the "holocaust
 
inflicted upon" the Tibetans and the Chinese government's
 
"misuse [of] the opportunity for a genuine dialogue."  Next,
 
ready to introduce the fundamental components of his peace
 
plan, he states: "it is against this background and in
 
response to the tremendous support and encouragement" of the
 
West that he will "clarify the principal issues and to
 
propose...a first step towards a lasting solution."  Here,
 
too, the Dalai Lama offers his speech as a way of shoring up
 
the base of the stupa, it is a "first step" at the bottom of
 
the negotiation process which leads to the "lasting solution"
 
at the top.
 
As stated above, the Dalai Lama's five-point plan
 
introduces the following plan:
 
1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone
 
of peace;
 
2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy
 
which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as
 
a people;
 
3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human
 
rights and democratic freedoms;
 
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural
 
environment and the abandonment of China's use of
 
Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and
 
dumping of nuclear waste;
 
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future
 
status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan
 
and Chinese peoples.
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Through these five points, the Dalai Lama evokes the
 
contradiction in not just the US's "conception of self," but
 
also the entire block of Western nations which share the
 
policy of considering Tibet an internal affair of China, and
 
not a sovereign nation which has been transgressed by another
 
nation.  The contradiction which the Dalai Lama introduces in
 
this address to Congress is that the human rights issue and
 
the foreign policy issue cannot be separated to assuage the
 
guilt of politicians and world leaders.
 
The Dalai Lama, through these five points, implies that
 
the nations who attempt to advance this separation of truly
 
united policy issues may find that their founding principles
 
dissipate when pragmatic political issues appear."  The two
 
issues are, "at the core," parts of the same policy.  As
 
opposite ends of the same policy, the Dalai Lama implies the
 
issues cannot, logically or justifiably, be separated.  The
 
contradiction makes it impossible for the West to be
 
exonerated from guilt for being an accomplice in its
 
participation with China's policies in Tibet.  The
 
contradiction would be grating to China because China had
 
taken great pains to improve its image on reform policies and
 
to appear, internationally, more modern in its administration
 
of government policies.
 
46 In an interview with The Times of London on August 20, 1985, the
 
Dalai Lama was asked to comment on British Prime Minister Margaret
 
Thatcher's position on Tibet.  He replied that "... her silence is very
 
unfortunate... Apart from the moral standpoint, the British Government,
 
among Western nations, has had the closest political relations with
 
Tibet" (1986, p. 157).
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"Burke maintains that one of the consequences of being a
 
language user is guilt...the sources of guilt in [humans]  are
 
to be found in [our] symbol systems..." (Coyne, 1973, p.66).
 
Thus the Dalai Lama has discovered the error, and consequent
 
guilt, in the Western symbol system of government and its
 
administration.  This error is the illogical separation of
 
otherwise wholly integrated policies for expedient political
 
and economic gains.  The rest of the speech reveals the
 
tactics that the Dalai Lama uses in his attempt to expose and
 
deepen this guilt in his immediate Western audience, as well
 
as in the omnipresent ear of the Chinese leadership.
 
Regarding the first point of the peace plan, he proposes
 
"that the whole of Tibet, including the [disputed] provinces
 
of Kham and Amdo, be transformed into a zone of 'Ahimsa,' a
 
Hindi term used to mean a state of peace and nonviolence."
 
This, he claims, "would be in keeping with Tibet's historical
 
role as a peaceful and neutral Buddhist nation and buffer
 
state separating the continent's great powers."  By using the
 
word "ahimsa," the Dalai Lama offers an allusion to Gandhi's
 
forcing the British Empire to bow out of India.  Ahimsa was
 
an integral concept in Gandhi's writings on nonviolent
 
protest.  Through this reference, he becomes the great
 
activist-leader, Gandhi; and China becomes Great Britain who
 
must logically relinquish its control of the land it usurped
 
and the peoples who dwell there.  A first step in
 
implementing this "ahimsa" would entail removing Chinese
 
troops from Tibet.  Doing so, he says, would yield two
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immediate benefits.  First, it would enable Indian troops to
 
depart from borders.  Second, Tibetans, for whom "the vast
 
occupation force...is a daily reminder...of the oppression
 
and suffering they have all experienced," could be assured
 
that "in the future a meaningful relationship might be
 
established with the Chinese, based on friendship and trust."
 
The mention here of "the oppression and suffering" serves as
 
a transition for broaching his second point.
 
He calls "the population transfer of Chinese into Tibet"
 
a "'final solution' to the Tibetan problem."  This, of
 
course, is an allusion to the holocaust of Jews in Hitler's
 
Nazi Germany.  By such an allusion, China assumes Germany's
 
odious historic role; and the Tibetans become the victims,
 
the Jews.  At this point, he brings in the statistics
 
involving enormous numbers, which serve to extend the imagery
 
of suffering in the listener's mind:
 
The massive transfer of Chinese civilians into
 
Tibet...threatens the very existence of the
 
Tibetans...In the Amdo province, for example, where
 
I was born, there are...2.5 million Chinese and only
 
750,000 Tibetans...Today, in the whole of Tibet 7.5
 
million Chinese settlers have already been sent,
 
outnumbering the Tibetan population of 6 million.
 
In central and western Tibet...Chinese sources admit
 
the 1.9 million Tibetans already constitute a
 
minority of the region's population.  These numbers
 
do not take the estimated 300,000 to 500,000 troops
 
in Tibet into account--250,000 of them in the so-

called Tibet Autonomous Region.
 
For the Tibetans to survive as a people, it is
 
imperative that the population transfer is stopped
 
and Chinese settlers return to China.  Otherwise,
 
Tibetans will soon be no more than a tourist
 
attraction and a relic of a noble past.
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The dizzying array of numbers transforms the problem of
 
"massive transfer of Chinese" into a looming and growing
 
horror.  This scenario provides a perfect parallel to the
 
Nazi holocaust.  But instead of Jews being carted off in
 
trains to be killed in Nazi concentration camps, there is a
 
terrible and ironic reversal.  The new holocaust victims,
 
Tibetans, are being "swamped" and drowned out by the influx
 
of "Chinese settlers" who are flooding into Tibet via China's
 
policy of "population transfer."  This discourse appears to
 
be an attempt to summon for the audience images of torture
 
and death at the hands of ChiNazis.  Therefore the audience
 
is primed for the third point of the peace plan, that of
 
human rights.
 
The Dalai Lama asks that "Fundamental human rights and
 
democratic freedoms...be respected in Tibet."  His discussion
 
here is brief.  He affirms that "The Tibetan people must once
 
again be free to develop culturally, intellectually,
 
economically and spiritually and to exercise basic democratic
 
freedoms."  He defines the human rights violations as
 
"apartheid...segregation and assimilation" and states that
 
"Tibetans are, at best, second class citizens in their own
 
country."  Referring to China's frequently voiced defense
 
that it is rebuilding destroyed monasteries, the Dalai Lama
 
holds that,
 
Although the Chinese government allows
 
Tibetans to rebuild some Buddhist monasteries and to
 
worship in them, it still forbids serious study and
 
teaching of religion.  Only a small number of
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people, approved by the Communist Party, are
 
permitted to join the monasteries.
 
While Tibetans in exile exercise their
 
democratic rights under a constitution promulgated
 
by me in 1963, thousands of our countrymen suffer in
 
prisons and labour camps in Tibet for their
 
religious or political convictions.
 
This statement serves to show that the Chinese are lying
 
about their claims.  It is the Tibetans, the Dalai Lama says,
 
and not the Chinese, who are rebuilding the monasteries
 
anyway.  The old Western fear and mistrust of Communism is
 
played upon47 by illustrating that only those "approved by the
 
Communist Party," are able to study religion.  The moral
 
superiority felt by the immediate Western audience, an
 
audience which presumably regards themselves as good,
 
democracy-loving people (particularly the members of
 
Congress) would surely be inclined to believe that no member
 
of the Communist Party, which is traditionally atheistic,
 
could be serious about religious study.  In effect, the Dalai
 
Lama means that the Communist Chinese allow no one at all to
 
study or teach religion.  Next, having tapped into the
 
audience's fears and negative connotations of Communists, he
 
then turns to a discussion of the legacy of Communists as
 
nuclear war adversaries.
 
The fourth point the Dalai Lama makes is that "serious
 
efforts must be made to restore the natural environment in
 
Tibet" because Tibet, he alleges, is being "used for the
 
47 The audience for this speech is viewing the world before the
 
crumbling of "The Berlin Wall."  The Communist threat, therefore, should
 
have been perceived by them at this point in time as still very real.
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production of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear
 
waste."  This is in the face of a people who "have a great
 
respect for all forms of life," whose "Buddhist
 
faith...prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether
 
human or animal."  He states that Tibet was formerly "an
 
unspoiled wilderness sanctuary" but after the arrival of the
 
Chinese, "the wildlife and the forests of Tibet have been
 
almost totally destroyed."  He urges his listeners to help
 
turn this around, saying "What little is left in Tibet must
 
be protected and efforts must be made to restore the
 
environment to its balanced state."  Lastly, he emphasizes
 
the nuclear threat which the Chinese have created in Tibet,
 
and which "other countries" allegedly condone:
 
China uses Tibet for the production of nuclear
 
weapons and may also have started dumping nuclear
 
waste in Tibet.  Not only does China plan to dispose
 
of its own nuclear waste but also that of other
 
countries, who have already agreed to pay [Beijing]
 
to dispose of their toxic materials.
 
The dangers this presents are obvious.  Not
 
only living generations, but future generations are
 
threatened by China's lack of concern for Tibet's
 
unique and delicate environment.
 
The Dalai Lama is able to combine the Western paranoia over
 
Communism and the Communist nuclear threat with the humanist
 
plea for helping to save "not only living generations, but
 
future generations" from environmental and perhaps global
 
devastation of the environment and the people who inhabit it.
 
The temporal dimensions reflected in this point, like all the
 
previous points, cover past, present, and future.  The past
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is the time "prior to the Chinese invasion;" the present
 
exists in "living generations," and the future will be bleak
 
for "future generations" who "are threatened by China's lack
 
of concern."  The Dalai Lama attacks China's actions
 
directly, as well as those of the "other countries" who
 
allegedly dump waste in Tibet.
 
On this point, he also implies the West's complicity in
 
this nuclear threat and environmental devastation lies in
 
passively sanctioning the Chinese invasion.  Their guilt for
 
this passive allowance would be increased if the West does
 
not make "efforts" on behalf of Tibet "to restore [Tibet] to
 
its balanced state."  According to Burke's "principle of
 
perfection," humans tend to "create...ideals which can never
 
be attained," and, "as a result of the continuing failing of
 
the real and the ideal to match each other, [people] feel
 
guilt" (Coyne, 1973, p.68).  The West then, is confronted
 
with the contradiction between its ideal of upholding human
 
rights and democracy and its real state, which is one of not
 
upholding those rights in the name of trade.
 
Finally, in his fifth point, the Dalai Lama discusses
 
the need for "negotiations on the future status of Tibet and
 
the relationship between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples."
 
He concludes that the Tibet question must be negotiated "in a
 
reasonable and realistic way, in a spirit of frankness and
 
conciliation and with a view to finding a solution that is in
 
the long term interest of all:  the Tibetans, the Chinese,
 
and all other peoples concerned."
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He then reiterates the notion which his historical
 
claims support, that "Tibetans and Chinese are distinct
 
peoples, each with their own country, history, culture,
 
language, and way of life."  On the other hand, he says that
 
these differences "need not...form obstacles to genuine
 
cooperation where this is in the mutual benefit of both
 
peoples."  This juxtaposition of the divergent themes of the
 
uniqueness and potential for togetherness of Tibetans and
 
Chinese presents a central problem to the speech; this
 
problem, however, is resolved in the person of the Dalai Lama
 
himself.  This thematic oxymoron is that "distinct peoples"
 
are presently mutual "obstacles" while there exists the
 
potential for them to be of "mutual benefit."  The
 
identification of this oxymoron shows the Dalai Lama's belief
 
in the audience's benevolent attitude towards different
 
peoples, races, ethnicities, and religions.  At the same
 
time, when considering the Dalai Lama's own religious
 
persona, this oxymoron may be viewed as a potential source
 
for effecting persuasion in the audience.  This divergent co­
theme is prevalent in the Dalai Lama's discourse in general.
 
The use of these opposing themes relates the idea that the
 
world, with its increasing population density, is
 
correspondingly losing, or at least modifying, its historic
 
borders of "culture, language, and way of life. "48  Two
 
examples of this come to mind.  The first is the inevitable
 
elimination of apartheid in South Africa.  The second is the
 
48 This notion is attributable to discussions with S. Gollah, Oregon
 
State University, during 1994-95.
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European Community's (EC's) progression, beginning in the
 
1950's, of lowering historic barriers to trade and everyday
 
life by implementing plans for adopting a common currency
 
(the Eurodollar), a common language of diplomacy (English),
 
and other jointly decided measures.  While these nations
 
which comprise the EC are extremely different in terms of
 
history, culture, and language, they have been able, thus
 
far, to agree to join forces for the common good.
 
Admittedly, this joining of forces, for South Africa, has
 
entailed white army attacks and terrorism, and for Europe, it
 
has not been without the xenophobic rhetoric of politicians
 
such as Jean Marie LePen of France and the sporadic campaigns
 
of neo-Nazi violence against new immigrants in Germany.
 
However, such problems of integration are summarily decried,
 
and, to the credit of these governments, there are continual
 
attempts to end strife related to differences among diverse
 
peoples who share regions and nations.  Thus the main problem
 
of the intercultural communicator as persuasive communicator
 
becomes this:  how does one mediate the primal human need to
 
maintain uniqueness and a link to some special identity
 
(linguistic, cultural, historical), while also proclaiming
 
that there is an equally pressing need, in the name of a
 
common good ("world peace"), to integrate, "cooperate," and
 
"negotiate" with some other contrastingly unique entity?
 
The Dalai Lama's continual proclamations of the
 
distinctness of Tibetans should fall on sensitive ears to an
 
international audience who understands that while integrating
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diverse races and ethnic groups throughout the world is
 
inevitable and difficult, it cannot be acceptable for it to
 
be done through forced "population transfers."  In hindsight,
 
an example of international sensitivity to ethnic "transfers"
 
would be the albeit precarious presence of United Nations
 
troops in the former Yugoslavia.  The motivation for keeping
 
troops there is not only to contain the civil war, but also
 
to attempt to prevent or reduce the "ethnic cleansing" forms
 
of population transfers that have happened, to the world's
 
horror, during the course of that civil war; the U.N.
 
presence indicates the  belief on the part of member nations
 
of the U.N. that population transfers in or out of regions
 
are wrong and should be stopped.  Therefore, as the
 
international concern for the former Yugoslavia shows, the
 
Dalai Lama has accurately gauged the world opinion about
 
population transfers.  He highlights the fact that,
 
especially for Western nations, China's population transfer
 
policy is at best unsavory and at worst fostering an
 
ecological and cultural genocide in Tibet.  By showing how
 
morally odious China's population transfer policy is, he
 
provides a sufficient reason for Western action on behalf of
 
Tibet to stop this policy.  Similarly, if the United States
 
Congress felt it important enough to host the Dalai Lama, who
 
is the symbol and perfect encapsulation of the Tibetan
 
people's unique religion, ethnicity and culture, then the US
 
should be justified in acting to defend and preserve the
 
people whom the Dalai Lama represents.  Therefore, the Dalai
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Lama makes it obvious that the clearest way for the US to act
 
to help Tibetans would be to condemn China's population
 
transfer policy not only with words, but with actions or even
 
sanctions.  The Dalai Lama's own presence as a speaker before
 
Congress is an indicator that such "action" by the US to
 
condemn China's policies is not only possible, it is already
 
happening.  The Dalai Lama's plea, then, is for the US and
 
the West in general to extend their actions beyond symbolic
 
efforts and translate the symbolic event into political and
 
tangible efforts to influence China's leadership in their
 
policy making and implementation.
 
The Dalai Lama's last statement regarding the call for
 
negotiations and "genuine cooperation" also refers to a
 
belief held by many political scientists that China will
 
never gain effective control over Tibet without the help, and
 
even better, the presence of the Dalai Lama.  Here the Dalai
 
Lama shows that he needs China's help to improve the
 
situation of his people.  He underscores the notion that
 
China will continue to flounder in its administration of
 
Tibet irregardless of the Dalai Lama's alleged "separatist
 
activities."  This last point, then, seems particularly
 
directed towards China:  "We must all exert ourselves to be
 
reasonable and wise, and to meet in a spirit of frankness and
 
understanding."
 
In his concluding statements, the Dalai Lama thanks the
 
Subcommittee "for the concern and support which you and so
 
many of your colleagues and fellow citizens [have] expressed
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for the plight of oppressed people everywhere."  Again, this
 
presses upon the human rights issue as it relates to the core
 
of foreign diplomacy of democratic nations like the US.
 
Then, playing upon Western guilt for its duplicity in
 
verbally patting Tibetans on the back over human rights
 
abuses while refusing to take firm diplomatic stances with
 
China (such as UN initiatives, MFN trade sanctions or
 
boycotts), he says,  "The fact that you have publicly shown
 
your sympathy for us Tibetans, has already had a positive
 
impact on the lives of our people inside Tibet."  The
 
audience's feelings of guilt thus primed, he then urges them
 
to act to redeem themselves of their false political
 
posturing and inaction: "I ask for your continued support in
 
this critical time in our country's history.  Thank you."
 
Linked Speeches.
 
Just as the Five Point Peace Plan speech was said to
 
have been at least one of the instigating factors for the
 
riots in Tibet in 1987, observers have noted a similar
 
relationship exists between the protests in Tibet which
 
followed the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg proposal.  The March
 
1988 riots were "the largest, best-organized and most
 
destructive demonstrations in Tibet to date," and led the
 
Chinese central government to "impose martial law on the
 
region" (Dreyer, 1989, p.281).49  Months later, on December
 
49 In the aftermath of the March protest events, "during  a trip to
 
Washington, DC, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xuegian branded the Dalai
 
Lama as 'an exile who attacks and smears the People's Republic of
 
China'" (Mann, 1988, p. 12).
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10, 1988, Tibetans in Lhasa risked death to demonstrate on
 
the fortieth anniversary of International Human Rights Day
 
(Schwartz, 1994, p. 137).50
 
Immediately following the Strasbourg speech, the Chinese
 
"accused the Dalai Lama of trying to internationalize the
 
issue of Tibet," while also "inviting him to come to Beijing
 
for negotiations" (Dreyer, 1989, p.288).  Norbu maintains
 
that "the main Chinese objection [to the Strasbourg proposal]
 
was the underlying assumption by the Dalai Lama that Tibet
 
had historically been an independent state prior to the
 
Communist takeover in 1950.  This assertion is repeated three
 
times in the Five Point Peace Plan and again three times in
 
the Strasbourg Statement" (1991, pp.355-356).
 
Aside from Chinese and Western interpretations of the
 
Strasbourg proposal, the Tibetans' perceptions of the speech
 
must be taken into account.  The ineffectiveness of the Dalai
 
Lama's nonviolent messages on a segment of his Tibetan
 
audience may, in part, stem from
 
the rise of a new generation of militant
 
Tibetans...[who] revere the Dalai Lama as a temporal
 
50 Regarding the selection of this particular day for their protest,
 
Schwartz posits that
 
Demonstrating on this day served two purposes...it gave
 
evidence of the...desire of Tibetans to protest against
 
Chinese rule in Tibet...(and it] was staged with an
 
international audience in mind and with a clear intention to
 
embarrass the Chinese government.  It was an act of defiance
 
in the face of attempts by the Chinese administration to use
 
the prospects of negotiations to quell protest.  At a time
 
when...negotiations with the Dalai Lama were still
 
anticipated, the demonstration reiterated the Tibetan
 
commitment to independence, while explicitly linking Tibetan
 
nationalist protest with international issues of democracy
 
and human rights (1994, p. 137).
 150 
and a spiritual leader, but they apparently find no
 
inconsistency between these professions of
 
unswerving devotion and their rejection of the Dalai
 
Lama's message of nonviolence.  The young Tibetans
 
have threatened a campaign of terrorism against the
 
Chinese and may be beyond the control of their god-

king (Dreyer, 1989, pp.288-289).
 
In April of 1994 the Dalai Lama acknowledged the lack of
 
support his speeches had from these young Tibetans:  "...I am
 
conscious of the fact that a growing number of Tibetans, both
 
inside as well as outside Tibet, have been disheartened by my
 
conciliatory stand not to demand complete independence for
 
Tibet."  Nonetheless, until very recently he has stood by the
 
proposals, stating in his own defense that "internationally,
 
my initiatives and proposals have been endorsed as realistic
 
and reasonable by many governments, parliaments, and non­
governmental organizations" (Tibetan Review, Apr. 1994,
 
pp.16-17).
 
The Next Audience:  The European Parliament
 
Herman and Lodge state that the ultimate purpose of the
 
European Parliament, as a supporting branch of the European
 
Community (EC), is to "perform certain functions in respect
 
of the public, namely communication, education and
 
information" (emphasis in original) (1978, p.68).  The
 
European Parliament was founded in the late 1950's as an
 
assembly to support the EC, its tasks involved serving as "an
 
inspiration and a help for the activities of the [EC] and [to
 
bring] public opinion of the [EC] to the support of all steps
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or endeavors made in the service of Europe" (1978, pp.24-25).
 
It appears that the Dalai Lama chose well his venue for
 
presenting his new proposal for Tibet's status.  What better
 
audience could one find to propagate one's ideas than an
 
audience whose sole purpose was "communication, education,
 
and information?"51
 
In addition, considering Great Britain is a powerful
 
member of the EC and a nation which deals heavily with China,
 
especially with regard to the status of Hong Kong, the
 
European Parliament was an appropriate base from which the
 
Dalai Lama chose to transmit his message.  Moreover, other
 
European nations represented at the European Parliament also
 
have interests in the Tibet question, particularly as human
 
rights issues in Tibet and throughout China impact trade
 
relations.  "Foreign businesses are investing more and more
 
On the other hand, K.L. de Gucht, an official of the European
 
Parliament, in his 1987-88 report on political affairs and human rights,
 
observes that
 
The fact is that [the European Parliament's] human rights
 
work can only be credibly pursued if Parliament's public
 
position on human rights is seen to be well-founded and
 
informed, and...sustained by a broad consensus in the
 
House...
 
Regrettably, however, there have...[been] instances
 
where [the European Parliament] has undermined its own
 
credibility... One need only mention the reaction by the
 
Assembly of the People's Republic of China to a
 
Parliamentary resolution of 15 October 1987 critical of
 
Chinese policy in Tibet, which led to a 'fence-mending'
 
public statement by [the European Parliament's] Bureau.  It
 
is the strongly held view of [myself and]...senior Members
 
of the Political Affairs Committee and its Human Rights
 
Subcommittee who have been consulted that this sort of
 
supine response does nothing but damage to [the European
 
Parliament's] credibility in human rights--particularly
 
since on the Tibet issue there is general international
 
recognition that human rights abuses have been perpetrated
 
by the Chinese authorities on a massive scale (1988, p. 50).
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money in China... [they] also are vying to establish
 
footholds in the country to sell their products... since
 
1979, foreign investors have poured $141 billion into
 
business ventures in [China]..." (Cooper, 1994, p. 315).
 
Foreign investment, however, is not immune to human rights
 
issues. Andrew Nathan reports that as a result of the
 
Tiananmen massacre and the publicized crackdowns of Tibetans
 
in Lhasa between 1987 and 1988, "China experienced a two-year
 
decline in its credit rating, foreign investment, export
 
orders, and tourism" (1994, p. 635).  Nathan also maintains
 
that China's human rights problems continue to impact Western
 
foreign policy and decision making about China (1994, pp.
 
633-643).
 
Vause states that the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Address
 
represents "a dramatic shift" in which the Dalai Lama
 
"reversed both positions...of strong opposition to the
 
Chinese military presence in Tibet" and "little or no
 
acknowledgment of any legitimate Chinese interests in Tibet"
 
such as "China's right to handle Tibet's foreign affairs"
 
(1989, p.21).  Other experts "said the plan represents a
 
significant shift in position by the Dalai Lama" (Mann, 1988,
 
p. 12).  Another report called the Strasbourg proposal "
 
radical new plan" (Palmer, 1988, p. 8).  I would argue,
 
however, that the Strasbourg Address does not constitute a
 
dramatic shift, but rather a logical progression of political
 
maneuvering that is based squarely on the five point plan
 
which he presented to Congress a year earlier.
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Surveying the events in China and elsewhere in the world
 
at the time when he gave the speech, it seems likely that the
 
Dalai Lama took the reality of the Tibet situation, combined
 
it with the exigencies of geopolitics, and fashioned the
 
Strasbourg proposal accordingly.  In Tibet itself, Qiao Shi,
 
head of a Chinese internal security force in Tibet, visited
 
Lhasa and its environs on June 15, 1988 "to handle any
 
further outbursts by Tibetans" (Schwartz, 1994, p.109).  At
 
that time, Shi pronounced publicly a policy of "merciless
 
repression" for dealing with any obstreperous Tibetans and
 
protest activities (p. 110).  The Dalai Lama was more than
 
likely apprised of these happenings in Tibet proper, and he
 
probably took them into consideration in the preparation and
 
delivery of the speech.
 
A US official remarked that "It sounds like [the Dalai
 
Lama] has modified his approach.  There are some new elements
 
here.  Last fall [in the Five Point Peace plan], the Dalai
 
Lama would not come out against the idea of independence for
 
Tibet" (Mann, 1988, p. 12).  Thus, rather than an abrupt
 
about-face, the Strasbourg Proposal represents a "modified
 
approach." Indeed, the Dalai Lama himself says
 
I was pleased to receive an invitation to speak to
 
a group of concerned politicians at the European
 
Parliament later in 1988.  This coincided with
 
several western leaders calling on China to open
 
negotiations with myself on the future of Tibet.
 
Thinking that this invitation offered an
 
opportunity to re-state the Five-Point Peace Plan,
 
and, in particular, to expand on its fifth
 
component, I gladly accepted (1990, p. 258).
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The prior Five Point Plan, then, was the springboard for his
 
Strasbourg speech.  The Dalai Lama "chose the occasion to
 
reveal his strategy for 'securing a compromise negotiated
 
agreement' with China (Palmer, 1988, p. 8).
 
The Dalai Lama's immediate audience was not "the full
 
European Parliament;" instead, he "spoke in a conference room
 
in the parliament building to two hundred people, journalists
 
and parliamentarians" (Oregonian, 1988, p. A-5).  The
 
Washington Post  made an editorial decision to downplay the
 
significance of the Dalai Lama's audience, reporting that the
 
speech "was prepared for delivery to the European
 
Parliament...[but that] the speech subsequently was canceled
 
because of fears his appearance would offend the Chinese
 
government.  He spoke with reporters after copies of his
 
speech were distributed" (1988, p. A-34).
 
The Dalai Lama himself simply states that he delivered
 
the Strasbourg speech on June 15, 1988, and does not mention
 
the reported speech cancellation (1990, p. 258).  It is clear
 
that copies of the speech were available.  The LOS Angeles
 
Times reported that the speech was "distributed by the Dalai
 
Lama's representatives in Europe and the United States"
 
(Mann, 1988, p.12).  Whether or not the cancellation of the
 
speech itself was foreseen by the Dalai Lama and his backers
 
is not known; it is clear that they were prepared for this to
 
happen, since pre-arranged copies were already being
 
circulated worldwide.52
 
52 As far as the context for the speech is concerned, all news and
 
journal reports of the Strasbourg proposal report that the formally
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This context for the delivery of the speech thus
 
established, the following section of this chapter will
 
provide an analysis of the text of the Strasbourg speech.
 
The Strasbourg Proposal-:  Finding Transcendence
 
in a Middle Way
 
Departing from issues of guilt, which are repeated in
 
the Five Point Peace Plan, the Dalai Lama relies in the
 
Strasbourg speech on the theme of transcendence.  This shift
 
in strategy proved to be a risky but wise choice because
 
planned speech was canceled out of fears that it would offend the
 
Chinese. It is noteworthy that both major Western news publications and
 
scholarly sources, however, fail to include specific details about the
 
cancellation of the formal speech event beyond what I have provided in
 
the above discussion. Sources in which I sought, but did not find any
 
details on the context and background of the speech include the
 
following: The European Parliament's Guide to Documents and
 
publications. 1987-1988, Luxembourg;  East, R. (ed.) Feesing's Record of
 
World Events. Vol. 34. 1988.  Longman Group UR Limited, 1988, p. 36001;
 
The World Today. 44, 1988, (Jul., Aug., Sept., Oct. issues); The Europa
 
Year Book 1988:  A World Survey. Vol. I, Europa Publications, Inc. 1988;
 
L'Express, 1988, (Jun., Jul. issues); per Spiegel, Jul. 1988.
 
An exemplary omission of any commentary about the Strasbourg
 
speech is found in Current History. 87, Sept., 1988.  The title of this
 
issue is: "The People's Republic of China, 1988." The entire issue is
 
devoted to articles exclusively about China, including articles on Sino-

American relations, politics, human rights issues, economics, and
 
Chinese society. Yet in the entire issue there are merely two curt
 
sentences that mention the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposal.
 
What reports such as these exclude is information regarding (1)
 
exactly when it was known that the formal delivery of the speech would
 
be canceled; (2) who was involved in making the decision to cancel the
 
speech event; and (3) whether or not last minute lobbying efforts on the
 
part of Chinese caused the speech to be canceled, or whether the
 
decision was made on the part of European Parliament members by
 
themselves, or by the French Government, since the European Parliament
 
meeting was held in Strasbourg, France--or whether the cancellation
 
occurred as a result of a combination of these and other factors.  The
 
Dalai Lama's own account (1990), too, excludes this same information. In
 
light of the commentary by K.L. de Gucht on the European Parliament's
 
history of "supine response" to Chinese pressure (see above, footnote
 
no. 50), it is likely that the decision to cancel the speech event was
 
made by members of the European Parliament themselves, who, ironically,
 
were the ones who had invited the Dalai Lama to Strasbourg to speak in
 
the first place.
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immediately following the speech, there were renewed
 
communications between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese
 
leadership, which stopped just short of actual negotiations
 
over the Tibet question (the details of the speech's
 
aftermath will be discussed in the next section).53
 
In terms of Kenneth Burke's schema for dealing with
 
human guilt, there are three tactics that apply to this
 
discussion.  First, one can blame oneself, which is
 
mortification; second, one can blame others, which is
 
scapegoating; and third, one can rise above the situation
 
through transcendence, when one transforms the error or
 
blame, through a shift in emphasis, into a virtual nonentity
 
(Burke, 1950, pp. 192-195; Brummet, 1981, p. 256).  Barry
 
Brummet comments that as far as rhetorical tactics are
 
concerned, audiences "prefer not to feel guilty.  They will
 
transcend potential guilt if manifest problems can be
 
attributed to some cause other than themselves" (Brummet,
 
1981, p. 264).  Through transcendence, one is able to "deny
 
guilt" by anticipating the mere "threat of guilt" and then
 
"transforming it" (Brummett, 1981, p. 256).  Thus
 
"transcendence permits seeing one's struggle within a larger
 
53 According to Schwartz, the more open and liberal minded factions of
 
the Chinese leadership, especially Yan Mingfu, then "head of the United
 
Front Work Department of the CPC," were already considering a strategy
 
of winning over Tibetan allegiance by stating their "willingness to
 
negotiate with the Dalai Lama...(provided that) the Dalai Lama renounce
 
any claim to independence for Tibet" (1994, p.133).  One indicator of
 
the effectiveness of the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposal is that while
 
the Dalai Lama's speech stops short of totally renouncing independence,
 
which was a "precondition" of the United Front's plans for negotiating
 
(p. 133), the Chinese leadership still called for negotiations and set
 
in motion plans for arranging meetings with the Dalai Lama after the
 
speech was delivered.
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hierarchy that prevents guilt" (Brummett, 1981,  p. 256).
 
Burke states that transcendence "allows the member of an
 
underprivileged minority... to confront the world at once
 
specifically and generically" (1950, pp. 194-195).  For
 
Burke, "any improvement in social status is a kind of
 
transcendence" (1950, p. 193).54
 
In the Strasbourg speech, the shift away from guilt, or
 
the avoidance of the "threat of guilt" for causing Tibet's
 
woes is transferred from China to a general notion of all
 
people's mistakes in general--that is, Chinese, Western, and
 
Tibetan.  Moreover, China's "sins" become moot because of the
 
realization that there is nothing that can be done about the
 
excesses of the past, particularly those which occurred
 
during the Cultural Revolution.55  In the social hierarchy in
 
54 Each party in the Tibetan scenario holds a unique place in the social
 
hierarchy that is germane to the drama unfolding.  The West comprises
 
nations of the first world, whose governments value liberty and human
 
rights; Westerners must preserve their place of power by continually
 
acting to prove these values.  China's place in the social hierarchy is
 
one of power, as a nuclear superpower and as a formidable trading
 
partner; China, too, must act to preserve its position.  Tibetans are
 
placed at the pinnacle of spiritual matters within the social hierarchy,
 
and their unique culture and history must be preserved in order for them
 
to maintain their status as leaders in spiritual matters.  Thus each
 
party is, in its own way, continually reaffirming the hierarchy and
 
attempting to improve its status.  Burke states that "...an individual
 
attempt at the transcending of inferior status gets increased poignancy
 
from the fact that, atop all the intensity of such effort in itself,
 
there is a working at cross-purposes" (1950, p. 193).  Burke also says
 
that
 
Where there are... many intense conflicts of an extraverbal
 
sort, no merely verbal manipulations can remove them.  But
 
verbal manipulations may offer a more orderly approach to
 
them, permitting them to be contemplated with less
 
agitation.  And where this is the case, verbal manipulations
 
are the very opposite of the "evasive" (1950, p. 195).
 
The Strasbourg Proposal, by delineating a "transcendent" and "orderly
 
approach," presents precisely the balm this conflict needs because the
 
Dalai Lama's "verbal manipulations" provide for negotiations "with less
 
agitation."
 
55 Brummett states that
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which moral individuals hold the power, China's status is
 
considered inferior; but through the option presented by the
 
Dalai Lama, the Chinese may improve their social  status, and
 
thus transcend the situation.  By the same token, the Western
 
place in the social hierarchy is determined by the way
 
Westerners overvalue materialism, which allows Western
 
nations to ignore alleged nuclear waste dumping in Tibet in
 
order to maintain good relations with China.  However, the
 
Strasbourg plan offers for the West a role as facilitator in
 
key negotiations among Chinese, Tibetans, and concerned
 
international parties whose national security would be
 
impacted by changes in Chinese control of the Tibetan region.
 
Westerners, as facilitators, could then avert guilt by acting
 
to help others.  Therefore the West could improve its
 
international "social status," thus transcending its present
 
place in the scenario by showing that materialism can be
 
tempered with other-oriented behavior.  Lastly, Tibetan guilt
 
for the excesses of self sacrifice in the name of nonviolent
 
When guilt is collective within a group or nation, the
 
leaders of the group may, through public rhetorical
 
pronouncements, transcend, bemoan, and redeem guilt for the
 
group. Thus, public rhetoric may sometimes be explained by
 
the ways in which it expresses a sense of guilt and enacts a
 
means of resolving or transcending guilt for the public. One
 
would especially expect rhetoric to take the form of
 
scapegoating, mortification, or transcendence 1) when
 
pressing problems threaten the national well-being and
 
realize the possibility that guilty actions have caused
 
those woes, and 2) when the national social order is under
 
examination (1981, p.257).
 
In the case of Tibet, the "pressing problems" are alleged human rights
 
abuses and ecological and cultural devastation.  In addition, the
 
"national social order" of communism in China as a whole and
 
particularly its administration in Tibet continues to be "under
 
examination."
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protest (mortification) can be avoided by finally giving up
 
the idea of total independence.  Tibetans would improve their
 
"social status" within the international political community
 
by yielding a measure of idealism in exchange for a more
 
workable and realistic resolution:  by relinquishing demands
 
for total independence and by working constructively with
 
China to create a better relationship, Tibetans would
 
transcend the current situation.  In the Strasbourg Proposal
 
the Dalai Lama intones that, as far as the need for taking
 
any constructive actions are concerned, only the present and
 
future are critical for helping Tibet.  The past is
 
irrelevant to improving the situation and to improving the
 
"social status" of the three parties to the conflict. In this
 
way, the shift in blame takes place, and transcendence is
 
achieved for all concerned.
 
In the Five Point Peace Plan, whether it was the
 
isolationist Tibetans themselves (mortification), the
 
overzealous communist Chinese or the callous Westerners who
 
export nuclear waste to be buried in Tibet (scapegoating),
 
the guilt rests more equally among members of the immediate
 
Western audience as well as the Chinese leadership abroad.
 
In the Strasbourg speech, it is only China as a whole who
 
bears the brunt of guilt for Tibet's suffering--Tibetans and
 
the rest of the world's people's may transcend any guilt and
 
move beyond it on the basis of what is deemed the highest
 
order in the hierarchy:  freedom.  Even then,  China itself
 
has its sin of excesses turned into "not-a-sin" (Brummett,
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1981, p. 256) because all it need do is cooperate with the
 
Dalai Lama in following his Strasbourg Proposal.  The
 
Strasbourg Proposal's underlying implication is that by
 
adhering to the Dalai Lama's agenda for a new arrangement,
 
China's sin could become effaced.  This tactic leaves room
 
for the Dalai Lama to emerge successfully from the debate
 
over Tibet because he presents as near as possible--given the
 
enormous constraints of the scenario--a plan for a win/win
 
outcome.
 
In the opening statement of the speech, the Dalai Lama
 
states that, given our socially interdependent hierarchy of
 
world order,  power and inspiration need only be coalesced
 
into action on behalf of Tibet to improve the situation
 
there.  Establishing the theme of universal responsibility at
 
the outset, the Dalai Lama says, "We are living today in a
 
very interdependent world.  One nation's problems can no
 
longer be solved by itself.  Without a sense of universal
 
responsibility our very survival is in danger."  By using the
 
theme of universal responsibility, the Dalai Lama appeals to
 
the moral nature of the audience.  At the same time, through
 
the notion of "cooperation" and joining of world power, he
 
implies that transcendence over the problems of Tibet can be
 
achieved.
 
The Dalai Lama cites as an example of such transcendence
 
what was accomplished in Europe after the Second World War:
 
I have...always believed in the need for better
 
understanding, closer cooperation and great respect
 
among the various nations of the world.  The
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European Parliament is an inspiring example.  Out
 
of the chaos of war, those who were once enemies
 
have, in a single generation, learned to co-exist
 
and to cooperate.
 
The Dalai Lama moves from this concrete example of
 
transcendence to the potential example, Tibet.  Paralleling
 
the idea of the "chaos of war," he states that "Tibet is
 
undergoing a very difficult period...under Chinese
 
occupation..."  In contrast to the "occupation," the Dalai
 
Lama introduces the theme of freedom:
 
The Tibetans...yearn for freedom and justice and a
 
self-determined future...For over a thousand years,
 
we Tibetans have adhered to spiritual and
 
environmental values...inspired by Buddha's message
 
of non-violence and compassion and protected by our
 
mountains, we sought to respect every form of life
 
and to abandon war as an instrument of national
 
policy.
 
Here the theme of freedom works in three ways.  First, it
 
serves to commend the Western democracies for having
 
political systems that value "freedom and justice" as well as
 
self-determination.  Second, freedom also is aligned to
 
Tibetans through their "thousand years" of history in which,
 
"protected by... mountains," they were free from China's
 
dominion.  Third, freedom is the idea that unites the
 
otherwise very different traditions of East and West, of
 
Tibet and Europe, because the Western conception of "freedom
 
and justice" entails notions of equality, which is not unlike
 
the Tibetan ideal "to respect every form of life..."
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This relationship having been established, the Dalai
 
Lama then reasserts his often repeated views on Tibetan
 
history, which he says stretches "back more than two thousand
 
years."  He makes it clear that Tibet's state in the past was
 
"one of independence."  He refers to any period of rule by
 
"neighbors--Mongol, Manchu, Chinese, British and the Gurkhas
 
of Nepal" as having been "brief and the Tibetan people have
 
never accepted them as constituting a loss of national
 
sovereignty."  It is crucial that the Dalai Lama reasserts
 
this overview of an independent Tibetan history at the
 
beginning of the speech, for it sets the tone for the rest of
 
the speech.  Proclaiming Tibet's prior independence at the
 
start also serves to lessen the impact of the proposal for
 
Tibet's status to be "in association with" China, especially
 
in the eyes of the more radical Tibetans who stubbornly call
 
for total independence at near impossible odds.  By using the
 
theme of Tibet's history as an agreed upon base within the
 
Dalai Lama's followers, he again emphasizes common ground.
 
The idea of a win/win scenario is then introduced.  The
 
Dalai Lama first sets the tone for the guilt of both the
 
Chinese (scapegoating) and the Tibetans (mortification),
 
while also opening the door for an opportunity for
 
transcendence from that guilt.  The Chinese guilt lies in the
 
structurally violent actions such as government repression of
 
culture as well as physically violent actions such as the
 
alleged genocide and destruction of monasteries; the Tibetan
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guilt exists in their loss of over one million citizens
 
through its forty years of nonviolent resistance:
 
In 1949 the People's Republic of China
 
forcibly invaded Tibet.  Since that time, Tibet has
 
endured the darkest period in its history.  More
 
than a million people have died as a result of the
 
occupation.  Thousands of monasteries were reduced
 
to ruins.  A generation has grown up deprived of
 
education, economic opportunities and a sense of
 
its own national character. Though the current
 
Chinese leadership has implemented certain reforms
 
it is also promoting a massive population transfer
 
policy onto the Tibetan plateau.  This policy has
 
already reduced the six million Tibetans to a
 
minority...our tragedy continues.
 
The opportunity for the Chinese to transform their guilt into
 
a non-guilt would be, logically, to end the "massive
 
population transfer" and to expand its limited "reforms" by
 
rising to the global ideal set forth earlier in the speech,
 
the ideal of working to ensure freedom.
 
In the next paragraph, he describes how the Chinese are
 
doing the exact opposite of working for freedom.  Even though
 
the Dalai Lama says he has "always urged my people not to
 
resort to violence in their efforts to redress their
 
sufferings," the Chinese have "violently suppressed" the
 
Tibetans with "Chinese police and military."  The Dalai Lama
 
at this point washes his hands of responsibility for future
 
violence in the face of such alleged repression, saying,
 
I will continue to counsel [Tibetans] for
 
nonviolence, but unless China forsakes the brutal
 
methods it employs, the Tibetans cannot be
 
responsible for a further deterioration in the
 
situation.
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Again, the offer for Chinese transcendence is repeated in the
 
directive for China to "forsake the brutal methods" now in
 
place.
 
Next, the Dalai Lama sets the agenda for relinquishing
 
the theme of Tibetan mortification and replacing it with
 
transcendence by showing how the Tibetan strategy of
 
"sacrifice" has fallen short of its "precious goal" of
 
freeing Tibet from China's throat-hold:
 
Every Tibetan hopes and prays for the full
 
restoration of our nation's independence.
 
Thousands of our people have sacrificed their lives
 
and our whole nation has suffered in this struggle.
 
Even in recent months, Tibetans have bravely
 
sacrificed their lives to achieve this precious
 
goal...[Yet] the Chinese totally fail to recognize
 
the Tibetan people's aspirations and continue to
 
pursue a policy of brutal suppression.
 
Note the phrase "sacrificed their lives" is offered twice
 
before he concludes that the "policy of brutal suppression"
 
continues nonetheless.  The Dalai Lama reiterates the imagery
 
of Tibetan suffering and sacrifice in the face of the Chinese
 
power structure while also hinting at a certain degree of
 
acknowledgment of the marginal efficacy of this orgy of self
 
sacrifice.  This acknowledgment prepares the audience for an
 
explanation of a way out, through, and beyond the present
 
situation in Tibet.
 
His acknowledgment of the excesses of Tibetan suffering
 
is explained in the next paragraph, when the Dalai Lama
 
states that he has thought about this dilemma "for a long
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time" in an effort "to achieve a realistic solution
 
to...(Tibet's] plight" (emphasis added).  This indicates that
 
the above described excesses of self sacrifice have not
 
worked, and that such mortification is not "realistic."
 
Next, pointing to tangible solutions that he and the )cashaq 56
 
have devised, he restates the ideas he set forth in the Five
 
Point Peace Plan.  It is in this place in the Strasbourg
 
Proposal where the Dalai Lama clearly uses the Five Point
 
Peace Plan as a launch pad for more tangible and realistic
 
resolutions.  Specifically, he states, "the fifth point of
 
the peace plan called for earnest negotiations between the
 
Tibetans and the Chinese.  We have therefore taken the
 
initiative to formulate some thoughts which may serve as a
 
basis for resolving the issue of Tibet."  These "thoughts"
 
are, in fact, very concrete and potentially realizable plans.
 
The first of these items is the one that would be most
 
disappointing to followers who stand adamantly on a free-

Tibet platform.  For although the Dalai Lama affirms the
 
principle of freedom and the Western ideal form of
 
government, he also establishes the "association" status for
 
Tibet, while also rejecting China's limitation of the
 
geographical place of Tibet to the TAR by stating that "the
 
whole of Tibet" refers to "Cholka-Sum--U-Tsang, Kham and
 
Amdo."  The second item is to allow China to handle Tibet's
 
foreign policy, while, in yet another fence-straddling
 
56 The kashaq is the cabinet of advisors and ministers of the Tibetan
 
Government in exile.
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position, "Tibet should, however, develop and maintain
 
relations, through its own foreign affairs bureau" in diverse
 
fields including "tourism" and "non-political activities."
 
The third item introduced is to set up a Western democracy,
 
"founded on a constitution or basic law" which "provides for
 
a democratic system of government...ensuring economic
 
equality, social justice and protection of the environment."
 
This latter item is a particular dig at the guilt of the
 
Chinese, for it alludes to the fact that the Communist
 
Chinese leadership's Marxist ideals of "economic equality"
 
have fallen far short of their reality.57  Then, in rhetoric
 
reminiscent of the free-Tibet movement's rallying cry, "Tibet
 
for the Tibetans," he states, "This means that the Government
 
of Tibet will have the rights to decide on all affairs
 
relating to Tibet and the Tibetans."  Offering more detail
 
about this government formula, the Dalai Lama also shows how
 
Tibet can transcend its current situation:
 
As individual freedom is the real source and
 
potential of any society's development, the
 
Government of Tibet would seek to ensure this
 
freedom by full adherence to the Universal
 
57 In many of the interviews of and writings by the Dalai Lama, he is
 
fond of saying how he holds nothing against Marxism in theory, but that
 
the Chinese have utterly failed to make it work in practice.  For
 
instance, in Freedom in Exile (1990), he observes,
 
[In 1954]...The more I looked at Marxism, the more I liked
 
it.  Here was a system based on equality and justice for
 
everyone, which claimed to be a panacea for all the world's
 
ills.  From a theoretical standpoint, its only drawback as
 
far as I could see was its insistence on a purely
 
materialistic view of human existence.  This I could not
 
agree with.  I was also concerned at the methods used by the
 
Chinese in pursuit of their ideals.  I received a strong
 
impression of rigidity (p. 90).
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Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights
 
to speech, assembly, and religion.  Because
 
religion constitutes the source of Tibet's national
 
identity, and spiritual values lie at the very
 
heart of Tibet's rich culture, it would be the
 
special duty of the Government of Tibet to
 
safeguard and develop its practice.
 
In repeating the Western ideal of "individual freedom" as a
 
goal for Tibet, the Dalai Lama shows the Western diplomats
 
that his plan is, in a kind of reverse-domino-theory fashion,
 
a goal that is worthy of support by Western leaders.  In
 
other words, if the West could expend so much staffpower and
 
money in the past to stop the spread of Communism (such as
 
that expended for wars in Korea and Viet Nam), why not expend
 
a little diplomatic energy toward ensuring a peaceful stop to
 
the spread of Communism by promoting the spread of democracy?
 
Also, by pinpointing religion as "the source of Tibet's rich
 
culture," the Dalai Lama is again showing how the atheistic
 
Communist regime is an alien force in Tibet, and how only
 
Tibetans themselves can properly safeguard what is valuable
 
to them.
 
According to the Dalai Lama, by allowing a greater
 
measure of freedom and democratic reform inside Tibet, China
 
can transcend guilt for the excesses of destructively rigid
 
communist programs in Tibet.  The Chinese system of
 
repression in Tibet is what holds the Chinese leadership down
 
in a position of being guilty:  only by embracing democratic
 
practices and recognizing the mutually beneficial results of
 
democratic institutions in Tibet can the Chinese find a way
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through and beyond the current system of repression.  This
 
repression must be let go because it only fosters continued
 
instability in Tibet, including the loss of lives (of both
 
Chinese and Tibetans); tourist dollars; and "face" for the
 
Chinese government.  China's transcendence, then, lies in its
 
potential for reaching the realization that supporting a
 
measure of autonomy as well as democratic reform in Tibet is
 
the only way for China to better manage the region as well as
 
reduce or eliminate the loss of international bargaining
 
power due to issues of human rights.
 
The Dalai Lama offers a Western style democracy
 
structure, "comprised of popularly elected Chief Executive, a
 
bi-cameral legislative branch, and independent judicial
 
system" located in Lhasa.  Moreover, the "social and economic
 
system of Tibet" would be "determined" by the Tibetan people,
 
bearing in mind especially the need to "raise the standard of
 
living of the entire population."  Once again, the former
 
statement is an appeal for Western support for the plan and
 
the latter is a jab at the current Chinese system which
 
rewards Chinese workers, replaces the native Tibetan language
 
with the Chinese language, and which tends to leave Tibetans
 
with a substandard level of education and opportunity.
 
The next item the Dalai Lama introduces is the
 
commitment of the newly installed "Government of Tibet" to
 
protect the environment, including "wildlife and plant-life."
 
Next, with regard to the "sin" of nuclear weaponry and its
 
side effects, he proposes that
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The manufacture, testing, stockpiling of nuclear
 
weapons and other armaments must be prohibited, as
 
well as the use of nuclear power and other
 
technologies which produce hazardous waste.  It
 
would be the Government of Tibet's goal to
 
transform Tibet into our planet's largest natural
 
preserve.
 
Here the Dalai Lama offers another way that the Chinese to
 
stop their negative actions.  Changing Tibet from a place of
 
suffering to "the planet's largest natural preserve" would
 
"transform" Tibet, and in so doing, would be a benefit to the
 
"planet" as a whole.  Thus Tibet would be transformed from a
 
nuclear waste dump site to a "natural" place of sanctuary;
 
both China and Tibet could then transcend the "technologies
 
which produce hazardous waste" while also serving as a model
 
of international peace through the reduction of military
 
weapons.
 
In order to achieve this scaling back of nuclear weapons
 
and weapons stockpiling, the Dalai Lama proposes to set up "a
 
regional peace conference" that would work to ensure "peace
 
through demilitarization."  The Dalai Lama allows that "until
 
such a peace conference can be convened and demilitarization
 
and neutralization achieved, China could have the right to
 
maintain a restricted number of military installations in
 
Tibet...solely for defense purposes."  So while he replaces a
 
bellicose slogan with his own pacifist slogan, he also backs
 
the idea by offering his plan for a "peace conference" which
 
would serve to decide the details for reducing the military
 
establishment in Tibet.
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By saying that the Chinese military in Tibet would be
 
used "solely for defense," he also alludes to the idea that,
 
for India, China's present forces are a threat, and for the
 
Tibetans, the forces are used improperly against Tibetan
 
civilians.  This allusion to China's misuse of its troops is
 
brought out in the next statement, in which the Dalai Lama
 
demands "the Chinese Government should cease its human rights
 
violations in Tibet and abandon its policy of transferring
 
Chinese to Tibet."  If the peace conference could actually
 
result in a reduction of Chinese troops in Tibet, it is made
 
to seem possible that these problems could be overcome.
 
The proposal thus set forth, the Dalai Lama turns to
 
address Tibetans specifically.  In speaking to Tibetans, he
 
acknowledges their dismay at what may be seen as giving away
 
too much--namely, independence--to Chinese leadership.  But
 
he also describes how they must view their role in
 
accomplishing the proposal as a transcendent act:
 
I am aware that many Tibetans will be disappointed
 
by the moderate stand...Undoubtedly, there will be
 
much discussion in the coming months within our own
 
community, both in Tibet and in exile.  This,
 
however, is an essential and invaluable part of any
 
process of change.  I believe [this proposal is]...
 
the most realistic means by which to reestablish
 
Tibet's separate identity and restore the
 
fundamental rights of Tibetan people while
 
accommodating China's own interests.
 
Thus relinquishing adamant demands for independence is the
 
act, or "process of change," that will cause transcendence.
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The Dalai Lama next addresses the Chinese leadership,
 
presenting a demand that any changes must occur with the
 
approval of not just the Chinese, but more importantly, the
 
Tibetans:
 
I would like to emphasize...that whatever the
 
outcome of the negotiations with the Chinese may
 
be, the Tibetan people themselves must be the
 
ultimate deciding authority.  Therefore, any
 
proposal will contain a comprehensive procedural
 
plan to ascertain the wishes of the Tibetan people
 
in a nationwide referendum.
 
In this demand, the Dalai Lama pairs the Tibetan sacrifice of
 
independence with the Chinese sacrifice of control over
 
decision-making, since the final say would be determined
 
through "a nationwide referendum" which excludes Chinese
 
input.  Once more, this shows that while the Dalai Lama
 
concedes that the role of China in Tibet has been, and would
 
continue to be, that of a controlling power, the
 
psychological and intangible nature of an independent Tibet
 
exists "nationwide" within the "Tibetan people."
 
Accordingly, the Dalai Lama must then set to rest any
 
uncertainties about his own role in this Chinese controlled,
 
yet psychologically independent, Tibet.58  He declares that
 
58 Particularly for the Tibetan protest movement within Tibet, Schwartz
 
notes that the Dalai Lama's role is crucial to their sense of purpose
 
and identity:
 
...the Dalai Lama is...important as the central religious
 
and political symbol for Tibetans.  The dual nature of his
 
role...as both political and religious leader--has been an
 
important...resource for them.  The Dalai Lama embodies the
 
central formula of Tibetan politics:  "religion and politics
 
combined."  In the conditions of Chinese rule this formula
 
has gained a new significance that contrasts with its
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he does not "wish to take active part in the Government of
 
Tibet."  This indicates, too, that he wants the Tibetans to
 
rise above what he has often voiced as their over-reliance
 
upon the Dalai Lama himself.  Also possible, is that this
 
assertion may be viewed as a message to the Chinese, that,
 
should this "new" arrangement for a "Government of Tibet" end
 
up being a sham, such as that under the 1950-1959 Communist
 
Chinese administration, that the Dalai Lama refuses to return
 
to playing the role of an impotent puppet-leader for the
 
Chinese regime.  Then, underscoring the Dalai Lama's stature
 
and symbolic power, he states, "I will continue to work as
 
much as I can for the wellbeing and happiness of the Tibetan
 
people as long as it is necessary."  This statement, too, can
 
be seen as a comforting message to reassure Tibetans he will
 
continue to play a central part in Tibetan society, while
 
also warning the Chinese that he will not give up his efforts
 
at changing the status quo in Tibet "as long as it is
 
necessary."
 
Regarding this proposal, the Dalai Lama then indicates
 
that the Tibetan Government in Exile is "prepared to meet
 
meaning in traditional Tibetan society, where it legitimized
 
the... Dalai Lama's government. As a formula for political
 
legitimacy, it derives its force from the figure of the
 
Dalai Lama, who remains a potent yet ambiguous symbol--thus
 
enabling the formula to be applied creatively to the present
 
situation in Tibet.  Tibetans understand the formula as
 
being essentially open-ended; they have no difficulty
 
equating its political side with democracy, since the Dalai
 
Lama is acknowledged as a world leader who symbolizes
 
democracy and human rights (1994, p. 124).
 
Thus the Dalai reaffirms his desire to work to help Tibetans, albeit
 
without a government role.  This ensures that the Dalai Lama has a
 
working relationship with the system but one that allows him to act
 
independently of the government so that he can remain a "potent yet
 
ambiguous symbol."
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with the Chinese to discuss the details."  He affirms the
 
proposal is "aimed at achieving an equitable solution"  to the
 
problem of Tibet.  The Dalai Lama also flexes his political
 
muscle, saying, "We are encouraged by the keen interest being
 
shown in our situation by a growing number of governments and
 
political leaders, including former president Jimmy Carter of
 
the United States."  By saying that among his supporters is
 
the former leader of a power as great as the US, the Dalai
 
Lama rises to meet Chinese leaders at their level of power.
 
The Dalai Lama also mentions his supporters who number even
 
among the Chinese:  "recent changes in China...have brought
 
about a new group of leadership, more pragmatic and liberal."
 
This indicates to the Chinese that they may transcend the
 
legacy of the Cultural Revolution era leaders by realizing
 
their abilities as "pragmatic and liberal" leaders.
 
The Dalai Lama next places more pressure on the Chinese,
 
and restates the opportunity for their "sins" to become "not
 
sins:"
 
We urge the Chinese ... leadership to give
 
serious... consideration to the [proposal].  Only
 
dialogue and willingness to look with honesty and
 
clarity at the reality of Tibet can lead to a
 
viable solution.  We wish to conduct discussions
 
with the Chinese Government bearing in mind the
 
larger interests of humanity.  Our proposal will
 
therefore be made in a spirit of conciliation and
 
we hope that the Chinese will respond accordingly.
 
That said, China would appear unreasonable not to "respond
 
accordingly."  The Chinese are encouraged "to look...at the
 
reality" of the situation so that they, too, may transcend it
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through "a viable solution."  The theme of universal
 
responsibility is echoed in terms of "the larger interests of
 
humanity."  In presenting the proposal, the Dalai Lama has
 
already given up enough, he has overcome great obstacles; for
 
the Chinese to banish their guilt for past sins, they must
 
"respond accordingly."
 
In the next paragraph, the Dalai Lama restates themes he
 
introduced in the Five-Point Peace Plan.  Having just
 
presented a solid and realistic proposal for Tibet's future,
 
these themes appear fitting and workable.  He reminds the
 
audience that Tibet has a "unique history and a profound
 
spiritual heritage," thus referring to Tibet's past
 
independence as well as the moral value of working to save it
 
on the basis of its spiritual worth.  He also offers one last
 
reminder of Tibet's role in international affairs, saying,
 
"Its historic status as a neutral buffer state, contributing
 
to the stability of the entire continent, can be restored."
 
By doing so, he claims "Peace and security for Asia as well
 
as the world at large can be enhanced."  Again, providing an
 
emphasis on the strategy of transcendence, he reiterates
 
Chinese guilt but also shows the possibilities if actions are
 
taken to reverse that guilt:
 
In the future, Tibet need no longer be an occupied
 
land, oppressed by force, unproductive and scarred
 
by suffering.  It can become a free haven where
 
humanity and nature live in harmonious balance; a
 
creative model for the resolution of tensions
 
afflicting many areas throughout the world.
 
The Chinese leadership need to realize that
 
colonial rule over occupied territories is today
 
anachronistic.  A large genuine union or
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association can only come about voluntarily, when
 
there is satisfactory benefit to all parties
 
concerned.
 
The Dalai Lama's comment about "colonial rule" is ubiquitous
 
in his discourse; it shows the irony of how the Communist
 
Chinese--who have traditionally castigated Western nations
 
such as the British and Americans as being "imperialists" and
 
"colonists"--are truly themselves guilty of precisely the
 
same kind of "colonial rule" they find so repugnant in other
 
nations.  Finally, the Dalai Lama points out that the
 
proposal can help all parties to transcend the conflict over
 
Tibet, and "throughout the world," because it will serve as
 
"a creative model for the resolution of tensions."
 
Again, stroking his audience, the Dalai Lama declares
 
that "The European Community is a clear example of this
 
[model of conflict resolution].  The Dalai Lama at this point
 
adds a contrasting counter-example, while also alluding to
 
the label the Chinese use for him:  "splittist;" the Dalai
 
Lama states:  "On the other hand, even one country or
 
community can break into two or more entities where there is
 
lack of trust or benefit, and when force is used as the
 
principal means of rule" (emphasis added).
 
Finally, the Dalai Lama reminds his immediate audience
 
of the benefits which a self-ruled Tibet could provide for
 
Europe:
 
I would like to end by making a special appeal to
 
the honorable members of European Parliament and
 
through them to their respective constituencies to
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extend their support to our efforts.  A resolution
 
of the Tibetan problem within the framework that we
 
propose will not only be for the mutual benefit of
 
the Tibetans and Chinese people but will contribute
 
to regional and global peace and stability.  I
 
thank you for providing the opportunity to share my
 
thoughts with you.
 
This conclusion effectively encapsulates the theme of
 
universal responsibility.  These concluding remarks also show
 
how the European Parliament, by enabling the Dalai lama to
 
use their session as a venue for presenting his plan, may
 
participate in transcendence over not just Tibet's problems,
 
but also the world's conflicts, thereby achieving "global
 
peace and stability."
 
Reactions to the New Ply
 
The Strasbourg proposal "outlined the framework for a
 
Hong Kong-style settlement...Most outside observers found the
 
agenda constructive, noting that for the first time, the
 
exiled leader had formally asked for an arrangement short of
 
total independence" (Dreyer, 1989, pp.284, 288).  The
 
Strasbourg speech exerted a tangible influence on China and
 
the West.  Grunfeld maintains that "there are Tibetans and
 
Chinese who believe the recent reforms in Tibet are a direct
 
result of the Dalai Lama's successful efforts to publicize
 
the Tibetan issue around the world" (1988, p. 27).
 
Tenzin N. Theton, the Dalai Lama's spokesperson in the
 
United States, said, "I don't think independence has been
 
conceded...this is the first time he's made such detailed
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proposals" (Mann, 1988, p. 12).  Inside Tibet, the Tibetans'
 
reactions to the speech were mixed:
 
Tibetans were torn between trust in the Dalai Lama
 
and willingness to acquiesce in his judgments...and
 
their obvious mistrust of Chinese intentions...the
 
prospect of giving up the goal of complete
 
independence was generally viewed with suspicion in
 
Lhasa, where the Chinese government's announcement
 
of its willingness to negotiate with the Dalai Lama
 
was seen as a propaganda ploy to quell the
 
demonstrations (Schwartz, 1994, p. 134).
 
As far as Chinese publicity was concerned, however, the
 
Chinese reaction to the plan was rejection.  On June 22,
 
1988, "the Chinese embassy in New Delhi issued a press
 
release which stated that... the Dalai Lama or 'his deputy
 
are welcome to [visit] Beijing for talks and every issue
 
except the independence of Tibet is open for discussion'"
 
(Tibetan Bulletin, 1988, p.3).  This statement reveals that,
 
while in the view of many Western analysts the issue of
 
independence seemed to be weakened, from the Chinese
 
perspective the speech presented a continued threat.  The
 
Chinese press release offers a response to that threat:
 
...[regarding] the change in tune of the Dalai
 
Lama's speech at the European Parliament at
 
Strasbourg and in the USA last year, the essence
 
was that he was still trying to tamper with history
 
to deny the fact that Tibet is an inalienable part
 
of Chinese territory and China exercises sacred
 
sovereignty over Tibet.  This the Dalai Lama was
 
trying to do in attempt to turn the question of
 
Tibet into an international issue...this is
 
something which we can never tolerate.  No
 
independence for Tibet is allowed.  No semi-

independence is allowed.  No independence in any
 
disguised form is allowed, either.  The attempt of
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splitting the motherland59 with the backing of
 
foreign forces will lead him nowhere" (Tibetan
 
pulletin, 1988, p.3).
 
Thus while the Dalai Lama's Western backers and many Tibetans
 
saw the speech as virtually giving up on independence, China
 
certainly did not.  To the contrary, China saw the speech as
 
formulating a plan for a "disguised form" of independence.
 
Dreyer observes that the Strasbourg proposal--although
 
rejected outright both by many Tibetans and by the Chinese
 
leadership--may ultimately be the best plan for Tibet's
 
future stability because
 
If...the alternative to Tibetan self-government is
 
dealing with a financial running sore and a human
 
rights embarrassment, the advantages of allowing a
 
Hong Kong-type of internal self-government is in
 
Tibet...may well outweigh the disadvantages.  It
 
remains to be seen whether the Dalai Lama can
 
persuade his militant supporters to accept such a
 
plan (1989, p.289) .60
 
59 While the Dalai Lama has not overtly made any specific observations
 
about the Chinese leadership's common use of the phrase "splitting the
 
motherland," or their calling the Tibetan protesters and government in
 
exile "splittists," the Dalai Lama's discourse does point to an
 
understanding of the rhetorical weaknesses of this chosen imagery.  To
 
say that something is "split" indicates, to a certain degree, that fault
 
lines or a nominal cleft was preexisting.  As a consequence, the
 
resulting "split," due to pressure, seems more natural.  It appears,
 
from the Dalai Lama's discourse, that the alleged history of separation
 
between Tibet and China is exactly this kind of fault line or cleft
 
which would make the "split" both natural and inevitable.
 
60 The Times of India also supports this view:
 
...The Chinese have not said the last word on this question.
 
The fact is that China is already operating a "one country,
 
several systems" arrangement. Special systems are in operation
 
in China's special economic zones.  For the future, Chinese
 
leaders are committed to permitting radically different systems
 
to exist in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.  There is no reason
 
why they cannot conceive and implement yet another system for
 
Tibet with the cooperation of the Dalai Lama (Deshingkar, 1989,
 
p.19).
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It is possible that the Chinese will continue to hold out in
 
the face of "human rights embarrassment."  There are
 
indications at present that China, in its best economic and
 
military interests, will continue to lobby hard to counter
 
the Dalai Lama's claims and to downplay any international
 
criticism over human rights.  On the whole, the Chinese
 
leadership's efforts at lobbying in the diplomatic circles of
 
the West have been extremely successful during the past ten
 
years, and shows few signs of weakening now that Western
 
businesses wanting access to the greater Chinese market are
 
supporting China's lobbying efforts (Awanohara, 1994, pp.24­
26).  It is clear, however, that human rights concerns will
 
continue to be an issue of concern in negotiating with the
 
Chinese.  Therefore, even if human rights concerns are
 
considered as only marginally influential in bargaining and
 
negotiating with the Chinese, the more intangible concern
 
associated with human rights--"face"--will continue to shape
 
international relations with China.  So while China's market
 
looms large in Western desires for trade access, human rights
 
issues still cast shadows over every negotiation that takes
 
place.  To save or maintain face, the Chinese government must
 
anticipate, react, and respond to Western concern over human
 
rights issues.  Thus the Chinese will be continually
 
challenged and forced to expend energy and resources on
 
international publicity campaigns and lobbying efforts to
 
downplay human rights issues (Awanohara, 1994, pp.24-26).
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In the short term, the speech did raise hopes that
 
productive negotiations between the Dalai Lama and Chinese
 
leaders would take place.  For instance, shortly after the
 
Strasbourg speech, the Chinese and the Dalai Lama began to
 
make arrangements for discussions to take place.
 
Unfortunately, the Chinese suddenly imposed extra
 
stipulations without which, they said, the discussions could
 
not take place.  The Chinese diplomats set a condition that
 
no outsiders be present at the negotiations.  The Dalai
 
Lama's government in exile wished to employ the services of a
 
Dutch attorney, which the Chinese refused to allow.  Then the
 
Chinese conveyed that Beijing would be the only place they
 
would negotiate, instead of Europe, which the Dalai Lama
 
preferred.  In addition, the Chinese would not agree to any
 
members of the kashaa, to be present at the negotiations
 
(Dalai Lama, 1990, p. 259).  Lastly, the Chinese stated that
 
they would enter into no discussions unless the issue of
 
independence was declared out of the range of discussion.
 
The Tibetan exiled government would not acquiesce to these
 
demands, and the planned meetings were called off (Dreyer,
 
1989, p. 288).  There has been little productive
 
communication between China and the Dalai Lama since that
 
time.  So, perhaps in part because of the Dalai Lama's
 
awareness of China's lobbying strength, more recently he has
 
all but abandoned the plan outlined in the Strasbourg
 
proposal.  Another reason for letting the Strasbourg plan
 
drop is the unwillingness of Chinese leaders to negotiate
 181 
openly with the Dalai Lama on the points proposed.  As the
 
incident above illustrates, the Chinese prefer to negotiate
 
strictly on their own terms.
 
In his statement issued on the thirty-fifth anniversary
 
of the Tibetan uprising in Lhasa, which was delivered on
 
March 10, 1994, the Dalai Lama declared:
 
The ideas put forward in my Five-Point Peace Plan
 
for Tibet in 1987 and the Strasbourg Proposal in
 
1988 envisage a solution which does not ask for the
 
complete independence of Tibet.  However, the
 
Chinese government has even refused to enter into
 
negotiations of any kind...I had hoped that my
 
middle-way approach would eventually create an
 
atmosphere of mutual trust...(but] the Chinese
 
government has rejected my overtures one after
 
another and has consistently attempted to confuse
 
the real issue...I must now realize that my
 
approach has failed to produce any progress...If
 
[this continues to be the case] then I will no
 
longer be able to pursue this policy with a clear
 
conscience.
 
What the next policy might be has yet to be determined.
 
Above all, the Dalai Lama has far from given up his campaign
 
of persuasion.  His stream of writings, lectures, and
 
published interviews continues at present in a strong flow.
 
His most recent books include p, Flash of Lightning in the
 
Dark of Night:  A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life
 
(1994) and The World of Tibetan Buddhism:  An Overview of Its
 
Philosophy and Practice (1995).  The future impact of the
 
Dalai Lama's persuasive campaign is uncertain, but the
 
discussion above does indicate that his influence continues,
 
at minimum, to uncomfortably pique the policy makers of China
 
and the West.
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Conc lus ioq
 
The Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Plan offers a clear
 
yet idealistic framework for resolving the problems besetting
 
Tibet. The first four points of the plan are quite
 
idealistic:  to convert Tibet into a zone of peace and
 
nonviolence (ahims4); to end China's population transfer
 
policy; to improve the human rights situation; and to
 
preserve Tibet's environment.  The last point, which is a
 
call for negotiations in earnest between Tibetans and the
 
Chinese, is the most pragmatic.  The Dalai Lama approaches
 
the idealistic points from the vantage point of his own
 
strong ethos and the moral and political conviction that
 
Tibet's historic independence should be reconfirmed and, with
 
the help of the West, regained.
 
In the Five Point Plan, mortification is a key theme:
 
the Dalai Lama presents an image of Tibetans as the suffering
 
servants of humanity, offering themselves as sacrifice for
 
the guilt of the Chinese leadership's flailing and malevolent
 
policies in Tibet.  The ideal reason for the sacrifice is a
 
Gandhian goal of ahims4, so the Dalai Lama holds forth the
 
idealistic image of a future Tibet that is free from
 
suffering and conflict.  With Western support and efforts,
 
the Dalai Lama says that Tibet could emerge from all of this
 
suffering and sacrifice to serve as a buffer zone to enhance
 
the safety of the world.  At the same time, the Dalai Lama
 
casts the Chinese in the role of intransigent and
 183 
unreasonable people, who are guilty for the tragedy which has
 
occurred in Tibet.  Thus the Chinese serve as scapegoats for
 
Tibet's inability to establish on their own an international
 
recognition of Tibet's de facto independence.  By the same
 
token, the West is scapegoated, although to a much lesser
 
degree than the Chinese.  The West is hinted at being an
 
overly materialistic society that rationalizes sending
 
nuclear refuse to be dumped on Tibet while it duplicitously
 
praises democratic ideals, especially the ideal of valuing
 
human rights.  The Dalai Lama confirms Tibet's independence
 
through history, and calls for the Chinese to end their
 
inhumane actions in Tibet.  He also calls for the West to
 
intervene and lobby with China on behalf of Tibet; helping
 
stabilize the region for the sake of the West and
 
international peace, as well as for the Tibetans themselves,
 
would be in line with the West's stated concern for human
 
rights and global stability.
 
The Strasbourg Proposal provides a different approach to
 
resolving the problem of Tibet.  Using the central five
 
points of the Five Point Plan as a basis, he expounds upon
 
the last point, offering a far more pragmatic approach.  The
 
Strasbourg proposal proposes the following actions:  first,
 
to allow China to handle Tibet's foreign policy; second, to
 
allow Tibet its own government and constitution; third, to
 
establish a Tibetan government with an elected chief
 
executive, a bicameral legislature, and an independent legal
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system; and fourth, to demilitarize Tibet but allow for some
 
Chinese installations for defense only.
 
The crucial difference in the Strasbourg Speech is that,
 
unlike the first four points of the Five Point Plan, this
 
speech indicates a shift towards a realistic and workable
 
solution.  This shift occurs in two key ways.  First, the
 
Dalai Lama reveals that he recognizes that total Tibetan
 
independence must be the token of exchange for a productive
 
and mutually beneficial arrangement with the Chinese in
 
Tibet.  Second, the Dalai Lama trades most of the
 
mortification and scapegoating which appears in the Five
 
Point Plan, and instead favors a tactic of transcendence.  By
 
offering a realistic and mutually beneficial approach for the
 
future, the Dalai Lama offers the Chinese a way to avert
 
their guilt for the tragic excesses they caused in the past.
 
The Dalai Lama offers Tibetans a way beyond their guilt over
 
'their inability to garner independence and the cumulative
 
excesses of a forty year long program of self sacrifice in
 
the name of an unattainable independence.  The Tibetans,
 
quite simply, are to give up the ideal of total independence.
 
The Dalai Lama also presents the West--for whom human rights
 
are supposedly a great concern--with a way to avoid being
 
blamed for looking the other way while Tibetans were being
 
persecuted and killed.  The West is offered the role of
 
facilitator in regional negotiations to demilitarize the
 
Tibetan plateau and thus reduce nuclear weapons proliferation
 
and the nuclear threat in that part of the world.
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The audience is thus presented with a practical way to
 
see beyond the troubling present and into a productive and
 
much improved future.  The transcendence of all parties
 
involved in the question of Tibet is ensured by a
 
transformation of past guilty actions, or sins, into
 
potential positive actions, thus averting future sins.  The
 
Strasbourg Proposal provides a detailed plan that would
 
resolve future conflicts not only in Tibet, but also with
 
regard to the nuclear threat, in the entire hemisphere as
 
well.  The cost to the Free-Tibet movement occurs in the
 
Dalai Lama's acquiescence to agree to giving Tibet an
 
"associated" status with China.  In a sense, this action is
 
the symbolic mortification that the Dalai Lama offers in
 
exchange for the physical mortification in terms of the loss
 
of Tibetan lives.  Giving up the ideal of total independence
 
for Tibet effectively ends the physical thrust of the
 
movement because the needless loss of lives would be ended;
 
yet the Free-Tibet movement remains symbolically intact, in
 
fact, it is strengthened in its transcendence, because it
 
would gain freedom and democracy through self rule--a mental
 
and social independence. Thus, through the clear and
 
practical items delineated in the Strasbourg Proposal, the
 
Dalai Lama enables all parties to emerge without guilt, thus
 
victoriously transcending the current situation.
 
This chapter has shown how the Dalai Lama's speeches
 
were contextually apt, carefully tailored for each audience,
 
and, as a result, influential.  The above discussion has
 186 
highlighted in particular the Dalai Lama's use of the
 
rhetorical tactics of mortification, victimage, and
 
transcendence.  The next chapter provides a discussion of the
 
rhetorical framework through which the Dalai Lama transmits
 
his messages.  Just as a painting's colors and hues are
 
enhanced or subdued in the viewer's eyes by the artist's use
 
of well chosen mattings and frames for the work of art, so
 
are the points of a speaker's discourse made more powerful
 
and effective by using what Kenneth Burke calls "frames."
 
Specifically, the next chapter presents an analysis of the
 
Dalai Lama's use of the "comic frame" and the "tragic frame,"
 
explaining how the use of these frames serves to make his
 
speech more compelling and persuasive.
 187 
CHAPTER SIX
 
A TRAGICOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE TIBET QUESTION
 
The Opening of the Wisdom Eye
 
Among his prolific writings on religion is the Dalai
 
Lama's book, The Opening of the Wisdom Eye (1966).  The
 
purpose of the book was to heighten the reader's awareness of
 
the world of human beings around them.  Through instruction
 
on compassion and understanding, the Dalai Lama presents ways
 
that readers can reach for a course of life that is directed
 
toward attaining wisdom and happiness.  In his political
 
writings the Dalai Lama has taken kernels of dissent in the
 
form of books, lectures, and interviews, and planted them in
 
audiences throughout the world.  The Dalai Lama states that
 
the goal of the political discourse, like the religious, is
 
to foster, ultimately, awareness and happiness and ultimately
 
world peace.
 
In terms of Kenneth Burke's analytical framing of human
 
conflict, the rhetoric surrounding the Tibet question
 
involves both comedy and tragedy.  "Comedy censures those who
 
separate [people] from each other; tragedy destroys those who
 
separate [people] from gods" (Burke, 1959, p. 59; Brummet,
 
1984, p.218). Thus while comedy deals with human conflicts
 
relating to society, tragedy deals with human conflicts that
 
violate God-given directives (Burke, 1959, p. 59; Brummet,
 
1984, p. 219).  In the conflict that has thus far impeded
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negotiations about Tibet, rhetoric molded in the comic frame
 
points to the errors which have been made in Tibet as arising
 
from China's Cultural Revolution and its leaders' very human
 
mistakes.  The rhetoric that is patterned after the tragic
 
frame castigates the Chinese for being "evil" and the West
 
for lacking the moral backbone to do anything about the
 
alleged genocide and ongoing human rights abuses in Tibet
 
(Weiss, 1987; Bullert, 1986).
 
The rhetoric of both frames serves to alleviate the
 
public "guilt that arises when people violate hierarchies"
 
(Brummet, 1984, p.217). Barry Brummet asserts that
 
"rhetorical critics may find these theories of comedy and
 
tragedy useful in explaining how and why public communication
 
takes the form that it does" (Brummet, 1984, p. 221).  The
 
Dalai Lama's rhetoric has capitalized upon both approaches to
 
promoting understanding of the conflict over Tibet.
 
This chapter is a brief examination of how the Dalai
 
Lama's nonviolent stance toward protesting human rights
 
violations in Tibet has been communicated in a tragicomic
 
manner.  The Dalai Lama uses what Kenneth Burke termed the
 
"comic frame" (1959, p.93). Coupled with the comic frame is a
 
highly sentimental, tragic frame for his discourse.
 
Communications scholar A. Cheree Carlson has noted that
 
researchers have studied the use of nonviolent rhetoric in
 
conflict situations, most notably the communication patterns
 
of Martin Luther King, Jr. in the United States and Mohandas
 
K. Gandhi in India (1986, p.446).  Yet the omission of the
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Dalai Lama, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, from these
 
paradigmatic models of nonviolent movement leadership and
 
communication is a glaring one.  This part of my analysis
 
will augment these earlier studies with a critical analysis
 
of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric according to these two frames.
 
The Comic Frame
 
According to Carlson, "movements rising from the comic
 
ritual may be identified as those like Gandhi's that rely on
 
a strategy of peaceful civil disobedience to achieve social
 
change..." (p.448).  This is precisely the type of movement
 
that the Dalai Lama leads in his conflict with Chinese
 
leaders and with international and particularly Western
 
political leadership.  The Dalai Lama's communication is
 
likewise comic because it too is "pragmatic;" it evinces "a
 
strong sense of irony" (p.450); "it aims at creating 'maximum
 
consciousness'" of both villain and victim as being
 
potentially one and the same (p.447); and it is highly
 
"religious" (p. 452).
 
Furthermore, for the leader of the social movement to
 
"free Tibet" from China's allegedly inhumane domination,
 
"comedy is an agent of change" that enables humans "to
 
correct the errors of the guilty party and to bring him or
 
her back to the social fold which his or her actions have
 
threatened.  The principle the fool may have violated is not
 
as important as the community which needs to be made whole
 
again."  (Brummet, p.220;219).  The Dalai Lama employs the
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comic frame in discussing how "to correct the errors" of
 
China and the West, who are the "guilty parties."  His five-

point peace plan was introduced in his speech on September
 
21, 1987 before members of the US Congress, and was
 
reiterated in his 1988 Strasbourg address before the European
 
Parliament.  The five-point plan presents a schema for how
 
China and the West, who are the "fools," can be exonerated of
 
their guilt for their mistakes. If they would only implement
 
the five-point plan, then the "community" of Tibet, and
 
perhaps even the whole world, could be made "whole again."
 
Moreover, by extrapolating the importance of Tibet, which
 
holds "a strategic position in the heart of Asia, separating
 
the continent's great powers," indeed, the "community"
 
relations of the world could also be improved (Dalai Lama,
 
1989, p.4).
 
If the comic frame is a way of "publicly" and
 
"vicariously" alleviating guilt, of what then, are China and
 
the West guilty?  In his five point address to Congress, the
 
Dalai Lama openly claims China is guilty of breaking
 
"international law," of incurring an "holocaust," and of
 
disrupting negotiations for a peaceful settlement over the
 
Tibet question (1989, pp.5-6).  In his Strasbourg address, he
 
alleges "China forcibly invaded Tibet," killing over "a
 
million" Tibetans and destroying "thousands of monasteries"
 
(p.11).  In both addresses he accuses China of using Tibet as
 
a dumping ground for nuclear waste.
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In implicating the West as a "fool," the Dalai Lama is
 
softer. He implies in the speech to Congress that the West is
 
guilty of being counted among the nations that did not
 
"condemn" China's "aggression," for "virtually," but not "all
 
nations of the free world" did condemn it.  By inference,
 
those who are aware of how the West turned a blind eye to
 
Tibet's pleas for help would understand that this statement
 
relates to the US (Weiss, 1987; Bullert, 1986). In the
 
Strasbourg address, he reminds the West that "we are
 
living...in a very interdependent world...Without a sense of
 
universal responsibility our very survival is in danger." So
 
if the West continues to ignore the conflict in Tibet, it is
 
endangering not just the future of Tibetans, but the peoples
 
of the West as well.
 
Religious Persuasion
 
The comic frame is consistent with the Dalai Lama's
 
religious position because "it provides a charitable attitude
 
towards people" (emphasis in original) (Burke, 1959, p.166).
 
It is equally useful for his position as "leader of the
 
Tibetan people" because it fulfills his political ends by
 
fostering "purposes of persuasion and cooperation" (p. 166).
 
Thus, through a "charitable attitude" towards China and the
 
West, the Dalai Lama may gain ground in resolving the
 
conflict.  Burke notes that "the comic frame should enable
 
people to be observers of themselves, while acting.  Its
 
ultimate [aim] would not be passiveness, but maximum
 192 
consciousness;" so that the guilty parties could "transcend"
 
themselves "by noting [their] own foibles" (emphasis in
 
original) (p. 171).  In this way, the Dalai Lama's role as a
 
spiritual leader and teacher is realized.  Not only is he
 
devising a reasonable solution to the conflict, but he is
 
also acting to improve humankind's "consciousness" of the
 
world around them.  The issues of human rights and nuclear
 
arms and waste are issues about which he affirms the world
 
must be aware.  The Dalai Lama often speaks of the universal
 
responsibility which all humans should feel for each other.
 
Universal responsibility, a nonviolent tenet, enhances our
 
awareness of each other; accordingly, universal
 
responsibility promotes correct and humane actions,
 
especially when dealing with conflicts.
 
"The comic frame identifies social ills as arising from
 
human error, not evil, and thus uses reason to correct them"
 
(Carlson, 1986, p. 448).  The five-point peace plan appears
 
to have been designed as a plan that "uses reason to correct"
 
Tibet's conflict. It defines Tibet's role in the
 
"interdependent world" in order to ensure the peace of the
 
"planet" as a whole" (Dalai Lama, 1989, p.11). Each of the
 
five components of the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg proposal
 
(discussed above in Chapter 5) reflects "reason" while also
 
serving as a kind of religious lesson in nonviolence toward
 
humans and nature.  The five points relate to the comic frame
 
because "comedy sees guilt in terms of community" (Brummet,
 
p.225).  By turning "Tibet into a zone of peace," the world
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community's safety is improved.  By ending "China's
 
population transfer policy" the community of Tibet is
 
strengthened.  By showing "respect for the Tibetan people's
 
fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms," the West's
 
democratic communities can prove that they really support
 
such ideals, either at home or abroad.  By protecting the
 
environment and by reducing nuclear proliferation, the safety
 
of the world as a community, again, is enhanced.  Lastly,
 
beginning in "earnest negotiations" on these points, is an
 
action that fosters a sense of community in the region and in
 
the world.
 
jrony and Awareness
 
"The structure of comic revelation is that of dramatic
 
irony, in which the audience sees the tension between the
 
image projected and what actually" exists (Brummet, 1984,
 
p.225).  The five-point peace plan shows for the audience the
 
"tension between image" and reality because it makes the
 
notion of world peace seem so simple, so reducible to five
 
points, while it highlights the inaction and bungling of
 
those "fools" who have the control over world issues but who
 
have continued to make mistakes.  The most "ironic" issues
 
which are pointed out to the audience are those of nuclear
 
weapons, waste dumping, and human rights.  These issues seem
 
antithetical to "community" and to "reason," and yet the West
 
and China are revealed to be the guilty parties, the "fools"
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who must be reminded to "negotiate" in order to rectify these
 
serious problems.
 
"The comic frame, in making [someone] the student of
 
himself, makes it possible for him to 'transcend' occasions
 
when he has been tricked or cheated, since he
 
can...put...[errors in the] 'assets' column, under the head
 
of 'experience.'  Thus we can 'win' by subtly changing the
 
rules of the game...we make 'assets' out of 'liabilities'"
 
(Burke, 1959, p.171).  The Dalai Lama's five-point peace plan
 
attempts to transform the "experience" of the alleged
 
"holocaust" in Tibet from a global liability of "holocaust"
 
and "waste" into an "asset," a "zone of peace" that would
 
serve to improve international peace.  Tibet, if used as "a
 
buffer state," could correct the "tensions" which "escalated
 
into the border war in 1962" between India and China (1989,
 
p.5).  In this way, the fools, India, China, and the West,
 
could learn from their past mistakes and remove the border
 
conflicts by negotiating to reinstate Tibet as a free state.
 
The Dalai Lama alludes to Gandhi's nonviolent tactics,
 
stating, "I propose that the whole of Tibet...be transformed
 
into a zone of 'Ahimsa,' a Hindi term used to mean a state of
 
peace and nonviolence" (p.7).  Invoking "the strategy of
 
nonviolent resistance has important symbolic uses.  It
 
creates a drama" that shows "an unjust situation" of such
 
magnitude that "the community has no choice but to confront
 
it" (Carlson, 1986, p. 450).  Holding the conflict up to the
 
light of the moralistic tenets of nonviolence helps to
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underscore the irony of the democratic West's lack of
 
commitment to democratic ideals such as "fundamental human
 
rights."
 
It is worth noting here that it is not uncommon in the
 
Dalai Lama's rhetoric, and in popular criticism of it, to see
 
allusions to Gandhi.  Conversely, in the academic realm, the
 
fields of rhetorical criticism and social movement theory are
 
bereft of this comparison.  The Dalai Lama's discourse, while
 
paralleling Gandhi's discourse in intent (to free his people
 
from a colonial ruler) and substance (nonviolent protest),
 
also draws persuasive strength from the powerful legacy of
 
Gandhi's success in leading his people and expelling the
 
British colonial rule from India.  In Freedom in Exile, the
 
Dalai Lama observes that he felt inspired by Gandhi in one
 
particular visit; and on another, deeply moved at a place
 
where the Buddha had given lectures."  Similarly, this
 
61 The Dalai Lama states,
 
...I made a pilgrimage to Rajghat...where Mahatma Gandhi was
 
cremated.  It was a calm and beautiful spot and I felt very
 
grateful to be there, the guest of a people who, like mine,
 
had endured foreign domination; grateful also to be in the
 
country that had adopted Ahimsa, the Mahatma's doctrine of
 
nonviolence.  As I stood praying, I experienced simultaneous
 
great sadness at not being able to meet Gandhi in person and
 
great joy at the magnificent example of his life (1990,
 
p.116).
 
At Bodh Gaya, India, when, after having met with a group of Tibetan
 
refugees, the Dalai Lama ordained monks for the first time.  He writes,
 
A very moving moment followed when [the refugees') leaders
 
came to me and pledged their lives in the continuing
 
struggle for a free Tibet.  After that, for the first time
 
in this life, I ordained a group of 162 young Tibetan
 
novices...I felt greatly privileged to be able to do this at
 
the Tibetan monastery which stands within sight of the
 
Mahabodhi temple, next to the Bodhi Tree under which the
 
Buddha finally attained Enlightenment (1990, p.157).
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allusion carries over into Western media about the Dalai
 
Lama.  One public relations book by John Avedon, which
 
features interviews with the Dalai Lama and articles about
 
him, is titled the podgaya Interviews.  Bodgaya is the name
 
of the place where Gandhi lectured and the Buddha is said to
 
have achieved enlightenment.  In a piece on the Dalai Lama by
 
actor Richard Gere and professor of religion A.F. Thurman
 
(both are activists for Tibet), printed in Rolling Stone in
 
1987, the reference to Gandhi is prominent:
 
...the Dalai Lama continues to speak out for the six
 
million Tibetans who still look to his leadership
 
and guidance.  In protest, Gandhi abstained from
 
salt, a staple of the Indian diet, and the British
 
Empire trembled.  The Dalai Lama abstains from tea.
 
Tea, which is a staple of the Tibetan diet, was traditionally
 
a chief product imported into Tibet from China.  By parallel,
 
we infer that China, as Great Britain before it, "trembles."
 
The Dalai Lama claims that the alleged holocaust of
 
Tibetans could be reversed by simply stopping the population
 
transfer policy.  On this point, the Dalai Lama's rhetoric
 
and actions can be likened to those of Dr. Martin Luther
 
King, Jr.  Here, the parallel is evident in the Dalai Lama's
 
often voiced concern that "Tibetans have become a minority in
 
their own country."  Just as King led the American Civil
 
Through discourse such as this, the Dalai Lama shores up the link
 
between his people and the people of India, as well as making a strong
 
comparison between himself and Gandhi, and as we see from the passage
 
above, perhaps even between himself and the Buddha.
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Rights movement to ensure African Americans would someday
 
have the same rights as Americans of European descent, the
 
Dalai Lama pushes the issue of civil rights and human rights
 
to the fore in his discourse about the situation inside
 
Tibet.  The Dalai Lama calls the population transfer policy
 
"the greatest threat to the continuation of Tibetans as a
 
distinct race;"  he also claims this policy has engendered in
 
Tibet "discrimination" and "outright apartheid" against
 
Tibetans (1990, pp. 250-251).  Another noteworthy parallel
 
exists between King and the Dalai Lama.  When Dr. King was
 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent efforts on
 
behalf of African Americans, American diplomats protested
 
that the award represented interference in America's internal
 
affairs; three decades later, when the Dalai Lama was awarded
 
the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent work for Tibetans,
 
China complained that the Nobel Committee was meddling in the
 
internal affairs of China.  In each case, the leader--with
 
the help and support of the Nobel Committee - -made the huge
 
world power appear as the "fool."
 
The Dalai Lama states that "the restoration and
 
protection of Tibet's natural environment" could be ensured
 
by ending the nuclear dumping and production occurring in
 
Tibet.  The dramatic irony evident in these issues is that
 
China denies any such policies are in existence, yet Western
 
media claim that they have evidence that such things are, in
 
fact, going on (anonymous, 1993, p. 14).  The final point of
 
the Dalai Lama's plan, the call for negotiations, is ironic
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because it shows the Dalai Lama's comic frame of perspective:
 
it reveals his "sense of identification among the opposing
 
forces of humanity"  (Carlson, 1986, p. 450).  In other
 
words, China and the West must be equal partners with him in
 
negotiations if any real progress is to be made in resolving
 
the conflict over Tibet.
 
"The notion that ritual conflict can create epiphany is
 
one of the hallmarks of the comic perspective, and nonviolent
 
civil disobedience is one strategy that can facilitate this
 
process" (Carlson, 1986, p.452).  The "epiphany" out of
 
conflict that the Dalai Lama appears to be seeking provides a
 
seamless quality to his religious leadership and the didactic
 
quality of his discourse.  His professed adherence to
 
nonviolent principles in achieving a more independent status
 
for Tibet has endowed his speech with persuasive powers
 
characteristic of the comic frame.  Through the comic frame,
 
he can maintain his status as "religious," while still
 
identifying with his rhetorical opponents as being "human
 
beings" in the global "community."
 
Finally, the comic frame is an effective tool in
 
reducing the moral and divisive dimensions of the conflict
 
into manageable, and mutually beneficial, terms.  The comic
 
frame serves the Dalai Lama's rhetoric by promoting
 
"pragmatic" resolutions that are worded so as to make the
 
parties to the conflict appear as equals at the bargaining
 
table.  At the same time, the comic frame is beneficial to
 
resolving the conflict because it highlights ways that the
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members in conflict can learn from their mistakes and work
 
towards preventing such errors from recurring.  Most
 
importantly, it fosters "identification," which propels the
 
persuasive message, which is sorely needed to get these
 
parties to negotiate in the first place.
 
The Tragic Frame:  A Sentimental Side
 
Just as the Dalai Lama employs the comic frame to
 
further his persuasive appeal, when appropriate, he likewise
 
finds it advantageous to use the tragic frame.  Just as
 
charitable, comically framed rhetoric is ubiquitous in his
 
speeches, so it is not uncommon to find discourse that is
 
tragic and highly sentimental.  This sentimental discourse is
 
emotion laden, and at times fraught with images of great
 
sorrow or even horror.
 
In Rhetorical Ouestions:  Studies of Public Discourse,
 
Edwin Black writes that the use of a tragic, sentimental
 
style of discourse indicates the rhetor's wish
 
to shape response.  No scintilla of reaction is
 
left for the auditor's own creation; every nuance
 
of effect is regulated by the speech...The
 
sentimental style seeks a total control over
 
consciousness...(1992, p.101).
 
Thus by using the sentimental style to convey the tragedy
 
that has allegedly befallen Tibet, the Dalai Lama exerts a
 
strong guiding influence over his audience.  As a social
 
movement leader, the Dalai Lama may find this style useful
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because it serves "either to instruct new initiates or to
 
renew the faithful" (Black, 1992, p.112).
 
In contrast to the comic frame, which presents guilt in
 
terms of a "fool" versus a "community," presenting events
 
through the tragic frame means depicting guilty actions as
 
having taken place against some principle; "Burke describes
 
that guilt as being against the cosmos or the nature of
 
things" (Brummet, 1984, p.218).  In this case the guilty
 
actions depicted are those of China, and, to a certain
 
extent, the West and India for their tacit agreement or
 
support of China through political and economic channels.
 
Burke's conception of the use of tragedy in discourse is that
 
Tragedy subjects the ...hero to
 
trial...Scapegoating and mortification...are the
 
tragic modes of exacting suffering and purgation
 
from the guilty.  Tragedy vicariously punishes
 
guilt in the audience by flaying the hero...The
 
hero, and vicariously the public, are led to
 
enlightenment through punishment; purgation of the
 
guilt leads one to an awareness that one has sinned
 
(Brummet, 1984, p. 219).
 
Thus the use of the sentimental style, when set in tragic
 
frame, places Tibetans in the position of being the "flayed
 
heroes," while the Chinese and Westerners, as well as
 
Tibetans who escaped into exile, may be exonerated of guilt.
 
With regard to the Tibetans' guilt for having escaped or for
 
existing under Chinese domination, the Dalai Lama often
 
expresses the opinion that the Chinese imposed "tragedy" was
 
the result of some accumulated "bad karma" on the part of all
 
Tibetans.  Indeed, Buddhist concepts such as karma or
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emptiness fit well into the tragic framework.  For instance,
 
note how the Dalai Lama incorporates Buddhist ideas into his
 
explanation of Tibet's tragedy:
 
One important Buddhist philosophy or concept is
 
that things are relative, things are of an
 
interdependent nature... Looking at an event in one
 
way it seems a tragedy; very sad.  But... from
 
another angle it seems a good opportunity.  Now
 
with this belief in mind, in the 1960s and early
 
1970s, the Tibetan issue seemed almost hopeless.
 
Even some of our best friends thought sadly that
 
the Tibetan issue was a dead issue, with no hope.
 
And in the meantime in our own country destruction,
 
immense destruction was happening.  However, during
 
this period we never gave up hope, and I think that
 
the most important thing is that inside Tibet the
 
determination of the people, especially the younger
 
generation, was never shaken, always very firm.  So
 
because of human determination and constant effort,
 
things can change. (1991, pp.1-2).
 
For Tibetans, guilt for their nation's tragedy is explained
 
in terms of Buddhism; the tragedy, while "immense," must be
 
considered as "relative."  For Westerners, guilt may be
 
explained in terms of the tragic frame, for Westerners, as
 
the "best friends" of Tibet, had already left Tibet for
 
"dead."
 
In his second and most recent autobiography, the Dalai
 
Lama often uses the tragic frame to present the situation in
 
Tibet.  In gut-wrenching imagery so characteristic of the
 
sentimental style, he describes the Nazi-like atrocities
 
which the Chinese allegedly committed:
 
crucifixion, vivisection, disemboweling and
 
dismemberment of victims was commonplace.  So too
 
were beheading, burning, beating to death and
 
burying alive, not to mention dragging people behind
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galloping horses until they died or hanging them
 
upside down or throwing them bound hand and foot
 
into icy water.  And, in order to prevent them
 
[from] shouting out, "Long live the Dalai Lama" on
 
the way to execution, the [Communist Chinese] tore
 
out their tongues with meat hooks (1990, p.124).
 
This sentimental discourse presents tragic images that are
 
not easily forgotten by the reader.  The description provides
 
intimate details for the tragic events; these details, in
 
turn, offer the audience a near-participatory experience,
 
which heightens the potential for achieving a sense of
 
vicarious "purgation of guilt" since the Dalai Lama still
 
expresses hope for Tibet's future even in the face of the
 
atrocities he describes.
 
The Dalai Lama's use of the tragic drama in his
 
discourse has been tempered over the course of time.  Today,
 
it appears comparatively less frequently in his discourse, so
 
that vociferous, tragic examples such as the one described in
 
the passage above are limited.  In the Dalai Lama's earlier
 
discourse, the tragic description was both more common and
 
perhaps a degree more vivid.  The following excerpt of the
 
Dalai Lama's earlier discourse is an example of his
 
description of the tragedy of Tibet.  This passage is taken
 
from his first autobiography:
 
Tens of thousands of our people have been killed,
 
not only in military actions, but individually and
 
deliberately.  They have been killed, without trial,
 
on suspicion of opposing communism...or for no
 
reason at all.  But mainly and fundamentally they
 
have been killed because they would not renounce
 
their religion.  They have not only been shot, but
 
beaten to death, strangled, hanged, scalded, buried
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alive, disemboweled, and beheaded...in public.  The
 
victims' fellow villagers and friends and neighbors
 
have been made to watch them...Men and women have
 
been slowly killed while their own families were
 
forced to watch, and small children have even been
 
forced to shoot their parents (1960, pp.221-222).
 
It is through this vividly dramatic approach to his
 
presentation of tragedy that the pacifistic speech of a
 
"simple monk" becomes the speech of a frenetic activist and
 
leader of a social movement.  This is the discourse of a
 
leader charged with gaining supporters, organizing
 
activities, forming international alliances, and propagating
 
information. "Burke links tragedy specifically to purpose,
 
and argues that when we find someone striving to do
 
something, we should look for the tragic mechanism at work.
 
This is because purpose requires action, and action is always
 
at the base of tragedy" (Burke, 1969, p. 38; Brummet, 1984,
 
p. 220).  The Dalai Lama's purpose is to get political
 
support for his cause and place pressure on China to amend
 
its policies in Tibet; the actions the Dalai Lama describes
 
show the valiant efforts of the tragic heroes, with himself
 
at the helm, as well as the malign actions of the Communist
 
Chinese who allegedly perpetrated the crimes.
 
The tragic frame through which the Dalai Lama presents
 
Tibet's drama is simple:  the Communist Chinese (and perhaps,
 
through karma, the Tibetans as well) have violated the
 
principle of universal responsibility.  The following passage
 
is from the Dalai Lama's statement, presented on March 10,
 
1963, to mark the Fourth Anniversary of the Tibetan People's
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National Uprising.  The statement evinces strong discourse
 
which works to shape one's perceptions completely.  In
 
describing the aftermath of the Chinese "liberation" of
 
Tibet, the Dalai Lama clearly presents the drama through the
 
tragic frame, and in language characteristic of the
 
sentimental style:
 
A year has rolled by since I spoke to my beloved
 
people on this memorable day to mark the
 
spontaneous upsurge of the peace-loving and devout
 
people of Tibet against their ruthless and
 
insensate conquerors [the Chinese].  Since then
 
there has been no respite in the struggle of my
 
unfortunate people for peace and freedom.  The
 
night of terror still continues.  Hundreds of
 
people are being massacred to satisfy the greed and
 
impious ambition of the Chinese military leaders.
 
The revered places of worship are being destroyed
 
or converted into arsenals for conquest and
 
oppression.  Famine and starvation stalk our
 
beloved land.  Refugees are fleeing to the
 
neighboring States to escape from cruel and inhuman
 
persecution.  The passive resistance of our people
 
still continues.  Vivid accounts of unspeakable
 
misery are still being brought to us in exile.  The
 
situation continues to be desperate and
 
hopeless...I pray with all earnestness and fervour
 
that the great Avaloketeswara may grant my beloved
 
people courage and determination to enable them to
 
continue their passive struggle against tyranny and
 
oppression (1986, p. 8).
 
The Dalai Lama pits the "devout" and "peace-loving" Tibetans,
 
who are the heroes of the tragedy, and who valiantly mount a
 
"passive struggle" against the Chinese.  The Chinese, as the
 
source and cause of the heroes' suffering, are depicted as
 
"ruthless and insensate conquerors" who wreak "unspeakable
 
misery" upon Tibet.
 
"Famine and starvation" are personified so that they become
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the twin soldiers of the Chinese to further their "cruel and
 
inhuman persecution."  The use of themes within the context
 
of tragedy is common to the sentimental style, which "works
 
by consolidating the perceptions that it sponsors with
 
precisely defined feelings" (Black, 1992, p.111).  The themes
 
that the Dalai Lama uses are those of the "horrors"
 
experienced by the peaceful Tibetans.  By using the
 
sentimental style, "feelings are rehearsed in the auditor,
 
and repeatedly associated with the same class of objects"
 
(Black, 1992, p. 111).  The Dalai Lama's use of repetition of
 
themes and words in his discourse works to "rehearse" the
 
feelings of his audience; this strategy of persuasion is also
 
in sync with the Tibetan form of dramatistic presentation."
 
Moreover, these "associations may become fixed," and
 
potentially form a "stock response" to similar discourse
 
(Black, 1992, p. 111).
 
In the Dalai Lama's statement on the Fifth Anniversary
 
of the Tibetan People's National Uprising, again, he
 
"rehearse the audience" by using the themes of horror
 
inflicted on the "peace-loving" Tibetans by the callous
 
Chinese "conquerors" ever since the Chinese arrived in Tibet:
 
Tyranny and oppression prevailed... and finally the
 
unarmed citizens of Lhasa rose in a body against
 
the violence of the Chinese Communist authorities,
 
and the torch of freedom was lit once again in
 
every corner of Tibet.  Since then my unfortunate
 
people have made great sacrifices.  Thousands of
 
62 Jerstad observes that "there is a great deal of repetition in all
 
Buddhist writing and in (dramatic plays)... In such oral communication
 
repetition is not wearisome in the least, but is part of the respectful
 
supplication which wins merit for listener and reciter" (1967, p. 209).
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them have been massacred.  Thousands of them have
 
been rendered homeless.  Thousands of them have
 
escaped to neighboring States.  But the barbarous
 
atrocities, even to the extent of exterminating the
 
race and religious belief of the Tibetans, still
 
continue, and the struggle of the people still goes
 
on (1986, p. 11).
 
The Dalai Lama "rehearses" for the audience the idea of the
 
numbers of people in involved--"thousands."  He likewise
 
reaffirms the Tibetans' role as heroes, the brave, "unarmed
 
citizens" who dared to fight the Chinese "Tyranny and
 
oppression."  The Chinese role as villains in the tragedy is
 
made clear by calling them "Communist" and accusing them of
 
committing "barbarous atrocities."
 
A year later, in 1965, on the Sixth Anniversary of the
 
Tibetan People's National Uprising, the Dalai Lama's
 
discourse once more works to shape and delineate carefully
 
what the audience ought to see and understand about the
 
tragedy in Tibet:
 
This being the situation today, it is necessary for
 
us, Tibetans and other peace-loving people alike,
 
to rouse the conscience of the world and to lodge a
 
strong protest against the barbarous and inhuman
 
treatment of the Tibetans by the Chinese
 
conquerors.  Today, I wish to call upon all
 
Tibetans to renew their faith... Today in the name
 
of humanity I call upon all the peoples of the
 
world to come to the rescue of the unfortunate and
 
unhappy people of Tibet (1986, p. 15).
 
Here, too, it is clear that the Dalai Lama seems to aim, in
 
characteristic sentimental fashion, at making the listener's
 
"associations fixed."  The associations for the Chinese would
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be that of "inhuman" and "conqueror."  The associations for
 
the Tibetans would be the "unfortunate and unhappy people"
 
who are suffering.  The association for the West, as a
 
potential ally capable of succor for Tibetans, assumes the
 
role of the new hero who can "come to the rescue" of the
 
victims in Tibet.
 
Again, in 1966, the Dalai Lama's annual address
 
reconfirms the associations the audience is led to conjure
 
along the lines of the sentimental discourse.  The Chinese
 
are the villains, the Tibetans are the victims, and the
 
Westerners are the potential heroes who can--and who are
 
already making attempts--to aid the sacrificial heroes, the
 
Tibetans, in the name of freedom and anti-communism:
 
It is now seven years since that historic day when
 
the people of Tibet rose in spontaneous revolt
 
against the tyranny and oppression of the Chinese
 
Communist military occupation.  Against fearful
 
odds and in utter self-sacrifice, our people stood
 
up as one against the might of their conquerors.
 
Many died in the struggle and others suffered
 
torture and humiliation before being killed.  It is
 
to the memory of these martyrs... and the cause for
 
which they have made their supreme sacrifice that
 
we dedicate this day...
 
Since the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese
 
Communists in 1949, our people were reduced to the
 
status of a subject race under the shackles of an
 
alien conqueror bent on wiping every vestige of our
 
national and cultural heritage.  In flagrant
 
violation of the truth the Chinese have tried to
 
cover up their inhuman and brutal treatment of the
 
Tibetan people under the names of 'liberation' and
 
'progress.'  They have killed and tortured our
 
people; they looted the ancient treasures of Tibet;
 
they have deprived our people of even the smallest
 
traces of fundamental freedom and have made the
 
Tibetans a second-class citizen existing only to
 
serve the Chinese.  In short the Tibetans have
 
become victims of Han imperialism....
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On behalf of those of our people who have
 
given up their lives for freedom, those who
 
heroically continue to resist the Chinese in Tibet
 
and those in exile, I would like to thank the
 
governments of El Salvador, Ireland, Malaysia,
 
Malta, Nicaragua, the Philippines and Thailand for
 
sponsoring [at the General Assembly of the United
 
Nations] the resolution calling for the immediate
 
cessation of oppression and the restoration of
 
fundamental freedom in Tibet... (1986, p. 17).
 
The Chinese, then, are depicted as Communists who are "alien
 
conquerors."  The Tibetan victims are "martyrs."  The nations
 
that the Dalai Lama names who are trying, through the United
 
Nations, to help Tibet, serve as indicators and models for
 
the rest of the West to follow suit and work for "the
 
restoration of fundamental freedom in Tibet."  The Dalai Lama
 
then closes the speech with a paraphrasing of the tragedy:
 
"To us Tibetans these are hard and tragic times... we realise
 
and feel the full anguish and sorrows of our brothers who
 
are... victims of brutality and aggression."  The sentimental
 
style operates so as to leave as little space as possible
 
(ideally, none) for the auditor to integrate his or her own
 
ideas or interpretations with what the speaker has just said.
 
Considering that the Dalai Lama's annual addresses are
 
presented in one published volume, it is clear that the
 
sentimental style would be even more effective when the
 
reader literally has no mental escape from the contiguous
 
presentation of discourse in this style.
 
The use of the sentimental style within the overarching
 
schema of the tragic frame works because the sentimental
 
style "is transitory" (Black, 1992, p. 111).  Therefore, just
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as the drama shifts and changes over time, so does the
 
sentimental style adapt accordingly.  Black observes that "to
 
an audience not [familiar with prior sentimental discourse by
 
a given rhetor], the sentimental style will be boring and
 
overdone" (1992, p. 112).  Perhaps that is why, in a critique
 
of the Dalai Lama's second autobiography, Carolyne Moorehead
 
observes, "[This] is a temperate book, at times even bland,
 
for all the Dalai Lama's anguish over the destruction of his
 
country" (1990, p. 44).  The action taken by the Dalai Lama
 
is to continue to speak out on these alleged events.  Through
 
his discourse, the Dalai Lama is dramatically reliving the
 
experience time and time again.  So while the repetition may
 
be perceived as "bland," when set in the tragic frame, it
 
enables audiences both familiar and unfamiliar with the Tibet
 
question to purge guilt vicariously.63
 
In summary, the Dalai Lama alters his discourse in turns
 
from comic to tragic as the audience, situation, and context
 
merit.  Such shifts are specially noteworthy in "those cases
 
where tragic and comic treatments of the same transgression
 
compete for public attention and participation, for at those
 
times the difference between the tragic and the comic in
 
general may become especially clear" (Brummet, 1984, p. 221).
 
For the Dalai Lama, in attempting to negotiate with the
 
Chinese leadership, the comic frame may be more advantageous
 
63 Regarding the Dalai Lama's first trip to the United States in 1979,
 
he observes that "although...I held the view that the US was the
 
champion of freedom actually very few people had any knowledge of the
 
fate of Tibet" (1990, p.198).  Thus in repeatedly relaying the message
 
of Tibet's tragedy, the Dalai Lama's action is to counter and thereby
 
alleviate the audience's added guilt for the "sin" of ignorance.
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or persuasive because it casts the Chinese in the position of
 
being the "fool," who has wronged the Tibetans but who is far
 
from evil; instead, their errors need only be corrected by
 
following the prescriptions the Dalai Lama offers, such as
 
the plans he laid out in the Five Point Peace Plan and the
 
Strasbourg Proposal.  Burke states that "Like tragedy, comedy
 
warns against the dangers of pride, but its emphasis shifts
 
from crime, to stupidity" (emphasis in original) (1959, p.41).
 
Based upon the survey of discourse undertaken for this
 
analysis, I believe that it is the comic frame which prevails
 
in the Dalai Lama's discourse.  According to Burke, it is
 
more advisable to use the comic frame since it "seeks healing
 
rather than punishment" (Brummet, 1984, p. 227).
 
Nonetheless, in dealing with the West and with Tibetans,
 
the Dalai Lama's use of the tragic frame may, in many
 
instances, be more effective in persuading audiences to act
 
because it highlights the urgency of tragedy and the need to
 
move swiftly; at the same time, the tragic frame also
 
assuages the audience's guilt for past situations when they
 
avoided their responsibilities to act on behalf of Tibet.
 
This chapter has illustrated the Dalai Lama's selective use
 
of the tragic frame and sentimental style, which tend to
 
operate in the rhetorical realm of a speaker-oriented
 
discourse.  The aim of speaker-oriented discourse is to
 
generate a single conception of meaning on an audience--the
 
speaker's.  Speaker-oriented discourse stands in opposition
 
to a discourse that promotes a meaning mutually determined by
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both audience and speaker.  According to Black, the
 
sentimental style appears to be the extreme of  a speaker
 
oriented discourse, for not only does the speaker shape the
 
audience's perceptions, but also his or her own perceptions
 
to the exclusion of all else.  Black states that the
 
sentimental style shields both the speaker and the audience
 
from other, more compelling, moral issues (1992, p. 102).  If
 
the sentimental style is truly operative in much of the Dalai
 
Lama's discourse, then what other moral issues are we being
 
averted from observing?  The goal of ending the population
 
transfer policy was noted in Chapter Five, above.  The Dalai
 
Lama's emphasis of this goal could possibly be considered as
 
a moral exclusion maneuver.64  The Dalai Lama's discourse on
 
the population transfer policy is potentially one in which a
 
moral issue--promoting the equality of all humans--is being
 
set aside in the name of equality and quality of life for
 
Tibetans only.  So in the face of shrinking land space, and
 
despite the fact that one in five people on the face of the
 
entire earth are Chinese, the Dalai Lama asks for the Chinese
 
to depart and never return, leaving the six million Tibetans
 
to enjoy a space of land that is roughly the size of France.
 
As a consequence, one may ask, is the Dalai Lama setting
 
64 In an interview in 1986, when the Dalai Lama was asked about China's
 
population transfer policy, the Dalai Lama replied:
 
...China invaded our country and now colonizes it... Now it
 
is time for them to leave.  They should go home and tend to
 
the problems of their own country.  This would be better for
 
them as well as for the Tibetans.  We have a right to follow
 
our own destiny, to live according to our own culture and
 
identity.  Nobody has the right to colonize others"
 
(emphasis added) (1986, p. 180).
 212 
aside ethics in order to effect persuasion?  The next chapter
 
examines the ethical implications of the Dalai Lama's
 
rhetorical strategies.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
 
ETHICS AND NONVIOLENT PERSUASION
 
The Ethics of a Nonviolent Rhetor
 
Ought we to consider the excruciatingly detailed images
 
the Dalai Lama offers as mere propaganda, half-truths,  or
 
exaggeration?  Indeed, regarding the use of the sentimental
 
style, Black holds that "it is the manifestation of a
 
disposition to subordinate all values to aesthetic values.
 
As such, it is the fallible sign of an evasion of moral
 
responsibility" (1992, p.109).  Is it not sufficient for the
 
Dalai Lama to simply state that human rights violations are
 
occurring, or that they have occurred in the past?  Why must
 
so much descriptive and repetitive detail and drama appear in
 
the Dalai Lama's discourse?  The Chinese leadership's
 
exasperation over the Dalai Lama's speech does not appear to
 
be without a degree of just cause.  However, whether or not
 
the Dalai Lama can be accused, as a Chinese diplomat did, of
 
conducting a "smear campaign;" and whether or not the Dalai
 
Lama's discourse "evades" ethics, should be carefully
 
explored.  This chapter will examine the Dalai Lama's ethical
 
grounding for his discourse.
 
It seems fair for the Chinese to ask what the purpose is
 
of rehashing alleged tragic events, especially since the
 
Chinese unabashedly concede that the same agonies befell
 
Chinese victims, too, during the Cultural Revolution.  The
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answer to the questions posed above is found in the Gandhian
 
concept of "satyagraha," to which the Dalai Lama adamantly
 
adheres.  Satyagraha means, literally, "soul-force," or
 
"truth-force," and it is the counterpart to "ahimsa," or
 
nonviolence.  To better understand the Dalai Lama's rhetoric,
 
we must also understand the theoretical underpinnings of the
 
Dalai Lama's outlook as a nonviolent leader of a social
 
movement.
 
The Dalai Lama's free-Tibet movement is showing signs
 
that it may soon break away from the Dalai Lama's desire for
 
peaceful demonstrations, and move into a more militant phase.
 
Of his political adversaries, it bears repeating that the
 
Dalai Lama says, "they too are human beings who struggle to
 
find happiness and deserve our compassion" (1992, p. 70).  At
 
the same time, the Dalai Lama must address his more militant
 
followers and express appropriate indignance over the
 
turmoils in Tibet.  Thus the Dalai Lama's tragic and
 
sentimental discourse ought to be understood not as discrete
 
commentary, but within the total framework of satyagraha.
 
Reaching for guidance, the Dalai Lama has said he finds
 
inspiration in Mahatma Gandhi.  Thus to glimpse into Gandhi's
 
vision of nonviolent protest, we may gain insight into the
 
Dalai Lama's perspectives as well.  In Gandhi's essay, "On
 
Satyagraha," Gandhi maintains that the truth gives power to
 
nonviolent resistance.  This truth, says Gandhi, is the only
 
power which can render words stronger than arms:
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...if nonviolence of thought is to be evolved in
 
individuals or societies or nations, truth has to be
 
told, however harsh or unpopular it may appear to be
 
for the moment.  And mere nonviolent action without
 
the thought behind it is of little value...
 
The way of peace is the way of truth...The
 
truth of a few will count, the untruth of millions
 
will vanish ...like the chaff before a whiff of
 
wind" (emphasis added)(Holmes, R. [ed.], 1990, pp.
 
55-56).
 
By using the tragic frame and sentimental style as a way of
 
presenting his discourse, the Dalai Lama's "truth," while
 
"harsh" and most certainly "unpopular," is apparently aimed
 
at making "the untruth of millions," that is, the alleged
 
cover-ups of the Dalai Lama's political adversaries,
 
"vanish."
 
Similarly, the Dalai Lama's followers, either current or
 
potential, are jolted into an awareness of the "truth," and
 
in this way they are encouraged to act on the basis of that
 
truth.  Under the tenet of satyagraha, the Dalai Lama- ­
provided he truly believes his harsh words--can justify his
 
use of the sometimes terrifying imagery he conveys through
 
the sentimental style and the tragic frame.  The Dalai Lama's
 
belief in soul-force is "the thought behind" the words.  In
 
this belief in satyagraha, the Dalai Lama's words gain power,
 
and the Dalai Lama may retain an ethical foothold in spite of
 
the elusiveness of ascertaining "truth" regarding the Tibet
 
question.
 
Also, Gandhi states that nonviolence ought not to be
 
equated with "passive resistance," for there is "nothing
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passive about nonviolence," indeed, "nonviolence requires
 
feverish activity" (Holmes, 1990, p.55).  Therefore, if the
 
tragic and gruesome imagery which the Dalai Lama creates is
 
at the heart of his nonviolent action, if it is "the thought"
 
propelling the social movement into "feverish activity," then
 
the Dalai Lama's rhetoric becomes anchored in a pragmatic
 
basis.  A pragmatic leadership helps ensure longevity for any
 
organization.  When the Dalai'Lama's discourse is viewed from
 
this realistic perspective, and considering his organization
 
bears the weight of the very existence of Tibetan culture,
 
the use of the tragic frame and sentimental style becomes
 
less frivolous.  So, in this situation, rather than being an
 
"evasion of moral responsibility," the use of these two
 
rhetorical strategies is transformed into an embracing of
 
universal responsibility.
 
In David Frank's discussion of nonviolent rhetoric, la 
Search of Peace (1983), Frank asserts that "a rhetoric of 
nonviolent action" must be tailored to the given "conflict 
situation."  Frank posits that the "nonviolent rhetor should 
have at her or his disposal a large reservoir of possible 
rhetorical actions and messages to use" (1983, p. 44). 
Clearly, then, the Dalai Lama has felt constrained enough in 
his campaign of awareness about Tibet to use the sentimental 
style and tragic frame when he finds it necessary.  Frank 
asserts that "an artistic choice [is]... governed by the 
principle of kairos, which allows the nonviolent rhetor to 
choose a fitting response" adapted to the conflict scenario 217 
(p. 44).65  The Dalai Lama's dramatistic strategies of
 
mortification, victimage, and transcendence, as well as his
 
use of the tragic and comic frames, are all ways that the
 
Dalai Lama's kairos is manifested.
 
Ethics and the Active Audience
 
By reading or listening to the Dalai Lama's discourse,
 
the audience is actively participating in the unfolding drama
 
of Tibet.  Clearly, this participation is active because it
 
is largely at the audience's discretion.  For although the
 
Dalai Lama regularly travels and speaks to select audiences
 
worldwide, he has yet to become regular nightly news fare in
 
Western countries.  The Dalai Lama's audience, for the most
 
part, must themselves seek out the Dalai Lama to read or to
 
hear his views.
 
In his essay, "Persuasion and Ethics" (1964), B.J. Diggs
 
asserts that in persuasive communication, there is a dual
 
responsibility.  There is the responsibility of the
 
persuader, but there is also a responsibility on the part of
 
the "persuadee" (p. 364).  For the persuader, Diggs goes on
 
to say, ethics enters into the picture because
 
...the speaker has a responsibility... the kinds of
 
persuasion exercised on people are important
 
elements in their logical and moral training.  Just
 
as any act may have some tendency to fix a person's
 
character, so a persuasive speech may tend to
 
65 Frank defines Kairos as "the adaptation of the speech to the manifold
 
variety of life, to the psychology of speaker and hearer...  The term
 
dictates the choice of organization, means of proof, and other elements
 
of a rhetorical message" (1983, p. 44).
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undermine or support the general acceptance of
 
sound principles (1964, p. 366).
 
The Dalai Lama, as first and foremost a religious leader,
 
speaks most often on religious or intellectual topics.  The
 
central focus of this thesis has been an analysis of two
 
speeches which focus on Tibet.  But while the Tibet issue
 
bobs up at will within his discourse on a variety of topics
 
(either as prompted by the audience or by the Dalai Lama
 
himself), Tibet's situation is far from being all consuming
 
in his discourse in general.  Speaking as a religious
 
teacher, the Dalai Lama's role is to instruct his audience in
 
"kindness," which is the ubiquitous theme of his speeches and
 
books, such as his "Oxford Union Address" (1991) and his
 
books Kindness, Clarity, and Insight (1984) and Ocean of
 
Wisdom (1990).  In the Oxford Union Address, he emphasizes
 
the importance of kindness to our lives,
 
...  religions are the business of the individual.
 
However, the matter of love and compassion and
 
human affection:  the whole of humanity needs
 
that... I believe that the very existence of human
 
beings depends on human affection... without human
 
affection, there is no purpose in life" (1991).
 
Certainly the Dalai Lama's discourse on themes of kindness
 
and universal responsibility are the "sound principles" that
 
Diggs indicates an ethical speaker would "support."
 
In the Dalai Lama's role as a monk, it seems natural for
 
the Dalai Lama to evince in his discourse the kind of paradox
 219 
and mystery that religious discourse allows for.  Kenneth
 
Burke states that this kind of discourse is found at times
 
...when orientations are in confusion--for it is at
 
such times that the certainties we live by are most
 
easily and inevitably brought into question.  The
 
mystic seeks a sounder basis of certainty than
 
those provided by the flux of history.  He seeks
 
the ultimate motive behind our acts--which... is
 
the equivalent to his seeking an ultimate situation
 
common to all [people] (1936, p. 283).
 
The "ultimate situation common to" humanity which the Dalai
 
Lama seeks to promote is quite simply world peace.  The Dalai
 
Lama's reliance upon concepts that are alien to most
 
Westerners, such as emptiness, or upon oracles and other
 
mystical notions that he incorporates into his discourse, may
 
be considered as ethical because his motive is to unite
 
people who are in dispute and bring them to a common ground.
 
Particularly in the Dalai Lama's discourse about the Tibet
 
situation, prominent among his motives is the desire to
 
resolve conflict and bring order out of "confusion."  To
 
accomplish this he emphasizes our "common situation" as
 
humans, thus his use of mysticism appears to be, at least in
 
his unique situation, warranted and ethically sound.66
 
66 Burke adds that
 
Mysticism... (flourishes] when traditional ways of seeing
 
and doing (with their accompanying verbalizations) have
 
begun to lose their authority... at times like ours, where
 
the entire commercial ethic shaping our contingent demands
 
has brought us to extremities, and where so many patterns of
 
living require us to slight or repress the most rudimentary
 
needs... One must go in search of authoritarian tests that
 
lie deeper (1936, p.285).
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In The Ethics of Rhetorig, Richard M. Weaver states that
 
"rhetoric moves the soul with a movement which cannot finally
 
be justified logically" (1985, p. 23).  So in the Dalai
 
Lama's reliance upon mysticism to bolster his ethos (as
 
discussed above in Chapter Four), or upon his use of the
 
sentimental style to move his supporters to action (as
 
illustrated above in Chapter Six), he is attempting to "move
 
the soul" of his audience.  At the same time, the Dalai
 
Lama's reliance upon dialectic in his international lecture
 
tours and question-answer format in his interviews with the
 
media indicates that he "desires not to devour" his audience,
 
but rather "to shape" the audience "according to the gods as
 
far as mortal power allows" (Weaver, 1985, p.25). The vast
 
majority of the Dalai Lama's publications, speeches, and
 
press conferences are structured in a question-answer, or
 
dialectic, format.  MIndScience:  An East-West Dialogue is a
 
prime example of the Dalai Lama's preference for dialectical
 
teaching.  NindScience provides transcripts of the Dalai
 
Lama's lectures and question-answer sessions as part of a
 
Harvard forum on neuroscience; the Dalai Lama fields
 
complicated questions from Western experts in scientific
 
fields ranging from psychology to neurosurgery.  The book
 
The Collected Statements. Addresses. and Interviews of the
 
Dalai Lame (1986) contains reprints of question-answer
 
interviews of the Dalai Lama from the 1960s to the mid 1980s,
 
The Dalai Lama offers precisely the sort of moral "ways of seeing and
 
doing" as well as the authority that people find attractive in the
 
present period of turmoil and "extremities."
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in which the Dalai Lama responds to manifold questions from
 
reporters on diverse topics ranging from religion and
 
politics to his own hobbies, or the supernatural components
 
of Tibetan life, or the general state of human affairs.
 
The Dalai Lama's use of a dialectic format is consistent
 
with the Dalai Lama's lifelong training as a Buddhist monk.
 
A main feature of Tibetan Buddhist training is mastering the
 
art of dialectics.  The Dalai Lama maintains that
 
"A monk's ability at this unique form of
 
disputation is the criterion by which his
 
intellectual achievements are judged.  For this
 
reason, as Dalai Lama, I had to have not only a
 
good grounding in Buddhist philosophy and logic but
 
also proficiency at debating.  I therefore began to
 
study these subjects in earnest when I was ten
 
years old and at twelve I was appointed two
 
tsenshap, experts who coached me in the art of
 
dialectics (1990, p. 26).
 
In order for him to attain his degree of Doctor of
 
Metaphysics (shortly before he fled to India), he had to
 
undergo lengthy debates with learned scholars, in which he
 
had to prove his knowledge.  Bearing this in mind, it is
 
interesting to note that the Dalai Lama most often arranges
 
for the popular media treatment of himself to appear in the
 
form of interviews with him, instead of articles about him.
 
Clearly, from the perspective of a leader of an
 
international campaign of persuasion, reliance upon dialectic
 
is not only a preference arising from the Dalai Lama's
 
education, but it is also a strategy to enhance persuasion.67
 
67 On the other hand, Frank asserts that
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Not surprisingly, in the course of conducting a biographical
 
survey of literature on the Dalai Lama, the most damaging
 
editorial commentary was found in descriptive articles about
 
the Dalai Lama (Jenkins, 1988).  In contrast, almost without
 
exception in published interviews, through a combination of
 
his own charisma and his use of simple and compelling logic,
 
the Dalai Lama manages to elicit a positive response from
 
even the most skeptical and contrary interviewer.68
 
Weaver maintains that "rhetoric at its truest," that is,
 
a charitable rhetoric, "seeks to perfect [people] by showing
 
them better versions of themselves, links in that chain
 
extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can
 
apprehend and only the soul can have affection for" (1985,
 
Nonviolent action.. [entails] inductive, deductive, and
 
quasi-logical reasoning in order to determine the most
 
reasonable truth in the given conflict situation... an
 
experiment with truth, [such reasoning) is not bound by the
 
demands of strict rationality and seeks to find the
 
strongest value that might be created, evolved, or
 
preserved in the conflict situation (1983, pp. 36-37)
 
Thus, when the Dalai Lama's dialectical reason breaks away at times when
 
he employs the sentimental style, the nonviolent tenet of illogic for
 
the sake of truth makes it possible for the Dalai Lama to retain an
 
ethical stance.
 
68 Weaver explains the use of dialectic in the context of an ethical
 
rhetoric as follows:
 
What a successful dialectic secures for any position...is
 
not actuality but possibility; and what rhetoric thereafter
 
accomplishes is to take any dialectically secured
 
position...and show its relationship to the world of
 
prudential conduct...what the... rhetorical plea asks of us
 
is belief, which is a preliminary to action...
 
... when we say that rhetoric instills belief and
 
action, we are saying that it intersects possibility with
 
the plane of actuality and hence of the imperative (1985,
 
pp.27-28).
 
So when the Dalai Lama relies upon publicity which strengthens his
 
dialectical approach, his rhetoric becomes more convincing because his
 
statements are shown to be arrived at from a "secured position." By the
 
same token, the actions he urges are shown to be useful "in the world of
 
prudential conduct."
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p.25).  Based upon my research, I would suggest that the
 
Dalai Lama's discourse is representative of such idealistic
 
and charitable rhetoric.  This is particularly evident in the
 
Dalai Lama's reliance upon the comic frame in his discourse.
 
The comic frame, as we have seen, operates in ways that
 
promote a charitable attitude toward one's transgressor(s).
 
But even the Dalai Lama's use of the tragic frame and
 
sentimental style must not totally be seen as an attempt at
 
using rhetoric to express a narrow and propagandistic vision.
 
The use of tragedy and sentimental language must be
 
considered in light of the basis upon which the discourse is
 
founded:  satyagraha.  In remembering the Dalai Lama's
 
nonviolent stance and the notions of satyagraha, the Dalai
 
Lama is able to avoid the pitfalls of making rhetoric that is
 
merely a one-sided propaganda bombardment.  Frank notes that
 
...the proper ethical grounding for a rhetoric of
 
nonviolence might be based upon the concept of
 
rhetorical relativism... [which] assumes that
 
values held by cultures and individuals are
 
established through social persuasion.  Since
 
values are established through persuasion, then
 
values should and can be changed through persuasion
 
(1983, p. 37).
 
The Dalai Lama's reliance upon the tenets of nonviolence
 
ensures that the tragic frame and sentimental style produce
 
in his audience a cathartic experience.  Therefore, the
 
persuasion that the Dalai Lama uses change the values by
 
which that persuasion is judged.
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By presenting constructive and pragmatic resolutions to
 
problems in Tibet, such as those outlined in the Dalai Lama's
 
Five Point Peace Plan and the Strasbourg Proposal, the Dalai
 
Lama's discourse is shown to be persuasive from a nonviolent
 
perspective.  Frank states that "nonviolent rhetors should
 
attempt to envision the possible in the conflict situation
 
and should attempt to construct novel actions and
 
messages...in order to overcome the conflict..." (1983, p.
 
52).  Frank's description of the ideal of nonviolent rhetoric
 
aligns to Weaver's conception of an ethical rhetoric, which
 
"intersects possibility with the plane of actuality" (Weaver,
 
1985, p.28).  The Dalai Lama's speeches offer examples of
 
this kind of intersection between "possibility" and
 
"actuality."
 
In sum, the Dalai Lama relies upon nonviolent
 
perspectives and dialectical discourse, which indicates that
 
he approaches persuasion from an ethical vantage point.  In
 
addition, his own ethos tempers his tactics of persuasion
 
with his desire to respect and educate his audience.  The
 
fact that he has "traveled assiduously to bring the Tibetan
 
case and the plight of his people to as wide an international
 
audience as possible" indicates that his goal is to help
 
people--persuasion is simply a means to that end
 
(Williams,1988, p. 146).69  This ethos-building history of the
 
69 Franz Michael states that
 
the Tibetan story is an outstanding example of what faith
 
and loyalty to one's culture can accomplish under great
 
leadership:  an almost miraculous recovery from a
 
grievous...disastrous blow... major credit belongs to the
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Dalai Lama's actions "reflect good will," which Wieman and
 
Walter find essential to a rhetor's ability to "understand"
 
and "appreciate" the audience (1957, p. 269).70
 
In the final chapter which follows, I discuss the
 
ramifications of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric which has been
 
examined in this thesis.  I also provide recommendations for
 
future research and study of the Dalai Lama's discourse.
 
Dalai Lama, whose clear understanding of the essence of
 
Tibet's religious foundations and the meaning of its
 
institutions, along with his great compassion, has enabled
 
him to provide the leadership that united the Tibetans in
 
exile, reconstituted their social and political
 
organizations, and strengthened their faith and political
 
will (1985, p. 738).
 
70 The Dalai Lama has been recognized internationally for his
 
humanitarian work; his awards include the Palketta Award of Norway
 
(1973), the Peace Medal of the Asian Buddhist Committee for Peace
 
(1979), the Leopold Lucas Prize in West Germany (1987), the Albert
 
Schweitzer Humanitarian Award (1987), the Raoul Wallenberg Congressional
 
Human Rights Award (1989), and the Nobel Peace Prize (1989) (McGuire,
 
1992, p. 70).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
 
AN ENDURING RHETORIC
 
Conclusions:  The Significance of the Dalai Lama's Discourse
 
The Dalai Lama's discourse may be studied from a
 
multitude of perspectives.  This thesis has offered a
 
qualitative study from one Westerner's point of view.  Select
 
passages of the Dalai Lama's discourse have been analyzed in
 
light of historiographical research into the background of
 
the Dalai Lama and his country, Tibet.  Specifically, the
 
focus of my study was a rhetorical analysis of two important
 
speeches by the Dalai Lama.  I analyzed through Burkean
 
critical perspectives "The Five Point Peace Plan" of 1987 and
 
the "Strasbourg Proposal" of 1988.  I also considered the
 
Dalai Lama's skills in cross-cultural communication, his
 
perspectives and abilities as the leader of a nonviolent
 
social movement, and the ethical grounding of his discourse.
 
In the critical analysis, I have endeavored to show that
 
the Dalai Lama's discourse has been influential on his
 
audience, which encompasses Tibetan and foreign followers,
 
political allies and opponents, world leaders and decision
 
makers.  As a rhetorical critic, I have attempted to
 
illuminate the Dalai Lama's tactics and strategies for
 
persuading his audience, including his use of mortification,
 
scapegoating, and transcendence, as well as the comic and
 
tragic frames as conceived by Kenneth Burke.  Communications
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scholar Loren D. Reid maintains that the job of a rhetorical
 
critic is to unearth worthy examples of excellence in
 
rhetoric and "to bestow praise when other [critics] have
 
passed them by" (1944, pp. 416-422).  In assessing the
 
research findings presented in this thesis, I believe it is
 
apparent that the Dalai Lama, as a writer and speaker skilled
 
in persuasion, is exactly one such rhetor who heretofore has
 
been "passed by" in the field of rhetorical criticism.
 
As a student of speech communication, I have presented
 
an assessment of the cross-cultural implications of the Dalai
 
Lama's discourse.  The Dalai Lama adapts his discourse to
 
meet the psychological needs of his diverse and far flung
 
audiences.  I have shown ways that he tailors his discourse
 
through themes and symbols to meet his audience's needs.  His
 
language use is shaped by his own culture, yet his experience
 
in dealing with international scenarios has--after some
 
mistakes- -made him adept at handling intercultural
 
communication exchange and negotiation.
 
As a student of history, I have focused upon the history
 
of one social movement's leader and how he has perpetuated a
 
public debate about historic events.  I have compared the
 
history of Tibet as it has been recounted by Western,
 
Chinese, and Tibetan historians, politicians, and media.
 
have taken the approach of the cautious historiographer who
 
must carefully hold up diverse accounts of the same event in
 
an attempt to arrive at the most accurate picture possible of
 
what actually transpired in the past.  I have then taken that
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surmised picture and contrasted it with the picture presented
 
by the Dalai Lama in his rhetorical campaign.  I have
 
indicated how the presentation of Sino-Tibetan history has,
 
over time, impacted the Dalai Lama's discourse.  Also, I have
 
drawn some parallels between the work and discourse of the
 
Dalai Lama as a social movement leader and that of Mahatma
 
Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King.  Lastly, I have
 
illustrated the constraints placed upon the Dalai Lama which
 
impact his rhetoric, including his own ethos or personal
 
history, his world views, and the internal and external
 
political, religious, social, and cultural factors that
 
impinge upon and shape his discourse.
 
This thesis has also presented a discussion of the
 
strategies that the Dalai Lama uses as a social movement
 
leader, including maintaining a busy schedule of
 
international travel and managing a comprehensive body of
 
followers who organize and support the Tibet cause.  Not only
 
has the Dalai Lama organized in exile the construction and
 
expansion of numerous Buddhist monasteries and Tibetan
 
universities, but he has also fostered a thriving community
 
in which the Tibetan identity, language, customs, and culture
 
flourishes despite the at times strained relations with its
 
host nation, India (Michael, 1985, pp. 737-744).  The Dalai
 
Lama's supporters include leading Chinese intellectual
 
dissidents, leaders in the European Parliament, neighbors of
 
China who risk their political futures to welcome the Dalai
 
Lama to visit, and famous filmmakers and actors in Hollywood.
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The Dalai Lama's main themes, such as universal
 
responsibility, freedom, kindness, history, and a respect for
 
nature, appear not only in his own rhetoric, but also in "the
 
dialectic in the moral arena"--his themes are responded to in
 
his adversaries' rhetorical efforts as well.
 
What I hope to have brought out in this thesis is that
 
the Dalai Lama, as a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and as
 
the exiled leader of six million Tibetans, fulfills with
 
remarkable skill the many roles associated with his
 
leadership.  He is the spiritual leader of all Tibetans; he
 
is the charismatic social movement leader who travels
 
constantly around the world, lecturing and raising awareness
 
and support for his cause; he is a persuasive speaker and
 
writer; he is a teacher and educator whose topic and mission
 
is promoting world peace.
 
Areas for Future Research
 
Based upon this initial study of the Dalai Lama and his
 
work, I am convinced that not just the discipline of speech
 
communication stands to gain much from further study of the
 
Dalai Lama, his leadership, discourse, and actions, but many
 
other disciplines have much to gain as well, including
 
sociology, history, political science, and religion; although
 
these fields have begun to publish analyses regarding the
 
Dalai Lama, which I was able to use herein, a great deal of
 
research lies ahead, for the Dalai Lama's entire range of
 
work remains largely unexamined.  First, in the field of
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rhetorical criticism, "rhetorical scholars have tended to
 
study presidential rhetoric, but have neglected presidential
 
peace rhetoric" (Frank, 1983, p. 13).  A study of the Dalai
 
Lama's peace rhetoric may help illuminate future studies of
 
presidential peace rhetoric and the rhetoric of nonviolence
 
in general.  Also, an obvious area for future research on the
 
Dalai Lama that I would recommend for students of rhetorical
 
criticism is a comprehensive study of the Dalai Lama's
 
annually delivered March 10 addresses, which commemorate the
 
Tibetan national uprising that led to his flight into exile
 
in India.  Every year since 1959, on March 10, the Dalai Lama
 
has delivered a speech about the situation in Tibet in terms
 
of Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet, and in terms of
 
Tibet's relationship to the international community.  A study
 
of these speeches according to analog criticism has yet to be
 
undertaken; I believe such a study would be a didactic
 
exercise and would greatly augment existing studies in
 
rhetorical criticism.
 
Similarly, I believe that the growing discipline of
 
intercultural communication stands to gain much from studying
 
the Dalai Lama's style of international diplomacy and
 
communication.  While ethnographic studies abound in cross-

cultural and intercultural communication, I believe the field
 
stands to gain much from studying individuals who are
 
paragons of successful intercultural communication.  Even
 
though the Dalai Lama has failed--as yet--to negotiate
 
successfully with the Chinese leadership to resolve the
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conflict over Tibet, I believe the current stalemate is in
 
good measure due to purely external geopolitical and economic
 
pressures rather than to the Dalai Lama's own abilities in
 
intercultural communication.  The Dalai Lama has, in fact,
 
shown himself to be a diplomat and international communicator
 
par excellence, and therefore his discourse and strategies
 
merit study by students of intercultural communication.
 
In the field of peace and conflict studies, again, I
 
would recommend the conduct of an in-depth analysis of the
 
Dalai Lama's strategies toward resolving conflicts, as well a
 
study of his successful humanitarian endeavors which have
 
helped the Tibetan culture flourish in exile.  The Dalai
 
Lama's successful organization in helping Tibetans adapt and
 
succeed in exile could serve as a model for other struggling
 
cultural minorities around the world.  By the same token, the
 
scholastic scales are unbalanced between studies of peace and
 
conflict, tipping heavily on the conflict side.  David Frank
 
asserts that
 
It is unfortunate that different standards have
 
been used to evaluate the efficacy of violent and
 
nonviolent actions.  First, critics point to
 
specific cases of nonviolent action that have
 
failed and then proceed to damn the entire concept
 
as being naive and impotent.  Yet, when physical
 
violence fails in specific cases, the failures are
 
blamed upon inadequate strategic and tactical
 
planning and not upon the technique itself.
 
Second, historians [and other critics] tend to
 
glorify and romanticize military victories;
 
nonviolent victories tend to be ignored and
 
minimized by these same scholars... many
 
individuals appear to equate nonviolent action with
 
pacifism, two different and distinct philosophies
 
and techniques.  By applying inconsistent
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standards, nonviolent action is rejected as
 
impractical, naive and ineffective (1983,  p. 13).
 
Based upon a purview of my own Western education as well as
 
the research I have conducted up to this point, I feel
 
compelled to agree with Frank's assessment that academia in
 
general manifests a tendency to, if not "glorify" military
 
actions, then at minimum to expend far too much energy upon
 
them.  The end result of this apparent over-emphasis on
 
bellicose subjects is quite possibly that we are being
 
educated into perpetuating a combative mentality.  I think
 
that not only in peace and conflict studies, but in a wide
 
range of other disciplines, it is incumbent upon students to
 
reverse this detrimental yet thriving trend.  As a start
 
toward that end, I believe that all of the above disciplines
 
would greatly benefit from studying the work of this
 
extraordinary leader and proponent of nonviolence:  the Dalai
 
Lama.
 
In conclusion, I have argued that the Dalai Lama, as a
 
nonviolent leader and communicator, is as significant and
 
worthy of study in his own right as both King and Gandhi are.
 
I suggest that the Dalai Lama's untiring work as a social
 
movement leader, prolific writer, educator, and rhetor merits
 
study, too.  I hope I have illustrated in this thesis that
 
the Dalai Lama represents an exciting and immensely valuable
 
subject of study from whom students of many disciplines may
 
gain new insights in their respective areas of interest.  It
 
is my wish that the foregoing analysis serve to broach,
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particularly in the fields of rhetorical criticism and social
 
movement theory, an enduring interest in the nonviolent
 
discourse and life's work of the Dalai Lama.
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